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Beyond Implicit Bias: Litigating Race and Gender
Employment Discrimination Using Data from the
Workplace Experiences Survey†
JOAN C. WILLIAMS†, RACHEL M. KORN† & SKY MIHAYLO†
This Article joins other voices1 in challenging what I will call the “implicit bias consensus” in
employment discrimination law, first crystallized in the work of Susan Sturm2 and Linda Hamilton
Krieger.3 The implicit bias consensus has two basic components. The first is that most employment
discrimination today is what Sturm christened “second generation employment discrimination”
caused by implicit bias that is uncontrollable and unconscious, subtle and ambiguous.4 The
second component of the consensus is that Title VII is ill-suited to address second generation
discrimination.5

† This Article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Katherine W. V. Phillips of Columbia Business
School (1973–2020), whose wise and humane spirit and influential contributions to social psychology will be
sorely missed. Many thanks for those busy people who were generous with their time in reading prior drafts of
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expert research assistance to Heather Lanyi, Rachel Maas, Natasha Martin, Katie Utehs Panzer, Hilary Burke
Chan, and Mikayla Boginsky. Our appreciation also goes to Brianna Watson for compiling graphs.
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Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
† Director of Research, Center for WorkLife Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
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1. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias’s Failure, 39 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 37 (2018); Ann C.
McGinley, ¡Viva La Evolución!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
415 (2000); Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New Narrative, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 193
(2018) [hereinafter Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias]; Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination:
The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279 (1997) [hereinafter Selmi, Proving Intentional
Discrimination]; Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?:
Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053 (2009) (worrying that the rhetoric of unconscious bias
will subvert concrete goals in favor or an amorphous goal of eradicating unconscious bias).
2. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 458, 459 (2001).
3. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995).
4. Sturm, supra note 2, at 468.
5. Stephanie Bornstein, Unifying Antidiscrimination Law Through Stereotype Theory, 20 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 919, 965 (2016); Sonia Goltz, Roger Reinsch & Joel Tuoriniemi, University Women’s Experiences in
Bringing Second Generation Sex Discrimination Claims: Further Support for Adoption of a Structural
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This Article challenges the implicit bias consensus based on six different datasets from the
Workplace Experiences Survey (WES), a simple ten-minute climate survey that provides a finegrained description of how racial and gender bias play out in everyday workplace interactions.
WES data and Williams’s other research offer plaintiffs’ lawyers a simple way to talk about racial
and gender bias as falling into five basic patterns. WES data also helps them respond to the
common defense argument that studies performed in social psychology labs do not describe what
happens at work: the conjunction of lab studies and WES data is more powerful than either type
of evidence alone, because lab studies provide objective evidence that the five basic patterns exist
in the world, while WES data provide attitudinal evidence that these five patterns exist in today’s
workplaces. The Article explores the implications of the WES and the five-patterns model for Title
VII, contesting some basic tenets of the implicit bias consensus, notably its description of bias as
unconscious and uncontrollable, and the contention that Title VII is ill-suited to address
contemporary forms of discrimination. The Article ends by providing a step-by-step guide to how
to use bias evidence in litigation, highlighting evidence that will be useful to help plaintiffs’
lawyers establish that a reasonable jury could find bias, particularly in light of the relaxed
causation standard articulated in Bostock v. Clayton County.6

Approach, 18 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 145, 153 (2009); Stephen M. Rich, One Law of Race?, 100 IOWA L. REV.
201, 231 (2014).
6. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
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INTRODUCTION
The basic patterns of gender bias are easily described. Prove-It-Again bias
means that women have to prove themselves more than men do. Tightrope bias
reflects that office politics are more complicated for professional women than
professional men because women risk being seen as “difficult” if they behave in
assertive and confident ways and “not go-getters” if they do not. The Tug of War
further complicates office politics when bias against women fuels conflicts
among women. Maternal Wall bias reflects the strong negative competence and
commitment assumptions triggered by motherhood. Enumerating these patterns
explains in very concrete ways how professional workplaces provide an
invisible escalator for (white) men both because they have to prove themselves
less than other groups, and face office politics that are much simpler.
Three of these four patterns tease out patterns of inequality that stem from
social status—gender is just a specific case. Consequently, these four patterns
capture racial as well as gender bias. Because Prove-It-Again bias reflects
assumptions that groups lower in status are less competent, it is triggered
robustly by race as well as gender.7 Tightrope bias reflects prescriptive
stereotypes about how people should behave; because groups seen as lower in
status are expected to behave in deferential rather than dominant ways,
Tightrope bias reflects both racial and gender bias. Tug of War reflects divisions
that arise because of the different ways that people of color enact their identities
and the different strategies for assimilating with the dominant group (or refusing
to do so), as documented in the influential work of Devon Carbado and Mitu
Gulati.8 In addition to these three patterns, racial bias also reflects racial
stereotyping that differs by group, but nearly always advantages whites over
people of color.
Note the implication: women of color face five patterns of bias. WES data
also show that women of color are the most likely group to report some bias
patterns, which makes the low success rate of cases involving “intersectional
plaintiffs” all the more disturbing—although, as we shall see, the new Supreme
Court case of Bostock v. Clayton County may help.9

7. CECILIA L. RIDGEWAY, STATUS: WHY IS IT EVERYWHERE? WHY DOES IT MATTER? 110 (2019).
8. DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?: RETHINKING RACE IN “POST-RACIAL”
AMERICA (2013); see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 701 (2001).
9. Elizabeth M. Almquist, Untangling the Effects of Race and Sex: The Disadvantaged Status of Black
Women, 56 SOC. SCI. Q. 129, 129–30 (1975); Rachel Kahn Best, Linda Hamilton Krieger, Lauren B. Edelman
& Scott R. Eliason, Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation,
45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 991, 1009 (2011); Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 143 (1989); Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Black and Female: The Double Whammy, 7 PSYCHOL.
TODAY 57 (1973); Pamela Trotman Reid, Feminism Versus Minority Group Identity: Not for Black Women Only,
10 SEX ROLES 247, 253 (1984); Deborah K. King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of
a Black Feminist Ideology, 14 SIGNS 42, 42–43 (1988); Ange-Marie Hancock, When Multiplication Doesn’t
Equal Quick Addition: Examining Intersectionality as a Research Paradigm, 5 PERSPS. ON POL. 63, 70 (2007);
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
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With help from Professor Richard M. Lee of the University of Minnesota,
Professor Erika V. Hall of Emory University, Professor Katherine W. Phillips
of Columbia Business School, and Rachel M. Korn and others at the Center for
WorkLife Law, Williams and her team used the five-patterns model to develop
the Workplace Experiences Survey (WES), a simple ten-minute bias climate
survey that asks people whether they have experienced bias and where. WES
also measures the impact of bias on outcome measures like employee belonging
and intent to stay. We now have U.S. data sets for 550 women science
professors; all the other samples contain both men and women: 3093 engineers
2827 lawyers, 1346 architects, and 227 people in tech;10 two cross-industry
samples are on the way. In addition to these quantitative data, we also have
extensive qualitative data from survey comments, focus groups, and interviews
performed in conjunction with WES surveys.11
Science gains validity through aggregation of data. These samples provide
evidence that many professionals today report having experienced precisely the
kinds of bias social psychologists have documented in the lab over and over
again for decades. This should reassure courts12 and defense experts13 who have
worried that what happens in social psychology labs does not reflect what
happens in today’s workplaces.
The power of the five-patterns model is its ability to describe bias on the
ground in a concrete enough way that most people recognize that it actually
happens. “You just described my life,” commented one white woman during an
interview.14 “Happens all the time,” noted an African-American man working at
a trade association during a workshop (speaking of Prove-It-Again bias).15 In
scores of corporate trainings throughout the country, Williams has found that
even not particularly receptive audiences accept the model’s fine-grained
description of how bias plays out in everyday workplace interactions. For
example, in a workshop for department chairs at a major STEM-heavy campus
who had eaten alive a sensitivity-based diversity trainer the year before, 100%
of participants said they had learned at least one way of interrupting bias, and
83% said they would use the strategies they learned for interrupting going
forward (among those who filled out an evaluation survey).16 Virtually no
pushback emerged in this and similar workshops; once people hear the fivepatterns description of how bias plays out on the ground, virtually everybody

10. Because this study focused on women of color, the numbers were smaller because there are so few
underrepresented minorities in technology.
11. All of these data will be referred to collectively as “WES data.”
12. Jones v. Nat’l Council of Young Men’s Christian Ass’ns of the U.S., 34 F. Supp. 3d 896, 900 (N.D.
Ill. 2014) (explaining that implicit bias expert testimony by Anthony Greenwald was “derived solely from
laboratory testing that does not remotely approximate the conditions that apply in this case”).
13. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading,
67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023, 1069 (2006).
14. Interview with Jane Doe, in S.F., Cal. (2014).
15. Interview with John Doe, in S.F., Cal. (2019).
16. Evaluation Survey, confidential workshop conducted by Joan C. Williams (Apr. 2016) (on file with
authors).
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agrees that they have seen it. This has important implications at many stages of
the litigation process, from initial client intake to settlement negotiations.
Perhaps most important, the widespread recognition of the existence of the five
patterns in mainstream media, public discourse, the business community, and
popular culture has important implications at summary judgment, and for
plaintiffs’ ability to introduce bias evidence without the use of expensive
experts, as discussed in Part IV, but instead as stereotyping evidence. In an
important sense, this Article extends the work of Stephanie Bornstein, who has
argued that plaintiffs’ lawyers should pay more attention to the Price
Waterhouse stereotyping approach.17
Plaintiff-friendly law professors have been in despair not only about the
increasingly rocky reception of implicit bias in courts, but also about the
Supreme Court’s hostility to so-called social framework testimony18 that
highlights that subjective decision-making is a petri dish for bias. And indeed, it
is, but social framework theory was sharply criticized by the Supreme Court in
Dukes v. Wal-Mart,19 which also held that merely pointing to the existence of
subjective decision-making (for example, tap-on-the-shoulder promotion
systems) often will not satisfy the “commonality” required to sustain a class
action under Rule 23.20 Some commentators announced the end of class
actions,21 but post-Wal-Mart plaintiffs have had some success, including with
evidence of implicit bias.22 One simple problem, in retrospect, is that the Wal-

17. Bornstein, supra note 5, at 932.
18. See, e.g., Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence in
Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 42–44 (2009); Nancy Levit, Megacases,
Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 B.C. L. REV. 367, 377–79 (2008); Elizabeth Tippett,
Robbing a Barren Vault: The Implication of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for Cases Challenging Subjective Employment
Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 433, 446–48 (2012); Lesley Wexler, Wal-Mart Matters, 46 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 95, 105–11 (2011); Roger W. Reinsch & Sonia Goltz, You Can’t Get There from Here:
Implications of the Wal-Mart v. Dukes Decision for Addressing Second-Generation Discrimination, 9 NW. J.L.
& SOC. POL’Y 264, 274 (2014) (“The Supreme Court’s rejection of the social framework testimony was a big
blow to the viability of class action discrimination suits.”); Noah D. Zatz, Introduction: Working Group on the
Future of Systemic Disparate Treatment Law, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 387, 389–92, 394 (2011). But see
Michael C. Harper, Class-Based Adjudication of Title VII Claims in the Age of the Roberts Court, 95 B.U. L.
REV. 1099, 1101 (2015) (arguing that Walmart has been “exaggerated”).
19. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 354–55 (2011) (declaring that the expert testimony on
social framework did “nothing to advance [plaintiff’s] case” and the Court could “safely disregard it”); Tanya
Katerí Hernández, One Path for “Post-Racial” Employment Discrimination Cases—The Implicit Association
Test Research As Social Framework Evidence, 32 LAW & INEQ. 309, 319 (2014) (noting a “possible post-Dukes
chill on using applied social framework evidence”). As Stephanie Bornstein has aptly noted, the Court “rejected
the purpose for which the evidence was used, not the validity of the evidence itself.” Stephanie Bornstein,
Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1077 (2017).
20. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 359 (“Because respondents provide no convincing proof of a companywide
discriminatory pay and promotion policy, we have concluded that they have not established the existence of any
common question.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
21. Melissa Hart, Learning from Wal-Mart, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 355, 379–84 (2006).
22. Compare Annika L. Jones, Comment, Implicit Bias as Social-Framework Evidence in Employment
Discrimination, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1221, 1230–42 (2017) (exploring rough sledding for social framework
evidence post-Walmart), with Anthony Kakoyannis, Assessing the Viability of Implicit Bias Evidence in
Discrimination Cases: An Analysis of the Most Significant Federal Cases, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1181, 1189–1204
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Mart class was just too big (1.5 million plaintiffs)—much bigger than in any
previous class action.23
The Wal-Mart majority felt that the plaintiffs lacked the “glue” needed to
link the plaintiffs’ cases togtether;24 subsequent plaintiffs have supplied that
glue. An instructive example is McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch,25 where plaintiffs
did not merely argue that Merrill Lynch’s assignment system was subjective, but
explained that its “teaming” policy operated to create “little fraternities” of white
brokers who chose to work with brokers like themselves, which meant that Black
brokers found it hard to access the “teaming” that led to lucrative accounts.26
Note how McReynolds provided the “connective tissue” Wal-Mart lacked:
it described precisely how in-group favoritism operated to deprive Black brokers
of equal opportunities.27 “Plaintiffs need to craft a story, a narrative, that
explains how stereotyping has, in fact, affected the defendants’
workplace. . . . in ways a jury, or a judge, is likely to accept,” notes Michael
Selmi.28 Other commentators have made similar points. “What is needed is a
new form of metaphorical glue,” concludes Tanya Katerí Hernández.29 The fivepatterns model may provide not just a narrative that the employer has maintained
a system vulnerable to discrimination—the Wal-Mart approach—but a finegrained description of precisely how bias influenced access to employment
opportunities.
Part I describes the implicit bias consensus’s description of bias and argues
that this description is ill-suited for employment law. Part II describes WES data.
Part III responds to the claim that Title VII is ill-suited to address twenty-first
century employment discrimination, arguing that once the focus shifts from
“unconscious bias” to the five-patterns model, established patterns of proof
readily accommodate evidence of racial and gender bias—particularly if courts
are honest about the implications of the five-patterns model for the “same-actor”
inference (that the same person who hired the plaintiff would not later fire the
plaintiff) and the “personal animosity” defense (that the plaintiff’s experience
reflected not discrimination but personal animosity). Part IV documents that the
basic patterns of bias have been widely disseminated in popular culture and the
mainstream media, which has implications for the introduction of bias evidence
without expert testimony and—most important—for summary judgment, where

(2017) (analyzing five cases and concluding some courts are allowing in social framework evidence, while others
are not).
23. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 343.
24. Id. at 339.
25. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2012).
26. Id. at 489.
27. Zatz, supra note 18, at 388.
28. Michael Selmi, Theorizing Systemic Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 477, 506 (2011).
29. Hernández, supra note 19, at 315 (referencing Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 352 (“Without some glue holding
the alleged reasons for all those decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class
members’ claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I disfavored.”)).
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the judges’ role is to assess what a reasonable jury would find.30 The Article
ends with a discussion of how to use the five-patterns model in litigation, from
the initial client interview to closing arguments.

I. THE IMPLICIT BIAS CONSENSUS GIVES A DESCRIPTION OF BIAS ILLSUITED TO THE WORKPLACE CONTEXT
Nearly twenty years ago, Susan Sturm published a highly influential article
arguing that discrimination had become “more complex and elusive”31 rather
than of the overt old-fashioned “this is no job for a woman” or “Irish need not
apply.”32 She asserted that “[c]ognitive bias, structures of decisionmaking, and
patterns of interaction have replaced deliberate racism and sexism as the frontier
of much continued inequality.”33 Modern discrimination, she argued, typically
reflects “cognitive or unconscious bias, rather than deliberate, intentional
exclusion.”34
Sturm’s reference to cognitive or unconscious bias refers to Linda
Hamilton Krieger’s pathbreaking 1995 article, The Content of Our Categories.35
Krieger’s influential article led to an alliance with Project Implicit, a special
issue of the California Law Review exploring “the law of implicit bias,”36 and to
sweeping statements that unconscious bias is “today’s most prevalent type of
discrimination.”37 “Over the last decade, implicit bias has emerged as the
primary explanation for continued inequalities, and, within this emerging
literature, it often seems as if all contemporary discrimination results from
implicit biases,” notes Michael Selmi.38
Project Implicit championed the use of the terms “implicit bias” and
“unconscious bias” to refer to the bias measured by the Implicit Association Test
(IAT).39 The IAT measures the speed with which the test-taker associates
stereotype-congruent and stereotype-incongruent words or images.40 For
example, our brains will tend to associate an oven mitt more quickly with a
30. FED. R. C IV. P. 56 (stating that the court may grant summary judgment on concluding there is no
genuine issue of material fact; no summary judgment where no reasonable jury could find for the moving party);
see also E-mail from Rick Marcus, Distinguished Professor of L., Univ. of California, Hastings Coll. of the L.,
to Joan C. Williams, Distinguished Professor of L., Univ. of California, Hastings Coll. of the L. (Aug. 10, 2020,
9:29 AM) (on file with authors).
31. Sturm, supra note 2, at 459.
32. Id. at 460.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Krieger, supra note 3, at 1164.
36. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 979 (2006).
37. See Krieger, supra note 3, at 1164 (arguing that unconscious bias is “today’s most prevalent type of
discrimination”); see also Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1130 (1999) (explaining
that unconscious bias is the “most pervasive and important form of bias operating in society today”).
38. Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias, supra note 1, at 194.
39. Lectures and Workshops, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://www.projectimplicit.net./lectures.html (last
visited Nov. 23, 2020).
40. Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan L. K. Schwartz, Measuring Individual
Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1464, 1464–
65 (1998).
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picture of a woman than a baseball mitt, providing a quantitative measure of
bias.
The introduction and publicizing of the IAT41 brought the discussion of
bias to a new level. The IAT provided a language and widespread understanding
that even people of goodwill who have no wish or conscious endorsement of
discrimination nonetheless can perpetuate stereotypes, bias, and ultimately
discrimination. This important contribution should never be underestimated.
Moreover, nothing in this Article contests the scientific validity of the IAT; our
focus is solely on the usefulness of IAT evidence in litigating employment
discrimination under Title VII. From the viewpoint of employment law, the IAT,
and the language its advocates have used to promote it, have two basic
drawbacks.
A. IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT, THE IAT FOCUSES ATTENTION ON THE
WRONG PART OF THE COGNITIVE PROCESS
The IAT—which focuses on the milliseconds that measure how stereotypes
affect automatic associations—is not particularly useful for employment law.
The employment context is not like the police violence context, where people
make split-second decisions of paramount importance that result in the killing
of a Black gentleman reaching for his wallet or a twelve-year-old child waving
a toy gun.42 Milliseconds matter in policing, but in the workplace decisionmaking proceeds at a statelier pace. Workers regularly override their initial
instincts and self-edit all the time in order to conform to workplace norms. Few
of us blurt out that we think our boss is an idiot or our colleague is sexy; we
provide a cognitive override. Thus, the implicit bias consensus focuses attention
on the wrong part of the cognitive process: in the workplace, stereotype
activation is automatic, but stereotype application can be controlled.
Another major drawback of the excessive focus on the IAT is the urgent
focus on whether automatic associations can be changed.43 Changing implicit
associations is very difficult, because stereotypes are learned early and
reinforced often, and any intervention to try to change stereotypes is likely to be
swamped by a past life governed by them, and by a day-to-day experience that
reinforces them. Luckily, avoiding employment discrimination does not require

41. Id.
42. See Associated Press, Ex State Trooper Who Shot Unarmed Black Man Reaching for Wallet Gets 3
Years in Prison, ABC 4 NEWS (Aug. 15, 2017), https://abcnews4.com/news/crime-news/ex-state-trooper-whoshot-unarmed-black-man-reaching-for-wallet-gets-3-years-in-prison; Meghan Keneally & James Hill,
Cleveland Cops “Recklessly” Shot Boy, 12, Over Toy Gun, Suit Claims, ABC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2014, 2:55 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/cleveland-cops-recklessly-shot-at-boy-12-toy-gun/story?id=27402837.
43. Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. REV. 242, 242–243 (2002); Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias, supra note 1, at 228. For examples of
how this focus on automatic associations appears in the legal literature, see Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda
Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 963–65 (2006); Nilanjana
Dasgupta, Mechanisms Underlying the Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes: The Role of
Automaticity and Cognitive Control, in HANDBOOK OF PREJUDICE, STEREOTYPING, AND DISCRIMINATION 267
(Todd D. Nelson ed., 2009).
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changing automatic associations. All that’s required is a double take—running
your gut response through your head. A large literature shows that people can
self-correct and decrease the level of bias if they are held accountable for
providing this cognitive override.44 When people are held accountable by, for
example, making it clear that they will have to justify their decisionmaking
process, they engage in more cognitive processing and can override biases.45
That’s where the focus should be for employment discrimination. You can think
whatever you want; what Title VII prohibits is differential treatment based on
race or sex.46 Put differently, antidiscrimination law is concerned not with the
“content of our categories”47 but with whether we allow bias to affect the
workplace experience of our coworkers.
In response to these and other concerns, some prominent commentators
have argued that plaintiffs’ employment lawyers should turn their attention from
the IAT to field studies.48 This throws out most of social psychology because
most studies of bias are performed in labs and not in the field. Even more
important, due to the small number of people of color in many job categories,
field studies often will yield high enough numbers to reach statistical
significance only in the context of hiring, which rules out field studies of
promotion and climate issues that will often be more, or equally, important.
WES data makes sole reliance on field studies unnecessary because it provides
robust evidence that people report encountering precisely the same kinds of bias
at work that have been found over and over again in lab studies.
B. THE PICTURE OF BIAS AS UNCONSCIOUS AND UNCONTROLLABLE IS
MISLEADING
Because of the excessive focus on whether stereotypes are triggered as
opposed to whether their influence is controlled, some IAT enthusiasts have
taken Project Implicit’s focus on automatic associations to extremely
unfortunate characterizations of bias as uncontrollable and unknowable.
“[A]ttitudes and stereotypes may also be implicit, in the sense that they are not
consciously accessible through introspection,” notes Jerry Kang, one of the most
influential legal scholars championing implicit bias.49 Two other authors note
that implicit biases, “once activated, influence many of our behaviors and
judgments in ways we cannot consciously access and often cannot control.”50

44. See, e.g., Philip E. Tetlock, Accountability and Complexity of Thought, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 74, 74–75 (1983).
45. Id. at 75, 82.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018).
47. Krieger, supra note 3, at 1199–1202.
48. Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias, supra note 1, at 227, 233–39.
49. Jerry Kang, Mark Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana Dasgupta, David Faigman, Rachel
Godsil, Anthony G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson & Jennifer Mnookin, Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA
L. REV. 1124, 1129–30 (2012).
50. L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE
L.J. 2626, 2630–31 (2013).
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Yet another author asserts, “[i]mplicit biases are automatic associations held by
individuals often beyond their conscious awareness or control.”51
Another basic tenet of the implicit bias consensus is that most bias, or most
bias that matters, is unconscious.52 What most don’t recognize is that insistent
focus of Project Implicit,53 the influential research group formed by
psychologists championing the IAT, on whether bias is conscious or
unconscious is unusual. Most social psychologists make little use of this
distinction. Project Implicit does because it is an outgrowth of cognitive
psychology, which is focused on brain studies and cognitive errors.54 This focus
deflects attention away from the social construction of knowledge, which is the
traditional focus of social psychology.
To clarify, this Article discusses work in three different areas of
psychology: cognitive, social, and industrial/organizational. Cognitive
psychology centers on cognitive processes like thinking and memory;55 social
psychology centers on the social dimension of human interactions;56 and
industrial/organizational psychology centers workplace behavior and how to
design human resource processes.57 Behavioral economics is a much more
recent entry into the study of bias; often its studies reproduce findings reported
for decades in social psychology. We seek to shift the focus from cognitive
processing to social and industrial/organizational psychology and behavioral
economics because we believe, for the purposes of antidiscrimination law, it is
less important to understand the cognitive processing of bias than to understand
how bias plays out in everyday workplace interactions.
Several strains of research provide important insights into what we should
make of claims that most bias is unconscious. One strain shows that powerful
people, and those high in dominance, are more likely than others to engage in
stereotyping. Susan Fiske first documented that high-power individuals are more
likely to stereotype others in 1993.58 Later work clarifies that increased
stereotyping by those in power reflects two separate mechanisms.59 Stereotyping
by default, which reflects decreased attention to stereotype-inconsistent
information, reflects powerful people’s sense that they are too busy to pay

51. Adam Benforado, Frames of Injustice: The Bias We Overlook, 85 IND. L.J. 1333, 1363 (2010).
52. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 43, at 947.
53. About Us, PROJECT IMPLICIT, projectimplicit.net./about.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
54. ROBERT J. STERNBERG & KARIN STERNBERG, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY, at xxiv (7th ed. 2017).
55. Id.
56. DAVID G. MYERS & JEAN M. TWENGE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, at xv (13th ed. 2019).
57. MICHAEL G. AAMODT, INDUSTRIAL/ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN APPLIED APPROACH 2 (8th
ed. 2016).
58. Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Other People: The Impact of Power on Stereotyping, 48 AM. PSYCH. 621,
623–24 (1993); Eric Dépret & Susan T. Fiske, Social Cognition and Power: Some Cognitive Consequences of
Social Structure as a Source of Control Deprivation, in CONTROL MOTIVATION AND SOCIAL COGNITION 176,
194–96 (1993).
59. See, e.g., Stephanie A. Goodwin, Alexandra Gubin, Susan T. Fiske & Vincent Y. Yzerbyt, Power Can
Bias Impression Processes: Stereotyping Subordinates by Default and by Design, 3 GRP. PROCESSES &
INTERGROUP RELS. 227 (2000).
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attention to those below.60 Stereotyping by design, which reflects increased
attention of stereotype-consistent information, reflects powerful people’s
motivation to underestimate their underlings to justify their powerful position.61
Other studies confirm that power increases both stereotyping62 and implicit
prejudice.63 People who are high in dominance traits exhibit the same tendency
to stereotype as do people in high-power positions.64 One review article
concludes: “In summary, high- and low-power individuals construe their social
worlds quite differently. Studies using varied measures of power and social
judgment consistently show that elevated power is associated with more
automatic, less complex styles of reasoning,”65 including stereotyping. In other
words, stereotyping is part and parcel of being powerful; it is not useful to excuse
the powerful who choose not to bring this into their consciousness on the
grounds that the resulting bias is “unconscious.”
Another strain of research dating back to 1978 concerns “perspective
taking.”66 Research finds that “high power reduces perspective taking and
related forms of social attention.”67 Privileged groups’ cluelessness, research
shows, is an artifact of social privilege.68 Particularly important in this context
are studies of role taking: the “communicative, affective, and cognitive work on
the part of the interactants as they give and elicit cues, attune to and express
feelings, and imagine one another’s thought processes,” to quote an influential
study by Tony P. Love and Jenny L. Davis.69 A well-known example of role
taking is that women are significantly more accurate in interpreting nonverbal
cues.70 This turns out to be a specific instance of a more general pattern: lower

60. Dacher Keltner, Deborah H. Gruenfeld & Cameron Anderson, Power, Approach, and Inhibition, 110
PSYCH. REV. 265, 273 (2003).
61. Id.
62. Joris Lammers, Janka I. Stoker & Diederik A. Stapel, Differentiating Social and Personal Power:
Opposite Effects on Stereotyping, but Parallel Effects on Behavioral Approach Tendencies, 20 PSYCH. SCI. 1543,
1544 (2009).
63. Ana Guinote, Guillermo B. Willis & Cristiana Martellotta, Social Power Increases Implicit Prejudice,
46 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 299, 300 (2010).
64. Goodwin et al., supra note 59, at 237.
65. Keltner et al., supra note 60, at 274–75.
66. Dean Tjosvold & Sabato D. Sagaria, Effects of Relative Power on Cognitive Perspective-Taking, 4
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 256, 256 (1978).
67. Steven L. Blader, Aiwa Shirako & Ya-Ru Chen, Looking Out from the Top: Differential Effects of
Status and Power on Perspective Taking, 42 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 723, 723 (2016); see also
Adam D. Galinsky, Joe C. Magee, M. Ena Inesi & Deborah H. Gruenfeld, Power and Perspectives Not Taken,
17 PSYCH. SCI. 1068, 1068 (2006); Joris Lammers, Adam D. Galinsky, Ernestine H. Gordijn & Sabine Otten,
Illegitimacy Moderates the Effects of Power on Approach, 19 PSYCH. SCI. 558, 563 (2008); Tjosvold & Sagaria,
supra note 66, at 256.
68. See, e.g., L. Taylor Phillips & Brian S. Lowery, The Hard-Knock Life? Whites Claim Hardships in
Response to Racial Inequity, 61 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 12, 14 (2015); Ashleigh Shelby Rosette & Leigh
Plunkett Tost, Perceiving Social Inequity: When Subordinate-Group Positioning on One Dimension of Social
Hierarchy Enhances Privilege Recognition on Another, 24 PSYCH. SCI. 1420, 1420–22 (2013).
69. Tony P. Love & Jenny L. Davis, The Effect of Status on Role-Taking Accuracy, 79 AM. SOCIO. REV.
848, 849 (2014).
70. Robert Rosenthal & Bella M. DePaulo, Sex Differences in Eavesdropping on Nonverbal Cues, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 273, 273 (1979).
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status groups are more attuned to higher status groups than vice versa.71
“[O]ccupying a position of high rather than low power” makes people pay less
attention to others’ views72 for the simple reason that those lower on the totem
pole need to know more about those above, because those above have power
over those below.73
A third strain of research documents that the powerful, when threatened,
are more likely to embrace negative stereotypes to legitimate their own
position.74 People in positions of power are responsible for making justifiable
decisions: a good way to justify one’s own position of power is to embrace
negative stereotypes about others. This is not just a cognitive error. It is driven
by social motivations to deny the existence of privilege. This is illustrated in a
study by L. Taylor Phillips and Brian S. Lowery, which is part of the literature
that documents that white people are motivated to believe they have benefited
only from meritocratic systems and personal virtues.75 In a fascinating
experiment, Phillips and Lowery found that white people, when faced with
evidence of white privilege, claimed that they themselves suffered from personal
hardships.76 The authors attribute that reaction to identity threat—claims of
white privilege threaten the identity of college students whose identities are built
around the idea that they have worked hard for everything they have achieved,
and that their social position reflects only merit.77 “[W]e found that Whites
exposed to evidence of White privilege claim more personal life hardships, but
do not deny the existence of White privilege at the group level. We theorized
that increased hardship claims may serve to help individuals deny the extension
of privilege to themselves.”78 As further evidence of this, when the study authors
did an additional experiment in which they sent reaffirming messages to the
subjects, the subjects were less likely to claim personal hardship.79 The authors
concluded, “hardship claims help people deny they personally benefit from
privilege—that White privilege extends to themselves.”80 Other experiments
have made similar findings about men and gender bias, leading Phillips and
71. RIDGEWAY, supra note 7, at 60.
72. Blader et al., supra note 67, at 724; Susan T. Fiske, Interpersonal Stratification: Status, Power, and
Subordination, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 941, 959–60 (Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert, &
Gardner Lindzey eds., 5th ed. 2010).
73. RIDGEWAY, supra note 7, at 60.
74. Goodwin et al., supra note 59, at 230; John T. Jost & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Role of Stereotyping in
System-Justification and the Production of False Consciousness, 33 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCH. 1, 3–5 (1994); John C.
Georgesen & Monica J. Harris, The Balance of Power: Interpersonal Consequences of Differential Power and
Expectancies, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1239, 1253 (2000); Ana Guinote & Adele Phillips, Power
Can Increase Stereotyping: Evidence from Managers and Subordinates in the Hotel Industry, 41 SOC. PSYCH.
3, 4 (2010); Rosa Rodríguez-Bailón, Miguel Moya & Vincent Yzerbyt, Why Do Superiors Attend to Negative
Stereotypic Information About Their Subordinates? Effects of Power Legitimacy on Social Perception, 30 EUR.
J. SOC. PSYCH. 651, 651–53, 665–66 (2000).
75. Phillips & Lowery, supra note 68, at 12–13.
76. Id. at 14.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 16.
80. Id.
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Lowery to conclude that “[b]eing exposed to evidence of privilege is an aversive
experience that elicits self-protective reactions.”81
In other words, denying social privilege is one of the accoutrements of
privilege. All this raises serious questions about Project Implicit’s focus on
whether bias is conscious. To use the telling vernacular, if you’re clueless,
whose fault is that? Instead of using language that seems to perpetuate and
enshrine high-status groups’ felt entitlement to be clueless, we should be
deploying language that provides a concrete description of how discrimination
prevents meritocracy from triumphing because some groups are held to higher
standards and face far trickier office politics. That is precisely what the fivepatterns model does.82
In an unfortunate excess of enthusiasm, Project Implicit’s approach to bias
is sometimes presented as a breakthrough that leaves older approaches in the
dust.83 IAT advocates such as Mahzarin Banaji and Jerry Kang sometimes
portray themselves as offering a fresh approach to the entire field of
psychology.84 In their laudable campaign to disseminate important findings, they
announced highly ambitious claims with rhetorical flourish.85 These claims
represent sincere enthusiasm coupled with land grab, as cognitive psychologists
focused on the brain upstaged social psychologists with Ph.D.’s in sociology,
social psychology, or industrial/organizational psychology. The common
storyline, as articulated by Anthony Greenwald and Linda Hamilton Krieger,
spoke of “the new science of unconscious mental processes” replacing an older
view of human behavior under conscious control, overlooking decades of work
in experimental social psychology.86
All this led predictably to an attack on the use of social psychology in
general, led by Gregory Mitchell and Philip E. Tetlock, who provided expert
testimony to employers seeking to defeat employment discrimination lawsuits.
In Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mind Reading, Mitchell and Tetlock
do just what IAT advocates did: they elide the difference between the IAT and
social psychology in general.87 In this and subsequent articles, they launch an
81. Id. at 13; see also Nyla R. Branscombe, Thinking About One’s Gender Group’s Privileges or
Disadvantages: Consequences for Well-being in Women and Men, 37 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCH. 167, 167–84 (1998);
Colin Wayne Leach, Aarti Iyer & Anne Pedersen, Anger and Guilt About Ingroup Advantage Explain the
Willingness for Political Action, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1232, 1232 (2006); Brian S. Lowery,
Eric D. Knowles & Miguel M. Unzueta, Framing Inequity Safely: Whites’ Motivated Perceptions of Racial
Privilege, 33 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1237, 1244 (2007); Rosette & Tost, supra note 68, at 1421;
Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCH. BULL. 480, 492 (1990).
82. JOAN C. WILLIAMS & RACHEL DEMPSEY, WHAT WORKS FOR WOMEN AT WORK at xiv–xv (2014).
83. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirmative
Action”, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2006).
84. See id.
85. See, e.g., Jill D. Kester, A Revolution in Social Psychology, 14 AM. PSYCH. SOC’Y OBSERVER ONLINE,
July–Aug. 2001, http://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/0701/family.html.
86. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 43, at 946.
87. Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 13, at 1068–69 (“Until the connection between measures of implicit
prejudice and discriminatory behaviors of greater consequence is established, the claimed link between implicit
prejudice and discriminatory behavior as expansively defined by social psychologists holds little legal
significance.”).
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attack on the IAT, and argue that its alleged methodological flaws prove that
evidence of implicit bias should not be allowed in employment cases.88 Notably,
Mitchell and Tetlock argue that lab studies are not dependable because they do
not describe what happens in actual workplaces: “those eager to import [IAT]
research into the law still must establish that the correlations between IAT scores
and discriminatory conduct found in artificial laboratory settings reliably predict
behavior in real-world settings.”89 WES data avoids these issues by relying on
lab studies combined with self-reports that show that workers describe precisely
the bias patterns documented in lab studies.
C. RELYING ONLY ON FIELD STUDIES IS NOT THE ANSWER
Two prominent commentators who share our goal of breaking the thrall of
“implicit association enthusiasm,”90 advocate a shift from a focus on the IAT to
a focus on field studies that document discrimination in real-world settings.91
We disagree. That just shifts attention from one narrow type of evidence (the
IAT) to another narrow type of evidence (field studies). That’s far too restrictive,
given that most studies are done not in the field but in the lab. Anyone who has
participated both in lab studies and in field studies (as we have) can explain why.
Lab studies, for one thing, are typically cheap: all you need to do is make
participating in a matched-resume study a course requirement in a psychology
course, and then crunch the numbers. Lab studies also are powerful because they
allow you to control for everything except for the variable to be studied, so they
yield clean data, statistical power, and clear effects.
Field studies are a different kettle of fish. First of all, they are much more
difficult to accomplish: Williams once negotiated with more than a dozen people
over the course of two years at one large company, only to be told through a
single email that the company had decided to discontinue its participation in the
project.92 John List, one of the foremost researchers in behavioral economics,

88. Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Popularity as a Poor Proxy for Utility: The Case of Implicit
Prejudice, in PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE UNDER SCRUTINY: RECENT CHALLENGES AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
164, 186 (Scott O. Lilienfeld & Irwin D. Waldman eds., 2017); Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 13, at 1034.
89. Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 13, at 1033. Mitchell and Tetlock have led what Selmi calls a
“determined and small group of academics.” Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law:
Changed Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions 39 (2014) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2430378; see also Bell v. Bolger, 708 F.2d 1312, 1319–20 (8th Cir. 1983)
(explaining that “subjective promotion procedures are to be closely scrutinized because of their susceptibility to
discriminatory abuse”); Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1046 (10th Cir. 1981) (concluding that, although
subjective decision making is not discriminatory per se, “obviously subjective decision making provides an
opportunity for unlawful discrimination”); Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias, supra note 1, at 199 n.21;
Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 88.
90. Bagenstos, supra note 1, at 38; Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias, supra note 1, at 196; see also
Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1669
(2011) (noting that IAT studies are “necessarily proof that real-world decisions are influenced by” implicit
attitudes, and recommending field studies as the alternative).
91. Bagenstos, supra note 1.
92. E-mail from organization to Joan C. Williams, Distinguished Professor of L., Univ. of California,
Hastings Coll. of the L (confidential).
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estimates that only about one in ten field studies actually works out.93 Second,
the sample sizes gained from field studies are often small, jeopardizing the
robustness of statistical analyses. The exception is hiring studies, but failure to
hire is not the key problem in many professional workplaces—retention and
advancement are.94 Doing field studies on the effects of bias on retention and
advancement immediately runs into small numbers and long time periods. This
makes doing them much costlier not only in terms of funding; it often fits poorly
into the academic incentives of the social psychologist or behavioral economist
in question, given the academic priority for consistent publication.

II. HOW BIAS PLAYS OUT IN EVERYDAY WORKPLACE INTERACTIONS: THE
WES DATA
Lab studies provide objective evidence that certain patterns of bias exist in
the world but not evidence that they exist in the workplace. The WES does not
provide an objective measure of bias—it is an attitudinal survey95—but it does
document that people report seeing the bias patterns documented in the lab
playing out at work. What is powerful is the conjunction of the two different
sorts of evidence. Mitchell and Tetlock’s worry that what happens in “artificial
laboratory settings” is not happening in the workplace seems misplaced.96
Williams distilled forty years of experimental research into five basic
patterns of bias that affect women and people of color.97 The next step was to
convert these patterns into the ten-minute WES and a shorter, related survey.98
The WES has been given to 693 engineers in India99 and 3093 in the United
States, 2827 lawyers, 550 science professors, 1346 architects, and 227 tech
workers.100 In addition, we have two cross industry samples: 823 individuals
93. E-mail from John List, Kenneth C. Griffin, Distinguished Service Professor in Economics at the Univ.
of Chicago, to Joan C. Williams, Distinguished Professor of L., Univ. of California, Hastings Coll. of the L.
(Jan. 12, 2020, 7:43 PM) (on file with authors).
94. The legal profession is a good example. For instance, women have been half or more of law students
for decades, but remain only twenty percent of law firm equity partners. DESTINY PEERY, REPORT OF THE 2018
NAWL SURVEY ON RETENTION AND PROMOTION OF WOMEN IN LAW FIRMS 2–3 (2018), https://www.nawl.org/
page/2018survey.
95. The WES asks people to answer questions about their own experiences in the workplace. For example,
“I have to prove myself over and over again to get the same level of recognition as my colleagues.”
96. Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 13, at 1033.
97. Much of the stereotyping research puts together members of different groups into larger categories (for
example, people of Asian descent include people from East Asian, Southeast Asian, and South Asian countries).
This approach means that we lose the ability to look at important differences between groups. However, there
are also important similarities in the workplace experiences of individuals in these groups, so we want to make
sure to talk about these stereotypes even though the approach is not perfect.
98. The WES is designed to examine the major patterns of gender and racial bias within an industry; it was
customized and used in this way to examine engineers, lawyers, and science professors. A shorter, generalized
version called the Bias at Work Survey was used to collect cross-industry data in two additional studies.
99. The WES was also used in a study of 693 engineers in India. JOAN C. WILLIAMS , RACHEL M. KORN,
ROBERTA RINCON & PETER FINN, WORKLIFE LAW, WALKING THE TIGHTROPE: AN EXAMINATION OF BIAS IN
INDIA’S ENGINEERING WORKPLACE, 12–14 (2018), https://worklifelaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/
Walking-the-Tightrope-Bias-Indias-Engineering-Workplace.pdf
100. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, SU LI, ROBERTA RINCON & PETER FINN, WORKLIFE LAW, CLIMATE CONTROL:
GENDER AND RACIAL BIAS IN ENGINEERING? 112 (2016), https://worklifelaw.org/publications/Climate-Control-
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recruited to a publicly available survey, and 1616 individuals recruited from
Cint, a paid participant pool.101 Each survey participant answered questions
about the experiences they had at their current or most recent employer.102
These surveys confirm that the kinds of bias documented in both lab and
audit studies in social psychology, industrial-organizational psychology, and
behavioral economics show up in workplaces today. One dramatic aspect of
WES data is the large divergences between the experience of white men and that
of other groups. WES data is particularly important in light of studies that show
that even small biases add up quickly over time: one computer model started out
with a workforce that was 58% women and showed that with only a 5% bias in
favor of men, the percentage of women fell to 29% after just seven iterations.103
When bias plays out year after year in all of the different business systems,
(hiring, performance evaluations, meetings, assignments, etc.) small biases add
up to big effects.
A. PROVE-IT-AGAIN BIAS
Women and African Americans need to provide more evidence of
competence in order to be seen as equally competent.104 Thus, resumes of people
of color get evaluated more negatively than identical resumes of white people.105
Prove-It-Again is “descriptive stereotyping”: it reflects assumptions that groups
will conform to stereotypes about them.106 Prove-It-Again is a status effect, so
Gender-And-Racial-Bias-In-Engineering.pdf [hereinafter WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL] (engineers
study); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, KATHERINE W. PHILLIPS & ERIKA V. HALL, WORKLIFE LAW, DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
GENDER BIAS AGAINST WOMEN IN SCIENCE 53 (2014), https://worklifelaw.org/publications/Double-JeopardyReport_v6_full_web-sm.pdf [hereinafter WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE JEOPARDY ?] (science professors study);
JOAN C. WILLIAMS, MARINA MULTHAUP, SU LI & RACHEL KORN, A.B.A. & MINORITY CORP. COUNSEL ASSOC.,
YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE: INTERRUPTING RACIAL & GENDER B IAS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION
5 (2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/women/you-cant-change-what-youcant-see-print.pdf [hereinafter WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN ’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE] (lawyers study);
JOAN C. WILLIAMS & RACHEL M. KORN, THE ELEPHANT IN THE (WELL-DESIGNED ) ROOM: A STUDY OF GENDER
AND RACIAL BIAS IN THE PROFESSION OF ARCHITECTURE (forthcoming 2020) (architects study).
101. See Appendix B for details on research design, implementation, and representative demographic group
findings.
102. WES data collected by Joan C. Williams (on file with the authors).
103. Richard F. Martell, David M. Lane, & Cynthia Emrich, Male-Female Differences: A Computer
Simulation, AM. PSYCH. 157, 157 (1996); RIDGEWAY, supra note 7, at 131.
104. Martha Foschi, Double Standards for Competence: Theory and Research, 26 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 21, 29
(2000) [hereinafter Foschi, Double Standards for Competence]; Monica Biernat & Diane Kobrynowicz, Genderand Race-Based Standards of Competence: Lower Minimum Standards but Higher Ability Standards for
Devalued Groups, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 544, 550 (1997); Martha Foschi, Larissa Lai & Kirsten
Sigerson, Gender and Double Standards in the Assessment of Job Applicants, 57 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 326, 335–37
(1994); Martha Foschi, Double Standards in the Evaluation of Men and Women, 56 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 237, 251–
52 (1996) [hereinafter Foschi, Double Standards in the Evaluation]; CECILIA L. RIDGEWAY, FRAMED BY
GENDER: HOW GENDER INEQUALITY PERSISTS IN THE MODERN WORLD 79 (2011).
105. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and
Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 992 (2004); see also
Heather J. Davidson & Michael J. Burke, Sex Discrimination in Simulated Employment Contexts: A MetaAnalytic Investigation, 56 J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 225, 237–38 (2000) (finding that evaluators discriminated
against female applicants “when there was less job-relevant information available”).
106. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at xxi.
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it is triggered by status categories such as gender, race, social class, LGBTQ
status, disability status, and more.107 Susan Fiske found that, “beliefs about a
group’s status and its competence [are] so closely related . . . that the two
concepts virtually defined each other.”108 This means that white men often get
the benefit of the doubt, while women and people of color often have to prove
themselves repeatedly. In this way, Prove-It-Again bias operates to create an
invisible escalator for majority men—but not all majority men: one study found
that a white man whose interests signaled an elite background (for example,
classical music, sailing, and polo) was twelve times more likely to receive a call
back than a white man whose interests signaled blue-collar origins (for example,
country music, pick-up soccer, and track and field).109
Prove-It-Again bias stems from two different mechanisms: in-group
favoritism and lack of fit. Although the term “in-group favoritism” was first
coined in the 1950s by Gordon Allport, Marilynn Brewer first explored its
workplace effects in the 1990s.110 Members of the dominant group tend to favor
other members of the dominant group,111 which means that in professions
dominated by white men from elite backgrounds, that demographic finds it
easier to get sponsors, to be “in the know,” and to get the benefit of the doubt.112
White men in professional/managerial jobs tend to favor other white men both
because like attracts like and because high-status people tend to favor other highstatus people.113
The second mechanism that plays an important part in creating Prove-ItAgain bias is explained by Madeleine Heilman’s lack of fit theory, which dates

107. Biernat & Kobrynowicz, supra note 104, at 550; Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Gender, Status, and Leadership,
57 J. SOC. ISSUES 637, 647 (2001) [hereinafter Ridgeway, Gender]; Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Status in Groups: The
Importance of Motivation, 47 AM. SOC. REV. 76, 76 (1982) [hereinafter Ridgeway, Status in Groups]. See
generally BRAD SEARS & CHRISTY MALLORY, GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION
IN THE WORKPLACE 1–40 (Christine M. Duffy & Denise M. Visconti eds., 2014); Mason Ameri, Lisa Schur,
Meera Adya, F. Scott Bentley, Patrick McKay & Douglas Kruse, The Disability Employment Puzzle: A Field
Experiment on Employer Hiring Behavior, 71 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 329 (2018); András Tilcsik, Pride and
Prejudice: Employment Discrimination Against Openly Gay Men in the United States, 117 AM. J. SOCIO. 586,
586–626 (2011); Eva Derous & Jeroen Decoster, Implicit Age Cues in Resumes: Subtle Effects on Hiring
Discrimination, 8 FRONT. PSYCH. 1, 1–15 (2017); Doris Weichselbaumer, Discrimination Against Migrant Job
Applicants in Austria: An Experimental Study, 18 GER. ECON. REV. 237 (2016); Amy J. Cuddy, Michael I.
Norton & Susan T. Fiske, This Old Stereotype: The Pervasiveness and Persistence of the Elderly Stereotype, 61
J. SOC. ISSUES 267 (2005). For resume studies, see Davidson & Burke, supra note 105; ALICE H. EAGLY &
LINDA L. CARLI, THROUGH THE LABYRINTH: THE TRUTH ABOUT HOW WOMEN BECOME L EADERS (2007);
Corinne A. Moss-Racusin, John F. Dovidio, Victoria L. Brescoll, Mark J. Graham & Jo Harndelsman, Science
Faculty’s Subtle Gender Biases Favor Male Students, 109 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD. SCI. 16474 (2012).
108. RIDGEWAY, supra note 7, at 78; SUSAN T. FISKE, ENVY UP, SCORN DOWN: HOW STATUS DIVIDES US
(2011).
109. Lauren A. Rivera & András Tilcsik, Class Advantage, Commitment Penalty: The Gendered Effect of
Social Class Signals in an Elite Labor Market, 81 AM. SOCIO. REV. 1097, 1125 (2016).
110. GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954); Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Favoritism:
The Subtle Side of Intergroup Discrimination, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS
ETHICS 160, 163–69 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996).
111. Id.
112. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 3.
113. RIDGEWAY, supra note 7, at 111.
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back to the 1980s.114 Heilman pointed out that professional workplaces assumed
that men were the best fit for professional jobs, and that the consequent
perceived lack of fit disadvantages women systematically.115 Heilman’s work
provides insight into the glass ceiling, which reflects the assumption that women
are a good fit for lower-level jobs, but not for top jobs.116 Some studies of
professionals suggest that bias ratchets up for women who reach higher levels
of authority.117
Because Prove-It-Again bias is caused by status differentials, it is triggered
by race as well as gender. This is a result of descriptive stereotyping: since Black
people118 and Latinx people119 are stereotyped as less competent, if they want to
be seen differently, they must prove themselves more. This effect is documented
in laboratory studies: in a study by Monica Biernat and Diane Kobrynowicz,
Black applicants were required to “jump through more hoops” than white
applicants in order to provide evidence of their competence.120
Heilman’s lack of fit analyses focused exclusively on gender, but her
framework has been extended to race in the work of Erika Hall, Ashleigh
Rosette, and others.121 For example, Ashleigh Shelby Rosette and Robert W.
Livingston found that Black women are rated more harshly when things go awry
than either Black men or white women.122
Both in-group favoritism and lack of fit provide theoretical models to
explain the African-American aphorism that Black people need to “work twice
as hard to get half as far.”123

114. Heilman’s “lack of fit” is arguably analogous to Alice Eagly’s “role incongruity.” Compare Madeline
E. Heilman, Sex Bias in Work Settings: The Lack of Fit Model, in 5 RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
269, 269 (L.L. Cummings & Barry M. Staw, eds. 1983) (finding that the role of a woman is incongruous with
the role of a good leader), with Alice H. Eagly & Steven J. Karau, Role Congruity Theory of Prejudice Toward
Female Leaders, 109 PSYCH. REV. 573, 579 (2002).
115. Heilman, supra note 114, at 269; see also Biernat, supra note 104, at 550 (showing women have to
provide roughly twice the evidence of competence as compared to men in order to be seen as equally competent);
Foschi, Double Standards for Competence, supra note 104, at 28 (classic study of double standards).
116. SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S C OURTS UNDERMINE
DISCRIMINATION LAW 71 (2017).
117. RIDGEWAY, supra note 7, at 115.
118. Biernat & Kobrynowicz, supra note 104, at 550.
119. James M. Weyant, Implicit Stereotyping of Hispanics: Development and Validity of a Hispanic Version
of the Implicit Association Test, 27 HISP. J. BEHAV. SCI. 355, 360 (2005).
120. Biernat & Kobrynowicz, supra note 104, at 550.
121. Erika V. Hall, Adam D. Galinsky & Katherine W. Phillips, Gender Profiling: A Gendered Race
Perspective on Person-Position Fit, 41 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 853, 854 (2015); Ashleigh S.
Rosette, Geoffrey J. Leonardelli & Katherine W. Phillips, The White Standard: Racial Bias in Leader
Categorization, 93 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 758 (2008).
122. Ashleigh S. Rosette & Robert W. Livingston, Failure Is Not an Option for Black Women: Effects of
Organizational Performance on Leaders with Single Versus Dual-Subordinate Identities, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 1162, 1166 (2012).
123. Christopher D. DeSante, Working Twice as Hard to Get Half as Far: Race, Work Ethic, and America’s
Deserving Poor, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 342, 352–54 (2013).
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A recent longitudinal meta-analysis by Alice Eagly found that lowcompetence stereotypes of women have diminished over time.124 This reflects
the waning of I Love Lucy-type “women as dingbats” stereotypes.125 Women
used to be seen as less intelligent and competent than men. Now they are not,
but they are still seen as less competent in masculine spheres (including
professional environments)126 and also as lacking in “performance capacity”: the
ability to master events and successfully accomplish goals.127
Here is what Prove-It-Again bias looks like on the ground:
Sponsorship and information advantages: The single strongest
determinant of who is in one’s social network is similarity: people tend to build
social networks made up of people who are like them.128 That means that if a
professional workplace starts out with a dominant group of white men from elite
backgrounds, those whom they sponsor (in other words, whose careers they
champion) will also tend to be same-class white men, and their bonding
activities may be class linked (think: golf). Valuable information such as what
plum assignments are coming “down the pike” tend to be shared through social
networks, too.129
Benefit of the doubt—Halo effect: In-group favoritism also influences
who gets the benefit of the doubt.130 On the ground, this will often mean that ingroup members get judged on their potential, whereas other professionals are
judged not on potential but on performance. This can result in lower rates of
hire, worse evaluations, higher rates of layoffs, and delayed promotions for
women and professionals of color.131 Industrial organizational psychologists
124. Alice H. Eagly, Christa Nater, David I. Miller, Michéle Kaufmann & Sabine Sczesny, Gender
Stereotypes Have Changed: A Cross-Temporal Meta-Analysis of U.S. Public Opinion Polls From 1946 to 2018,
75 AM. PSYCH. 301, 310–12 (2020); E-mail from Alice Eagly, Professor of Psych. and of Management and
Organizations at Northwestern Univ., to Joan C. Williams, Distinguished Professor of L., Univ. of California,
Hastings Coll. of the L. (Sept. 16, 2019, 10:50 PM) (on file with authors).
125. Judy Klemesrud, TV’s Women Are Dingbats, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1973, at 107,
https://www.nytimes.com/1973/05/27/archives/tvs-women-are-dingbats.html.
126. RIDGEWAY, supra note 104, at 60–61.
127. Id.
128. ELLEN BERSCHEID & E LAINE H. WALSTER, Rewards Others Provide: Similarity, in INTERPERSONAL
ATTRACTION 69 (1969); DONN BYRNE, THE ATTRACTION PARADIGM (1971); R.S. BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES:
THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION (2009).
129. Brewer, supra note 110, at 65.
130. Rocio Garcia-Retamero & Esther López-Zafra, Prejudice against Women in Male-congenial
Environments: Perceptions of Gender Role Congruity in Leadership, 55 SEX ROLES 51 (2006); Jeffrey H.
Greenhaus & Saroj Parasuraman, Job Performance Attributions and Career Advancement Prospects: An
Examination of Gender and Race Effects, 55 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 273, 290–92 (1993);
Magid Igbaria & Jack J. Baroudi, The Impact of Job Performance Evaluations on Career Advancement
Prospects: An Examination of Gender Differences in the IS Workplace, 19 MIS Q. 107, 115 (1995); Clara
Kulich, Grzegorz Trojanowski, Michelle K. Ryan, S. Alexander Haslam & Luc. D. R. Renneboog, Who Gets
the Carrot and Who Gets the Stick? Evidence of Gender Disparities in Executive Remuneration, 32 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 301, 317 (2011); Janet K. Swim & Lawrence J. Sanna, He’s Skilled, She’s Lucky: A Meta-Analysis of
Observers’ Attributions for Women’s and Men’s Successes and Failures, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL.
507, 514–16 (1996); Shelley E. Taylor, Susan T. Fiske, Nancy L. Etcoff & Audrey J. Ruderman, Categorical
and Contextual Bases of Person Memory and Stereotyping, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 778, 791 (1978).
131. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 105, at 998; Hannah Riley Bowles & Michele Gelfand, Status
and the Evaluation of Workplace Deviance, 21 PSYCH. SCI. 49, 52 (2010); Monica Biernat, Kathleen Fuegen &
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have documented the halo effect (the erroneous perception that someone who is
great at one thing is great at everything)132 and the horns effect (the erroneous
perception that someone who has had one failure will be a failure more
globally).133 Halo-horns tends to be driven by stereotypes134 such that groups
stereotyped as high in competence tend to get halos, whereas groups stereotyped
as low in competence tend to get horns.
He’s skilled, she’s lucky—It could happen to anyone, she “doesn’t have
it”: Attribution bias plays a role in how people code successes and mistakes.135
If a woman has a success, people tend to attribute the success to unstable, outside
causes.136 If a man has a success, people tend to attribute the success to stable,
internal causes.137 Obviously, if women’s successes are written off as luck, they
have to have more of them in order to be successful. Attribution bias also affects
people of color.138 Perceptions of mistakes are also driven by stereotypes of who
is competent, but in the opposite direction: a woman’s or a person of color’s
mistakes tend to be noticed more, remembered longer, and lead to global
judgments.139 Another name for this is confirmation bias, which is captured by
the aphorism “we see what we expect to see.”140 If white women and people of
color find that colleagues tend to notice and remember their mistakes, but
discount their successes, obviously these groups will have to provide more
evidence of competence in order to be seen by colleagues as equally competent.
One study of law firm partners found that more mistakes were found in a memo
supposedly written by an African-American associate than in an identical memo
written by a white associate.141

Diane Kobrynowicz, Shifting Standards and the Inference of Incompetence: Effects of Formal and Informal
Evaluation Tools, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 855, 866 (2010); Cara C. Bauer & Boris B. Baltes,
Reducing the Effects of Gender Stereotypes on Performance Evaluations, 47 SEX ROLES 465, 471 (2002).
132. Edward L. Thorndike, A Constant Error in Psychological Ratings, 4 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 25, 25 (1920).
133. Seymour Rosenburg, Carnot Nelson & P.S. Vivekananthan, A Multidimensional Approach to the
Structure of Personality Impressions, 9 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 283, 284 (1968) (discussing personality
judgements); see also Michelle C. Bligh, Jeffrey C. Kohles, Craig L. Pearce, Joseph E. Justin & John F. Stovall,
When the Romance Is Over: Follower Perspectives of Aversive Leadership, 56 APPLIED PSYCH. 528, 536 (2007)
(explaining horn effect is generally “applied to situations in which an overall negative appraisal is made based
on one salient failure or negative characteristic”).
134. Boris B. Baltes & Christopher P. Parker, Reducing the Effects of Performance Expectations on
Behavioral Ratings, 82 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 237, 263 (2000).
135. For a comprehensive introduction to attribution bias, see generally Krieger, supra note 3.
136. Swim & Sanna, supra note 130, at 508.
137. Id.
138. Miles Hewstone, The ‘Ultimate Attribution Error’? A Review of the Literature on Intergroup Causal
Attribution, 20 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 311, 313 (1990); Greenhaus & Parasuraman, supra note 130, at 276.
139. Madeline E. Heilman, Sex Stereotypes and Their Effects in the Workplace: What We Know and What
We Don’t Know, 10 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 3, 6 (1995).
140. Johan E. Korteling, Anne-Marie Brouwer & Alexander Toet, A Neural Network Framework for
Cognitive Bias, 9 FRONT. PSYCH. 1, 7 (2018).
141. ARIN N. REEVES, WRTITEN IN BLACK & WHITE: E XPLORING CONFIRMATION BIAS IN RACIALIZED
PERCEPTIONS OF WRITING SKILLS (2014), https://nextions.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/written-in-blackand-white-yellow-paper-series.pdf.
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Casuistry: People tend to value qualities when men or white people have
them.142 For example, in an experiment for a job that required both education
and experience, when the man had more education, subjects tended to choose to
hire the man and said it was because he had more education; when the man had
more experience, subjects again tended to choose the man and now said it was
because he had more experience.143 Another study found that this “casuistry”
pattern is also triggered by race when qualifications are ambiguous (as they often
are), for example, when an applicant was moderately qualified for the job, rather
than being a strong “yes” or “no.”144
Polarized evaluations: Out-groups typically receive lower evaluations
than similarly situated members of the in-group unless they are superstars, in
which case they tend to receive exceptionally good evaluations (who knew a
woman could do it?).145 Obviously, if only the superstars survive and thrive,
fewer members of that group will do so.
Leniency bias: Objective rules are applied rigorously to out-groups, but
leniently to in-groups.146 The important implication, often overlooked, is that
objective rules are no guarantee of objectivity. This is an important point, which
the intense focus of class action lawyers on eliminating subjectivity has
sometimes led them to overlook.147 In professional contexts, women and people
of color often find they have to follow rules to the letter, but that majority men
often get a pass.148
Stereotype content: Women are stereotyped as warmer but less competent
than men,149 and as more emotional than men.150 Black people are stereotyped
as less competent than white people.151 This has measurable consequences that
have been demonstrated over and over again in lab and audit studies. One study
found white applicants more than twice as likely to be considered for a job than
identical Black applicants.152 Another often-cited identical resume study shows
142. Michael I. Norton, John M. Darley & Joseph A. Vandello, Casuistry and Social Category Bias, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 817, 817 (2004). See generally Diana Burgess & Eugene Borgida, Who Women
Are, Who Women Should Be: Descriptive and Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex Discrimination, 5 PSYCH.
PUB. POL’Y. & L. 665 (1999); Gordon Hodson, John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Processes in Racial
Discrimination: Differential Weighting of Conflicting Information, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 460
(2002).
143. Norton et al., supra note 142, at 821.
144. Hodson et al., supra note 142, at 460.
145. Patricia W. Linville & Edward E. Jones, Polarized Appraisals of Out-Group Members, 38 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 689, 695 (1980); Biernat & Kobrynowicz, supra note 104, at 550.
146. Brewer, supra note 110, at 65.
147. Based on observations and conversations that Joan C. Williams has had with class action attorneys over
the course of Williams’ career.
148. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 34 (explaining how the in-group gets more lenient treatment).
149. Susan T. Fiske, Amy J. C. Cuddy, Peter Glick & Jun Xu, A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content:
Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition, 82 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 878, 880 (2002).
150. Michele Grossman & Wendy Wood, Sex Differences in Intensity of Emotional Experience: A Social
Role Interpretation, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1010, 1022 (1993).
151. Biernat & Kobrynowicz, supra note 104, at 554.
152. Devah Pager & Bruce Western, Identifying Discrimination at Work: The Use of Field Experiments, 68
J. SOC. ISSUES 221, 226 (2012).
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that “Jamal” needed to have eight more years of experience to get called back at
the same rate as “Greg.”153 Latinx individuals are also stereotyped as less
competent than white people.154 People of Asian descent are seen as cold but
competent, but the stereotype that they are cold is stronger than the stereotype
that they are competent.155 Moreover, their competence is viewed as limited to
technical work, not leadership potential.156 Despite this positive competence
stereotype, however, white lawyers were still rated as better litigators than
identical Asian-American lawyers in an experiment examining implicit and
explicit stereotypes.157
WES data: All these patterns contribute to professional workplaces in
which women and people of color often need to provide more evidence of
competence than majority men to be seen as equally competent. These
experimental findings, which have been replicated decade after decade, prove
that Prove-It-Again bias exists in the world, while WES data show that it exists
in the workplace. For example, in our sample of U.S. engineers, roughly onethird of white men said they have to prove themselves repeatedly to get the same
level of respect and recognition as their colleagues, but nearly two-thirds of
women and over two-thirds of engineers of color did.158

153. Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 105, at 992.
154. Weyant, supra note 119, at 360.
155. Monica H. Lin, Virginia S. Y. Kwan, Anna Cheung & Susan T. Fiske, Stereotype Content Model
Explains Prejudice for an Envied Outgroup: Scale of Anti-Asian American Stereotypes, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. BULL. 34, 36 (2005).
156. Lei Lai & Linda C. Babcock, Asian Americans and Workplace Discrimination: The Interplay Between
Sex of Evaluators and the Perception of Social Skills, 34 J. ORG. BEHAV. 310, 320 (2013); Ashleigh Shelby
Rosette, Rebecca Ponce de Leon, Chrisy Zhou Koval & David A. Harrison, Intersectionality: Connecting
Experiences of Gender with Race at Work, 38 RSCH. ORG. BEHAV. 1, 7 (2008).
157. Jerry Kang, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Kumar Yogeeswaran & Gary Blasi, Are Ideal Litigators White?
Measuring the Myth of Colorblindness, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 886, 911 (2010).
158. WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 117.
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Qualitative data provide color and detail:
“Being from an international background, not white bread American
raised, we have to work harder.” —a Latinx man engineer.159
“My colleagues range from the males who don’t think women should be
engineers to those that think women should perform at a higher standard.”—a
white woman engineer.160
“I find I have to work 4 times as hard to get a fraction of the respect given
to others who just sit at the table . . . . This is no glass ceiling. It is a considerably
reinforced concrete ceiling.”—a woman architect.161
Another expression of Prove-It-Again bias concerns how one’s ideas are
received. In professional workplaces, having ideas accepted by the group is often
a key to success.162 Both women and people of color report on the WES that
other people often get credit for ideas they originally offered at much higher
rates than white men do. In our study of lawyers, white men reported the “stolen
idea” at a level twenty-two percentage points lower than women of color, twenty
percentage points lower than white women, and six percentage points lower than
men of color.163

159. Id. at 6.
160. Id. at 23.
161. WILLIAMS & KORN, supra note 100.
162. HBR IdeaCast, Women at Work: Make Yourself Heard, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://hbr.org/podcast/2018/01/women-at-work-make-yourself-heard.
163. WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE, supra note 100, at 17–18.
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“[Y]ou say something in a meeting, you throw an idea out on the table,
nobody picks up on it. Then, a little while [later] one of your male colleagues
throws the exact same idea on the table and everybody goes, ‘Oh, that’s a
fantastic idea.’” —a Latinx woman statistician.164
A dramatic instance of lack of fit occurs when professionals are assumed
to hold lower-level jobs. White male professionals are rarely mistaken for
administrative or custodial staff—it is assumed that they are professionals. In
our study of lawyers, white men reported being mistaken for admins, court, or
custodial staff at a level fifty-one percentage points lower than women of color,
forty-four percentage points lower than white women, and twenty-three
percentage points lower than men of color.165

164. WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE JEOPARDY?, supra note 100, at 13; see also Joan C. Williams, Double
Jeopardy? An Empirical Study with Implications for the Debates over Implicit Bias and Intersectionality, 37
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 185, 198 (2014).
165. WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE, supra note 100, at 19.
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Qualitative data again add color and detail.
“Old white men know what a successful lawyer looks like: an old white
man. When they see a woman, or a person of color, they *know* that’s not a
successful lawyer.” —a male lawyer.166
“I have learned that I never have the benefit of the doubt . . . and must make
for myself opportunities which are given to others. I would not trade working as
an engineer for anything and am incredibly motivated to continue in the hopes
that things are easier for the women following after me.” —a Latinx woman
engineer.167
“I do not get the benefit of the doubt as my male colleagues do. I often have
to list my credentials when meeting new colleagues or upper management.” —
a woman engineer of Asian descent.168
How gender bias differs by race:169 White women were less likely than
women of color to report Prove-It-Again bias. Thus, women of color may have
to prove themselves more than white women do (who in turn have to prove
themselves more than white men do). One-way ANOVA170 testing determined
there was a statistically significant difference between groups, and a post-hoc

166. Id. at 14.
167. WILLIAMS, CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 20.
168. Id. at 24.
169. To examine how gender bias differs by race, we standardized the data from women across studies and
used one-way ANOVA testing to test for differences between racial groups. When appropriate, we used posthoc Tukey HSD testing to examine the group differences in detail. The graphs in this Part represent levels of
bias relative to other groups of women.
170. An ANOVA is a statistical test used to determine whether there are statistically significant differences
between groups.
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Tukey HSD test171 determined that the disparity between white women and
Black women was significant.172

“You don’t know if you’re working twice as hard because you’re a woman
or if you’re working twice as hard because you’re African-American.” —an
African-American woman mathematician.173
In our study of women science professors, we found that Black women are
more likely to attribute their Prove-It-Again problems to race, whereas all other
groups of women were more likely to attribute them to sex.174 This has
implications for lawyers interviewing Black women plaintiffs.
Prove-It-Again data has concrete workplace effects:175 In our study of
engineers in India, regression analyses revealed a link between Prove-It-Again
bias and important workplace processes and outcomes.176 Higher levels of
Prove-It-Again bias were associated with decreases in career satisfaction and
enjoyment at work and higher levels of individuals reporting that they are
considering looking for a new job somewhere else.177 Similarly, Prove-It-Again
bias was linked to lower levels of belonging at work and lower perceptions of

171. Tukey’s HSD Test is a statistical test that uses pairwise comparisons to determine whether there are
statistically significant differences between groups.
172. Data on file with authors. See id. (describing analyses).
173. WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE J EOPARDY?, supra note 100, at 15.
174. Id. at 6.
175. These regression analyses were conducted on data collected from engineers in India, and we have not
had the opportunity to run the same tests on data from the United States. However, we expect that the patterns
of bias will have similar negative effects on workplace processes and outcomes in the United States.
176. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 99, at 16.
177. Id.
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fairness of performance evaluations, sponsorship, networking opportunities, and
compensation processes at their organizations.178
B. TIGHTROPE BIAS
Majority men not only have to prove themselves less than other groups,
their office politics are simpler.179 Experimental studies show that behaviors that
signal competence, mastery, and leadership to North Americans are accepted
more from men than women.180 Anger also is accepted less readily from women
and people of color, which makes it harder for those groups to “draw a line in
the sand” when that’s necessary to establish authority or get work done well.181
Tightrope bias again stems from two mechanisms. One is that lower-status
groups are expected to be deferential, not dominant. Part of being politically
savvy entails “knowing your place,” or gracefully accepting your own lack of
status and influence.182 Group members who don’t “know their place” risk being
seen as unreasonable.183 In addition, higher-status groups are expected to be
“assertive, independent, and agentic”—all highly valued in professional
workplaces—more so than lower-status groups.184
Tightrope bias also stems from prescriptive stereotypes: expectations about
how people should behave.185 Prescriptive gender stereotypes are well
documented, and Alice Eagly’s recent study found that prescriptive stereotypes

178. Id.
179. EAGLY & CARLI, supra note 107.
180. RIDGEWAY, supra note 7, at 114; Eagly, supra note 124, at 12; Victoria L. Brescoll & Eric Luis
Uhlmann, Can an Angry Woman Get Ahead? Status Conferral, Gender, and Expression of Emotion in the
Workplace, 19 PSYCH. SCI. 268, 273 (2008); Eagly & Karau, supra note 114, at 583–88; Laurie A. Rudman &
Kimberly Fairchild, Reactions to Counterstereotypical Behavior: The Role of Backlash in Cultural Stereotype
Maintenance, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 157, 171–73 (2004); Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick,
Feminized Management and Backlash Toward Agentic Women: The Hidden Costs to Women of a Kinder,
Gentler Image of Middle Managers, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1004, 1007–09 (1999) [hereinafter
Rudman & Glick, Reactions]; Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and Backlash
Toward Agentic Women, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 743, 757–59 (2001) [hereinafter Rudman & Glick, Prescriptive
Gender]; Ashleigh Shelby Rosette, Christy Zhou Koval, Anyi Ma & Robert Livingston, Race Matters for Women
Leaders: Intersectional Effects on Agentic Deficiencies and Penalties, 27 LEADERSHIP Q. 429, 440–41 (2016);
Jennifer L. Berdahl & Ji-A Min, Prescriptive Stereotypes and Workplace Consequences for East Asians in North
America, 18 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCH. 141, 149–50 (2012).
181. Brescoll & Uhlmann, supra note 180, at 273; Robert W. Livingston & Nicholas A. Pearce, The TeddyBear Effect: Does Having a Baby Face Benefit Black Chief Executive Officers?, 20 PSYCH. SCI. 1229, 1234
(2009); Rosette et al., supra note 156, at 6; Rudman & Fairchild, supra note 180, at 171.
182. Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Sandra Nakagawa, Is Deference the Price of Being Seen as Reasonable? How
Status Hierarchies Incentivize Acceptance of Low Status, 80 SOCIO. PSYCH. Q. 132, 148–50 (2017).
183. Cameron Anderson, Daniel R. Ames & Samuel D. Gosling, Punishing Hubris: The Perils of
Overestimating One’s Status in a Group, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 90, 98–100 (2008).
184. RIDGEWAY, supra note 104, at 66.
185. See Burgess & Borgida, supra note 142, at 665–66. See generally Deborah A. Prentice & Erica
Carranza, What Women and Men Should Be, Shouldn’t Be, Are Allowed to Be, and Don’t Have to Be: The
Contents of Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes, 26 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 269, 279–80 (2002); Laurie A. Rudman,
Corinne A. Moss-Racusin, Julie E. Phelan & Sanne Nauts, Status Incongruity and Backlash Effects: Defending
the Gender Hierarchy Motivates Prejudice Against Female Leaders, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 165, 166
(2012).
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of women have actually strengthened in recent decades.186 The good woman is
seen as nice and “communal”: helpful, modest, interpersonally sensitive—a
good team player.187 The good man is seen as competent and “agentic”: direct,
assertive, ambitious, competitive—a leader.188 Of course, as Eagly’s other work
has documented extensively, the behavior expected of men maps tightly onto the
behavior expected of leaders, whereas the behavior expected of women does
not.189 Many studies, notably by Laurie Rudman and Victoria Brescoll,
document the “backlash” or “penalties for gender deviance” faced by women
who fail to conform to prescriptive stereotypes.190 When women act in ways that
are consistent with their professional roles, they may encounter pushback. “So,
if you’re stern . . . or you say no, your immediate reaction is to call that woman
a bitch, right? If you’re a man, it’s just a no,” said a focus group participant.191
Until quite recently, prescriptive bias had only been studied in the context
of gender. It is beginning to be documented in the context of race, too.192 One
study found that assertive behavior by African-American men triggers hostility
in predominantly white workplaces.193 Another study found that white

186. Eagly et al., supra note 124, at 3.
187. Id. at 3; see also Madeline E. Heilman & Tyler G. Okimoto, Why Are Women Penalized for Success at
Male Tasks?: The Implied Communality Deficit, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 81, 82 (2007); Deborah A. Prentice &
Erica Carranza, Sustaining Cultural Beliefs in the Face of Their Violation: The Case of Gender Stereotypes, in
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CULTURE 259, 260 (Mark Schaller & Christian S. Crandall eds., 2004);
Prentice & Carranza, supra note 185, at 279–80; Rudman et al., supra note 185, at 168; Rudman & Glick, supra
note 180, at 743; Madeline E. Heilman, Gender Stereotypes and Workplace Bias, 32 RSCH. ORG. BEHAV. 113,
115 (2012); RIDGEWAY, supra note 7, at 114.
188. Prentice & Carranza, supra note 187, at 260; Prentice & Carranza, supra note 185, at 279–80; Rudman
et al., supra note 185, at 165–66; Heilman & Okimoto, supra note 187, at 91; Anne M. Koenig, Abigail A.
Mitchell, Alice H. Eagly & Tiina Ristikari, Are Leader Stereotypes Masculine? A Meta-Analysis of Three
Research Paradigms, 137 PSYCH. BULL. 616, 637 (2011); Corinne A. Moss-Racusin, Julie E. Phelan & Laurie
A. Rudman, When Men Break the Gender Rules: Status Incongruity and Backlash Against Modest Men, 11
PSYCH. MEN & MASCULINITY 140, 140–41 (2010).
189. Alice H. Eagly & Blair T. Johnson, Gender and Leadership Style: A Meta-Analysis, 108 PSYCH. BULL.
233, 235 (1990); EAGLY & CARLI, supra note 107; Eagly & Karau, supra note 114, at 573–98; Alice H. Eagly
& Mary C. Johannesen-Schmidt, The Leadership Styles of Women and Men, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 781, 785–86
(2001).
190. Victoria L. Brescoll, Who Takes the Floor and Why: Gender, Power, and Volubility in Organizations,
56 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 621, 622 (2011); Rudman et al., supra note 185, at 165–66; RIDGEWAY, supra note 104;
Rudman & Fairchild, supra note 180, at 157–58; Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender
Stereotypes and Backlash Against Agentic Women, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 743 (2002); Amanda B. Diekman & Alice
H. Eagly, Of Men, Women, and Motivation: A Role Congruity Account, in HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION SCIENCE
434, 436–42 (James Y. Shah & Wendi L. Gardner eds., 2008); Eagly & Karau, supra note 114, at 575; Susan T.
Fiske & Laura E. Stevens, What’s So Special About Sex? Gender Stereotyping and Discrimination, in GENDER
ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 173, 175–76 (Stuart Oskamp & Mark Costanzo eds., 1993).
191. Interviews with Focus Group for Nat’l Sci. Foundation Achieving Competitive Excellence (ACE)
Grant in S.F., Cal. (2007) (on file with authors).
192. Robert W. Livingston, Ashleigh Shelby Rosette & Ella F. Washington, Can an Agentic Black Woman
Get Ahead? The Impact of Race and Interpersonal Dominance on Perceptions of Female Leaders, 23 PSYCH.
SCI. 354, 355 (2012); Rosette et al., supra note 156, at 6; Berdahl & Min, supra note 180, at 141; Amy J. C.
Cuddy, Susan T. Fiske & Peter Glick, Warmth and Competence as Universal Dimensions of Social Perception:
The Stereotype Content Model and the BIAS Map, in 40 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 61,
76–77 (2008).
193. Livingston et al., supra note 192, at 355.
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Americans not only expect individuals of Asian descent to be passive; they also
tend to dislike those who display dominant behavior.194 Other studies show that
dominant, self-promotional behavior by women or people of color tends to
evoke “resistance and dislike from others, reducing their perceived hire-ability
and others’ willingness to comply with them compared to a similar white
man.”195
At an intuitive level, it is obvious that prescriptive bias is triggered by
gender as well as race. Being seen as an “angry Black person” is typically not a
great career move in majority white workplaces, whether one is a man or a
woman.196 Thus, people of color as well as women walk a tightrope: their office
politics are more complicated because they not only need to be authoritative, but
also need to figure out how not to trigger backlash from colleagues who don’t
feel comfortable with authoritative behavior from members of their group.197
White men just need to be authoritative, full stop.198
Prescriptive bias is often expressed as dislike for the individual who does
not conform to stereotypes about how their group should behave, or the sense
that they are unreasonable. This fact has important implications for the “personal
animosity” defense.199
Here is how prescriptive bias plays out in professional workplaces:
Competence-likeability tradeoff (aka walking the tightrope): Women
often have to navigate a very tight space between being seen as too masculine,
and therefore respected but not liked, and too feminine, and therefore, liked but
not respected.200 But in order to get ahead, professionals typically have to be
both liked and respected.201 Because assertiveness is an essential quality in a
194. Berdahl & Min, supra note 180, at 141.
195. RIDGEWAY, supra note 7, at 118.
196. Rosette et al., supra note 180, at 440; Adia H. Wingfield, The Modern Mammy and the Angry Black
Man: African American Professionals’ Experiences with Gendered Racism in the Workplace, 14 RACE, GENDER
& CLASS 196, 201 (2007).
197. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 231.
198. Heilman & Okimoto, supra note 187, at 90–92.
199. See infra notes 606–663 and accompanying text.
200. Natalie Porter & Florence Geis, Women and Nonverbal Leadership Cues: When Seeing Is Not
Believing, in GENDER AND NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR 39, 42 (Clara Mayo & Nancy M. Henley eds., 1981); Cuddy
et al., supra note 192, at 101; Susan T. Fiske, Donald N. Bersoff, Eugene Borgida, Kay Deaux & Madeline E.
Heilman, Social Science Research on Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping Research in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
46 AM. PSYCH. 1049, 1050–51 (1991) [hereinafter Fiske et al., Social Science]; Fiske et al., supra note 192, at
77; Susan T. Fiske, Juan Xu, Amy C. Cuddy & Peter Glick, (Dis)respecting Versus (Dis)liking: Status and
Interdependence Predict Ambivalent Stereotypes of Competence and Warmth, 55 J. SOC. ISSUES 473, 476 (1999)
[hereinafter Fiske et al., (Dis)respecting]; Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, An Ambivalent Alliance: Hostile and
Benevolent Sexism as Complementary Justifications for Gender Inequality, 56 AM. PSYCH. 109, 109 (2001);
Geoffrey Haddock & Mark P. Zanna, Preferring “Housewives” To “Feminists”: Categorization and the
Favorability of Attitudes Toward Women, 18 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 25, 48 (1994); Heilman, supra note 139, at 6;
Madeline E. Heilman, Description and Prescription: How Gender Stereotypes Prevent Women’s Ascent Up the
Organizational Ladder, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 657, 659–64 (2001); Heilman & Okimoto, supra note 187, at 81;
Rudman & Glick, Reactions, supra note 180, at 1004; Rudman & Glick, Prescriptive Gender, supra note 180,
at 743; Laurie A. Rudman & Julie E. Phelan, Backlash Effects for Disconfirming Gender Stereotypes in
Organizations, 28 RSCH. ORG. BEHAV. 61, 69 (2008).
201. See generally Fiske et al., Social Science, supra note 200; Fiske et al., (Dis)respecting, supra note 200.
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leader in a professional workplace, women again walk a tightrope: if they are
seen as too assertive, they may be disliked, but if they are seen as not assertive
enough, they may be seen as lacking leadership ability.202 The complex office
politics facing women is epitomized by Madeline Heilman’s study of women
managers in which subjects attributed negative personality characteristics
(“bitter” and “selfish”) to women who were described as effective managers
(despite a complete lack of information about the women’s personalities being
given).203 Another study found that women who give negative performance
feedback tend to be disliked and seen as less competent.204 Another famous
matched-resume case study found that hard-driving Heidi Roizen was judged
“selfish” and less hirable than Harold Roizen (whose resume was identical). 205
Pressure to display traditionally feminine behavior: Susan Fiske and
Peter Glick’s work on ambivalent sexism explains that sexism entails both
hostile disapproval of women who don’t play traditional roles, and benevolent
approval of women who do.206 Thus women professionals often face
expectations that they will be the peacemaker, the dutiful daughter who aligns
with a powerful man but never contests his authority, or the ever-supportive
office mom who takes care of everyone else.
Backlash against assertive “agentic” behavior: Men are expected to be
assertive; that is part of the masculine stereotype.207 Women are expected to be
communal team-players; they are not expected to act in an agentic, assertive
manner.208 In fact, an “agentic penalty” has been documented when women act
in a way that is deemed dominant, competitive, assertive, or angry, due to the
prescriptive stereotype that women should be communal and warm.209 Women
who do behave in agentic ways tend to be disliked, faulted for personality

202. Eagly & Karau, supra note 114, at 573–98; Doré Butler & Florence L. Geis, Nonverbal Affect
Responses to Male and Female Leaders: Implications for Leadership Evaluations, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 48, 54–57 (1990); EAGLY & CARLI, supra note 107.
203. Madeline E. Heilman, Caryn J. Block, Michael C. Simon & Richard F. Martell, Has Anything
Changed? Current Characterizations of Men, Women, and Managers, 74 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 935, 941 (1989).
204. Lisa Sinclair & Ziva Kunda, Motivated Stereotyping of Women: She’s Fine if She Praised Me But
Incompetent if She Criticized Me, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1329, 1340 (2000).
205. Maria Katsarou, Women & the Leadership Labyrinth: Howard vs Heidi, LEADERSHIP PSYCH. INST.,
https://www.leadershippsychologyinstitute.com/women-the-leadership-labyrinth-howard-vs-heidi/ (last visited
Nov. 23, 2020).
206. Glick & Fiske, supra note 200, at 109; Peter Glick, Jeffrey Diebold, Barbara Bailey-Werner & Lin
Zhu, The Two Faces of Adam: Ambivalent Sexism and Polarized Attitudes Toward Women, 23 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1323, 1324–25 (1997).
207. See generally Burgess & Borgida, supra note 142; Prentice & Carranza, supra note 185.
208. Id.
209. Brescoll & Uhlmann, supra note 180, at 268; Eagly & Karau, supra note 114, at 573–98; Tyler G.
Okimoto & Victoria L. Brescoll, The Price of Power: Power Seeking and Backlash Against Female Politicians,
36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 923, 923–36 (2010); Laurie A. Rudman, Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor
for Women: The Costs and Benefits of Counterstereotypical Impression Management, 74 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCH. 629, 629 (1998); Rudman & Fairchild, supra note 180, at 158; Rudman & Glick, Reactions, supra
note 180, at 1004–10; Rudman & Glick, Prescriptive Gender, supra note 180, at 743–44; Livingston et al., supra
note 192, at 354 (dominance accepted from white men).
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problems, and get feedback that they come off as “aggressive,” “bulldogs,”
having “sharp elbows,” “shrill,” or “bitchy.”210
This backlash can play out for both women and people of color in
performance evaluations. One unpublished study of performance evaluations by
the Center for WorkLife Law found that 91% of people of color and 82% of
white women received comments on their performance evaluations about their
personalities, while only 77% of white men did.211 An informal study of tech
companies found that 66% of women had received criticism about their
personalities on their performance evaluations compared to only 1% of men.212
The gender literature glosses over the fact that while dominance is accepted
from white men, the same is not true of Black men, who are often penalized for
expressing dominance.213 The most vivid study showed that Black men CEOs
tend to be baby-faced, whereas white CEOs tend to have more mature faces, and
concluded that this “teddy bear effect” serves to provide racial reassurance to
white people that the leadership behavior of the Black CEOs was, indeed,
appropriate and not too threatening.214 Black men have to take steps that women
and white men do not in order to get ahead in the workplace, whether by using
disarming mechanisms, racial comfort strategies, or simply having the “right”
appearance.215 Social dominance theory helps explain why Black men can
become particular targets of bias, because their status as men threatens the social
dominance of white men.216 This also helps explain why Black women do not
present the same threat. Research on Black women indicates that agentic
behavior may not carry the same penalty as it does for Black men or white
women.217
Because women of Asian descent are expected to be more passive than
other women, they may face an even greater penalty for agentic behavior.218
People of Asian descent are stereotyped as communal team players, which
means they can face pushback if they speak without softening their language,
seek a leadership role, or advocate for a raise.219 Other research reports that

210. Prentice & Carranza, supra note 185, at 280; Rudman et al., supra note 185, at 167.
211. Audit of the performance evaluations of a medium-sized law firm (unpublished data) (on file with
authors).
212. Kieran Snyder, The Abrasiveness Trap: High-Achieving Men and Women Are Described Differently in
Reviews, FORTUNE (Aug. 26, 2014, 2:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2014/08/26/performance-review-genderbias/.
213. Livingston et al., supra note 192, at 355.
214. Livingston & Pearce, supra note 181, at 1232.
215. CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 8; Livingston et al., supra note 192, at 1229.
216. JIM SIDANIUS & FELICIA PRATTO, SOCIAL DOMINANCE: AN INTERGROUP THEORY OF SOCIAL
HIERARCHY AND OPPRESSION (1999); Jim Sidanius & Rosemary C. Veniegas, Gender and Race Discrimination:
The Interactive Nature of Disadvantage, in REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 47, 50 (Stuart Oskamp
ed., 2000).
217. Livingston et al., supra note 192, at 335; Rosette et al., supra note 180, at 439.
218. Rosette et al., supra note 180, at 439–40.
219. Berdahl & Min, supra note 180, at 143; Debra M. Kawahara, Monica S. Pal & Jean Lau Chin, The
Leadership Experiences of Asian Americans, 4 ASIAN AM. J. PSYCH. 240, 241 (2013); Thomas Sy, Lynn M.
Shore, Judy Strauss, Ted H. Shore, Susanna Tram, Paul Whiteley & Kristine Ikeda-Muromachi, Leadership
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white women who display authority are most likely to be seen as having
personality problems, while women of Asian descent are seen as the worst fit
for leadership.220 Qualitative data suggest that women of color who violate
prescriptive gender norms risk triggering highly negative racial stereotypes. For
example, one Asian-American woman reported that sometimes, if she did not
conform to the modest/self-effacing/nice good woman stereotype, then she was
treated as sly and untrustworthy—“all those Asian things.”221 Notice how a
transgression of gender mandates triggered ugly nineteenth-century stereotypes
of people of Asian descent.222
Similarly, a Latinx woman scientist reported that she was treated as angry
when she wasn’t angry—she just wasn’t deferential.223 For her, violating
prescriptive gender stereotypes again triggered a racial stereotype—the “hotblooded Latin.”224
Leadership and management roles: “[M]en are more readily accepted by
others in leadership roles.”225 Resistance to women as leaders has been
extensively documented,226 and is largest in masculine-typed contexts (which
includes most professional/managerial jobs).227 This includes management roles
because management is seen in the United States as a masculine task.228 The
male leadership advantage is so strong that even low-dominance men are more
likely to be chosen as leaders than high-dominance women.229 Men also are
more likely to be seen as effective leaders in male-dominated and military
contexts.230 Male leaders also are more likely to be positively evaluated than
female leaders, particularly in male-typed roles.231 On the other hand, when
women give negative feedback, they tend to be disliked and seen as less
competent.232
Perceptions as a Function of Race-Occupation Fit: The Case of Asian Americans, 95 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 902,
914 (2010); Lin et al., supra note 155, at 35.
220. Justine Tinkler, Jun Zhao, Yan Li & Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Honorary Whites? Asian American Women
and the Dominance Penalty, 5 SOCIUS 1, 6 (2019).
221. Confidential Interview (2012).
222. Lin et al., supra note 155, at 41.
223. WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 46.
224. Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino Males: An Analysis of Race, National
Origin, and Gender Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231, 240 (1994).
225. RIDGEWAY, supra note 104, at 80; Joseph Berger, Cecilia L. Ridgeway, M. Hamit Fisek & Robert Z.
Norman, The Legitimation and Delegitimation of Power and Prestige Orders, 63 AM. SOCIO. REV. 379, 397–98
(1998); Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Joseph Berger, Expectations, Legitimation, and Dominance Behavior in Task
Groups, 51 AM. SOCIO. REV. 603 (1986); Cecilia L. Ridgeway & Chris Bourg, Gender as Status: An Expectation
States Theory Approach, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENDER 217, 217–41 (Alice H. Eagly, Anne E. Beall & Robert
J. Sternberg eds., 2004).
226. RIDGEWAY, supra note 104, at 82; EAGLY & CARLI, supra note 107, at 49; Alice H. Eagly & Steven J.
Karau, Gender and the Emergence of Leaders: A Meta-Analysis, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 685, 685
(1991).
227. Eagly & Karau, supra note 226, at 685–86.
228. Heilman et al., supra note 203, at 941.
229. RIDGEWAY, supra note 104, at 83.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 85.
232. Sinclair & Kunda, supra note 204, at 1137.
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Interruptions and other conversational norms: Professional workplaces
often require assertiveness in meetings, which again disadvantages women and
people of color. In meetings, (white) men tend to interrupt more, are more likely
to gain the floor when they do interrupt, spend more time speaking, make more
task suggestions, use less tentative speech, use more assertive gestures, and
exercise more influence.233 When women use assertive speech in mixed-groups,
they are less, not more, influential than when they use tentative forms of speech,
and they are also seen as less likable and less trustworthy.234 Women and
professionals of color have to figure out a way to get their ideas on the table
without being seen as inappropriately pushy.235 Of course, professionals who are
constantly interrupted risk having their authority undermined, and will likely
have a more difficult time getting their ideas accepted by the group. Matters are
even more difficult for women experts trying to get their point across; women
are actually less influential when they possess expertise, while male experts are
more influential.236
Anger: Showing anger tends to increase the status of a man, but decrease
the status of a woman,237 in part because women’s anger is often coded as her
“getting emotional.”238 Racial stereotypes also play a role. Black people may
have to put extra effort in to avoid being seen as the “angry black person.”239
Black men in particular are stereotyped as violent and quick to anger.240 The
workplace implications of this stereotype are clear: when Black men display
behavior that is merely assertive, they may trigger the “violent” stereotype and
be dinged as “intimidating.” For example, the New York Times recently reported
on discrimination faced by a Black bank customer and his Black financial
advisor, who were told they might “intimidate” other bank employees (although
their behavior was not intimidating).241
Self-promotion: Women often face pushback for self-promotion at work,
even though self-promotion can be a good strategy to get your accomplishments
noticed. Self-promotion violates the stereotype that women should be modest

233. Lynn Smith-Lovin & Charles Brody, Interruptions in Group Discussions: The Effects of Gender and
Group Composition, 54 AM. SOC. REV. 424, 432 (1989). The studies cited compare men to women, but such
studies tend to inadvertently reflect the hidden assumption that “men” means European American men. Id.; see
also RIDGEWAY, supra note 104, at 77.
234. RIDGEWAY, supra note 104, at 81; Linda L. Carli, Gender, Language, and Influence, 59 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 941, 949 (1990); Ridgeway, Gender, supra note 107, at 614; Susan Shackelford,
Wendy Wood & Stephen Worchel, Behavioral Styles and the Influence of Women in Mixed-Sex Groups, 59 SOC.
PSYCH. Q. 284, 290–92 (1996).
235. Ridgeway, Gender, supra note 107, at 648–49.
236. Melissa C. Thomas-Hunt & Katherine W. Phillips, When What You Know Is Not Enough: Expertise
and Gender Dynamics in Task Groups, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1585, 1594 (2004).
237. Brescoll & Uhlmann, supra note 180, at 268.
238. Grossman & Wood, supra note 150, at 1013.
239. Rosette et al., supra note 180, at 439; Wingfield, supra note 196, at 201.
240. Negin Ghavami & Letitia Anne Peplau, An Intersectional Analysis of Gender and Ethnic Stereotypes:
Testing Three Hypotheses, 37 PSYCH. WOMEN Q. 113, 119 (2012).
241. Emily Flitter, This Is What Racism Sounds Like in the Banking Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/11/business/jpmorgan-banking-racism.html?searchResultPosition=7.
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and helpful rather than competitive.242 In one experiment, women (but not men)
who engaged in self-promoting behavior in a mock interview were disliked
(although self-promoting men and women both were seen as more competent
than those who did not self-promote).243 People of Asian descent may encounter
a backlash if self-promotion is seen as dominant behavior from someone who is
expected to be passive and deferential.244
Who does the office housework—and who gets the glamour work?:
Women also are under pressure to perform organizational citizenship behaviors,
such as helping behaviors around the workplace that make you a good team
player, but do not really count when it comes time for advancement.245 Women
tend to do more of that work, and they tend to get less credit when they do it.246
We refer to this as doing the office housework.247 There are really several quite
different kinds of office housework: (1) literal housework (planning parties,
ordering food, cleaning up the cups), (2) administrative work (sending the
follow-up email, finding a time to meet, taking notes), (3) emotional work (being
the peacemaker, doing the mentoring, comforting people), and (4) doing
undervalued work that is important but does not lead to promotion.248 In the law
firm context, the undervalued work for litigators is doing the task list and
managing the paralegals, whereas the glamour work is talking with clients and
arguing in court. In architecture, the glamour work is design work; project
management is the undervalued work.249 Often, newly minted professionals of
both sexes do large loads of less valued work, but then men are often naturally
transitioned out of it, while women get stuck.250
WES data: WES data document Tightrope bias on the ground in
professional jobs. Our study of engineers found that over two-thirds of white

242. Kimberly A. Daubman et al., Gender and the Self-Presentation of Academic Achievement, 27 SEX
ROLES 187, 189–90 (1992); Robert J. Gould & Caroline G. Sloan, The “Feminine Modesty” Effect: A SelfPresentational Interpretation of Sex Differences in Causal Attribution, 8 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL.
477, 478 (1982); Julie E. Phelan et al., Competent Yet Out in the Cold: Shifting Criteria for Hiring Reflect
Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 32 PSYCH. OF WOMEN Q. 406, 407 (2008); Rudman, supra note 209, at 630;
Rudman & Glick, supra note 180, at 1004; Laurie Heatherington et al., Two Investigations of “Female Modesty”
in Achievement Situations, 29 SEX ROLES 739, 740 (1993).
243. RIDGEWAY, supra note 104, at 82.
244. Berdahl & Min, supra note 180, at 144; Rosette et al., supra note 181, at 5.
245. Tammy D. Allen, Rewarding Good Citizens: The Relationship Between Citizenship Behavior, Gender,
and Organizational Rewards, 36 J. APPLIED SOCIO. PSYCH. 120, 136 (2006); Linda Babcock, Maria P. Recalde,
Lise Vesterlund & Laurie Weingart, Gender Differences in Accepting and Receiving Requests for Tasks with
Low Promotability, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 714, 744 (2017); Cassandra M. Guarino & Victor M. H. Borden,
Faculty Service Loads and Gender: Are Women Taking Care of the Academic Family?, 58 RSCH. HIGHER EDUC.
672, 673 (2017).
246. Guarino & Borden, supra note 245, at 673.
247. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 110.
248. WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN ’T SEE, supra note 100, at 25–27; WILLIAMS,
CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 40; WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 110; Williams, supra note
164, at 215.
249. WILLIAMS & KORN, supra note 100.
250. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 110.
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men reported they seldom received pushback when they behaved assertively,
whereas only about half of women and people of color agreed.251

Qualitative data illustrate the tightrope women walk.
“If [women] play a traditional female role, which is more consensus
building and more gentle in terms of team dynamics and looking out for the
team, they are considered just too wimpy to have what it takes to succeed in this
aggressive culture. On the other hand, when they jump in and they play that kind
of investment-banking aggressive, they are labeled as a bitch immediately.” —
a white woman investment banker.252
“There are different rules women have to follow. You have to smile more.
Your behavior is judged on a different standard. You have to be nice as opposed
to assertive and bitchy.” —a white woman professor.253
“I have experienced the most push back from being an assertive and
authoritative woman (and minority woman); so there is resentment of my
perceived ‘masculinity’ such that people accuse me of wanting to be feared,
when men [are] deemed to simply be ‘demanding’ or as having ‘high
standards.’” —a Black woman lawyer who worked in-house.254
WES data also showed wide divergence between the experience of white
men and those of other groups with respect to interruptions. White men
engineers report being interrupted at meetings at a level nearly thirty percentage
points lower than women and people of color:255

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 121.
WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 61.
Id.
WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE, supra note 100, at 23.
WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 121.
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“White men don’t realize how much ‘space’ belongs to them or that they
unconsciously feel that they own space. They frequently interrupt others, but if
a woman on a conference call states her thoughts, she’s immediately criticized
as interrupting.” —a woman of Asian descent who worked at a law firm.256
WES data also dramatize a disparity in who is allowed to express anger.
Our data on lawyers showed that white men are much more likely to report being
free to express anger than women and people of color.257

256. WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE, supra note 100, at 22.
257. Id. at 25.
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“I raised my voice during a meeting, and I was reprimanded for getting
emotional. But two male leaders . . . get into a yelling match in the same meeting
and it’s no big deal.” —a Latinx woman engineer.258
Men could get angry, she said, but women could not. She attributed the
problem to gender, not race, but the anger problem may be exacerbated for
Latinx women because it triggers the “fiery Latin” stereotype.259 Similarly for
Black women, the anger problem may be exacerbated because it triggers the
“angry Black person” stereotype.260
“When conflicts arise, I am always put in the defensive position because
the assumption is that I was the initial aggressor. My defensive behavior gets
more of the negative spotlight than the actions . . . of those I’m defending myself
against.” —a Black woman architect.261
“In the past year, I’ve been called ‘overconfident’ and ‘not deferential
enough’ by co-counsel, another Asian American woman. It was extremely
frustrating as I was finally starting to feel confident and assertive and direct,
acting as any normal white male attorney in a law firm would. I was
subsequently removed from that case.” —a woman lawyer of Asian descent.262
“Asians are supposed to be very passive. And when you add women to that,
they really don’t expect Asian women to stand up for themselves, or they expect
the dragon lady, the extreme opposite. You can’t just be a normal person.

258. WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 48. The low number of Latinx professionals
in our datasets precludes statistically robust conclusions from WES data and we are aware of no experimental
studies documenting bias against Latinx professionals.
259. Williams, supra note 164, at 208.
260. Rosette et al., supra note 180, at 439; Wingfield, supra note 196, at 201.
261. WILLIAMS & KORN, supra note 100.
262. WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE, supra note 100, at 21.
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There’s no expectation for you to be normal.” —a woman geophysicist of Asian
descent.263
“I have heard that I am considered argumentative or aggressive, even
though I don’t do anything different than my male counterparts.” —a Latinx
woman engineer.264
More recent interviews in tech revealed that Latinx women in tech are often
belittled as “feisty” or “sassy”265—two interesting words that denote
unexpectedly assertive behavior from someone who is expected to behave
deferentially.266 In addition, Latinx people may be seen as angry even when they
aren’t:
“I basically chewed him out at work and, unfortunately, I lost all [the]
respect of my colleagues. After that, I’ve been very, very careful about that.” —
a Latinx woman lawyer.267
WES data also show women of all races were less likely to feel that they
were rewarded for self-promotion than white men.268

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE J EOPARDY, supra note 100, at 19.
WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 46.
Telephone Interviews with women of color in technology (2019) (on file with authors).
Id.
Williams, supra note 164, at 208.
WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN ’T SEE, supra note 100, at 24.
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Women of all races report doing larger loads of office housework than
white men.269

Whereas the office housework affected chiefly women (of all races), both
women and men of color report less access to desirable assignments. In our study
of lawyers, there was a nearly thirty percentage point gap in the experiences of
white men and women of color when it came to opportunities for the glamour
work.270

269. WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN ’T SEE, supra note 100, at 26–27.
270. Id.
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“Despite superior educational credentials and being a lateral transfer from
a far more prestigious firm, I was given an appropriate title but slotted into the
subservient, support role (i.e., expected to take notes, get coffee, hang men’s
jackets, etc.).” —a white woman who worked at a law firm.271
“We [racial minorities] are perceived as the help, not the leaders, when
often we are more capable of leading the job . . . Constant country club behavior.
Brotherhood/male fraternity type behaviors allow men to be more involved or
allowed first dibs on projects . . . .” —a multiracial woman architect.272
“The stupid little sexism things: asking me to sew something when I’m the
only woman in a leadership team; asking why my office isn’t decorated for the
holidays ‘like the front office girls’ . . .” —a Latinx woman engineer.273
Stereotypes about Latinx people being good at maintenance or domestic
work puts pressure on Latinx employees to be exceptionally hard workers and
do the jobs that “no one else wants,” which may mean more office housework
and less glamour work opportunities in office settings.274 Women of color also
report less access to the glamour work than white women.275

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id.
WILLIAMS & KORN, supra note 100.
WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 48.
Williams, supra note 164, at 207.
Data on file with authors. See supra notes 169–172 and accompanying text.
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The bottom line of Tightrope bias is rarely noted. In some workplaces,
women and people of color have been invited in, but expected to play a very
different role than white men do: to be worker bees that work hard, keep their
heads down, and avoid confrontation, leaving the glamour work and leadership
roles to white men. White men report being expected to be worker bees at a level
fourteen to twenty percentage points lower than women and people of color.276

276. WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN ’T SEE, supra note 100, at 28.
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White men also reported being seen as leaders at a level significantly higher
than their colleagues.277

277. Id. at 29.
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“As an Asian-American man, I often felt firm leadership would overlook
my leadership contributions and capabilities.” —an Asian-American male
architect.278
How gender bias differs by race: Women of color report higher levels of
Tightrope bias than white women. 279

280

In one of our studies, women of Asian descent reported the highest level of
pressures to behave in feminine ways, and the highest level of pushback if they
did not.281 Some research suggests that Black women are expected to be
agentic—they do not face the same pushback for advocating for their own
careers that white women do.282 Some WES qualitative evidence supports this.
“I’ve never really dealt with being thought of as a bitch, but I have—I kind
of aspire to that a little bit because I see, at this university at least, that—actually
it’s a very effective perception to have.” —a Black woman science professor.283
However, in WES data, Black women report higher levels of some forms
of Tightrope bias, notably that they are less able to express anger at work than
white women.284

278. WILLIAMS & KORN, supra note 100.
279. In order to examine how gender bias differs by race, we standardized the data from women across
studies and used one-way ANOVA testing to test for differences between racial groups. When appropriate, we
used post-hoc Tukey HSD testing to examine the group differences in detail. The graphs in this Subpart represent
levels of bias relative to other groups of women.
280. Data on file with authors. See supra notes 169–172 and accompanying text.
281. WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE J EOPARDY?, supra note 100, at 6.
282. Livingston et al., supra note 192, at 357.
283. WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE J EOPARDY?, supra note 100, at 21.
284. Data on file with authors. See supra notes 169–172 and accompanying text.
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“You have to avoid the stereotype of the ‘angry Black female,’ which
diminishes your opinion and the weight of your argument.” —a Black woman
statistician.285

Interview evidence of science professors suggests that Latinx women may
be more likely than other groups to get stuck with the office housework.
“I think there are times when I am asked to be kind of the mother of the
group. I’m the one who has to make sure that everybody fills out their
paperwork, and I’m the one who takes care of things, sets up the meetings and
things like that. I mean, I play many roles that could be done by a competent
administrative assistant . . . . It’s assumed that I’ll take care of it because nobody
else will.” —a Latinx woman science professor.286
“I mean, these kind of administrative duties eat into my time.” —a Latinx
woman science professor.287
Tightrope data has concrete workplace effects:288 In our study of
engineers in India, Tightrope bias had the strongest and most far-reaching effects
of all five patterns of bias.289 Higher levels of Tightrope bias were associated
with lower levels of career satisfaction and enjoyment, feeling that others are
less invested in your career, less willingness to recommend ones’ organization
to others as a good place to work, less happiness about one’s career continuing
as it has been, greater intentions to leave, greater feelings of exclusion, and lower
285. WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE J EOPARDY?, supra note 100, at 21.
286. Williams, supra note 164, at 207.
287. Id.
288. These regression analyses were conducted on data collected from engineers in India, and we have not
had the opportunity to run the same tests on data from the United States. However, we expect that the patterns
of bias will have similar negative effects on workplace processes and outcomes in the United States.
289. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 99, at 16–17.
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feelings of belonging.290 Tightrope bias was also linked to negative fairness
perceptions in a number of workplace processes, including performance
evaluations, assignments, sponsorship, networking, and compensation.291
C. MATERNAL WALL BIAS
The third major pattern of bias contains both a descriptive component—
that mothers will conform to the ideal of a mother who puts her children first—
and a prescriptive component—that mothers should.292
Negative competence and commitment assumptions: Motherhood
triggers very strong negative competence and commitment assumptions for
women.293 Maternal Wall bias has a descriptive element: that mothers are not a
good fit for the professional world.294 In one study, subjects were given two
identical resumes with one difference: one but not the other listed membership
in the PTA.295 They found that the mother was 79% less likely to be hired, half
as likely to be promoted, offered an average of $11,000 less in starting salary,
and held to higher performance and punctuality standards.296 Many women
report that, when they return from maternity leave, they need to prove
themselves all over again.297 Fiske and Glick document that housewives are
stereotyped as low in competence, in comparison to businesswomen.298
Housewives are stereotyped as more but similar in competence to the elderly
and disabled individuals.299 More work from Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick finds that
the stereotype about working mothers is similar to housewives.300

290.
291.
292.
293.

Id.
Id.
WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at xxi.
Stephen Benard & Shelley J. Correll, Normative Discrimination and the Motherhood Penalty, 24
GENDER & SOC’Y. 616, 639 (2010); Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a
Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOCIO. 1297, 1333 (2007); Faye J. Crosby, Joan C. Williams & Monica Bierat,
The Maternal Wall, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 675, 679 (2004); Amy J. C. Cuddy, Susan T. Ficke & Peter Glick, When
Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn’t Cut the Ice, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 701, 711 (2004); Kathleen
Fuegen, Monica Biernat, Elizabeth Haines & Kay Deaux, Mothers and Fathers in the Workplace: How Gender
and Parental Status Influence Judgments of Job Related Competence, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 737, 748 (2004); Jane
A. Halpert Midge L. Wilson & Julia L. Hickman, Pregnancy as a Source of Bias in Performance Appraisals, 14
J. ORG. BEHAV. 649, 660 (1993); Michelle R. Hebl, Eden B. King, Peter Glick, Sarah L. Singletary & Stephanie
Kazama, Hostile and Benevolent Reactions Toward Pregnant Women: Complementary Interpersonal
Punishments and Rewards That Maintain Traditional Roles, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 1499, 1504 (2007); Madeline
E. Heilman & Tyler G. Okimoto, Motherhood: a Potential Source of Bias in Employment Decisions, 93 J.
APPLIED PSYCH. 189, 196–97 (2008).
294. Williams, supra note 164, at 192.
295. Correll et al., supra note 293, at 1316–17.
296. Id.
297. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 135.
298. Fiske et al., supra note 149, at 879; see also Thomas Eckes, Paternalistic and Envious Gender
Prejudice: Testing Predictions from the Stereotype Content Model, 47 SEX ROLES 99, 110 (2002); Fiske et al.,
(Dis)respecting, supra note 200, at 476.
299. Fiske et al., supra note 149, at 223.
300. Cuddy et al., supra note 293, at 706.
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Prescriptive bias: Prescriptive stereotypes are that the good mother is
“always available to her children.”301 Consequently, mothers who are
indisputably competent and committed face backlash at work as well. Known as
“hostile prescriptive stereotyping,” they tend to be seen as less likable and are
held to higher performance standards because they are seen as bad mothers and
therefore bad people.302 Stereotypes of mothers can be benevolent as well as
hostile. Benevolent prescriptive stereotypes mean that colleagues often withhold
work opportunities from others because “with the two young kids, it’s not a good
time for her.”303
Attribution bias means that women have to prove themselves all over
again after they have children. Thus, if a mother is late from work, the
assumption will be that it is due to her children, not a traffic jam.304 If a mother
is out of the office for a business meeting, people may well assume that she is
out of the office for child-related matters.305
Bias against fathers: Having children is a good career move for fathers—
unless they take care of them. Fathers are held to lower performance and
punctuality standards, offered higher salaries, and are more likely to be hired
and promoted than identical men without children.306 This reflects the
assumption that fathers are breadwinners, with family responsibilities, who will
work harder because they have families to support. However, fathers who take
parental leave or request a flexible schedule risk serious penalty. A matched
resume study found a robust flexibility stigma: fathers who take parental leave
were less likely to be promoted, receive the high-profile assignments, and get
recommended for raises, and they were more likely to be demoted or encouraged
to look for a new job elsewhere.307 Research by Joseph Vandello and colleagues
documents the flexibility stigma for men who request flexible schedules: men
who did so were penalized with lower ratings, lower raises, and were rated as
less masculine than men who maintained full-time schedules after the birth of a
child.308 An important finding is that the flexibility stigma is, at the core, a
femininity stigma: fathers who engage in family caregiving are penalized
because they are seen as too feminine.309 This means that bias against fathers
can be litigated as sex discrimination. Under Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, it is
301. Diane Kobrynowicz & Monica Biernat, Decoding Subjective Evaluations: How Stereotypes Provide
Shifting Standards, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 579, 584–87 (1993).
302. Benard & Correll, supra note 293, at 639; Stephen Benard, In Paik & Shelley J. Correll, Cognitive Bias
and the Motherhood Penalty, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1372–77 (2008).
303. Benard et al., supra note 302, at 1385.
304. Ivy Kennelly, “That Single-Mother Element”: How White Employers Typify Black Women, 13 GENDER
& SOC ’Y. 168, 172 (1999); Deborah L. Rhode, Comment, Myths of Meritocracy, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 585, 588
(1996).
305. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 135.
306. Correll et al., supra note 293, at 1316–17.
307. Laurie A. Rudman & Kris Mescher, Penalizing Men Who Request a Family Leave: Is Flexibility Stigma
a Femininity Stigma?, 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 322, 329 (2013).
308. Joseph A. Vandello, Vanessa E. Hettinger, Jennifer K. Bosson & Jasmine Siddiqi, When Equal Isn’t
Really Equal: The Masculine Dilemma of Seeking Work Flexibility, 69 J. SOC. ISSUES 303, 315–18 (2013).
309. Rudman & Mescher, supra note 307, at 329.

November 2020]

BEYOND IMPLICIT BIAS

385

sex discrimination for an employer to penalize a female worker for being too
masculine or, presumably, a male worker for being “too feminine.”310
WES data: WES data confirm that Maternal Wall bias is alive and well in
today’s professional workplaces. White men were much less likely to report that
their colleagues’ perceptions of their work competence and commitment
changed after they had children. The gap between white men and women in our
study of engineers311 was large: twenty-three percentage points.312

The sudden change in perceptions of work commitment and competence
was clear in the qualitative data as well:
“You can either be perceived as the nurturer or extremely competent, but
it’s pretty hard to be perceived as both.” —a woman chemist of Asian descent.313
“Needing to set more boundaries around my time and availability [after
having a baby] seemed to negatively impact my position and the perception of
my abilities, despite the years I had already put in ‘proving’ myself.” —a white
woman architect.314
“After having children . . . the principals in my office . . . automatically
assumed that my career wasn’t as important (relative to my male counterparts,
with or without children).” —a woman engineer of Asian descent.315

310. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989).
311. The majority of people of color in the engineering dataset were women. Therefore, the conclusions
drawn about people of color are most applicable to women of color and may not be representative of the
experiences of men of color. We supplement the engineering data with data from lawyers where possible to
illustrate the experiences of men of color.
312. WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 125.
313. WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE J EOPARDY?, supra note 100, at 28.
314. WILLIAMS & KORN, supra note 100.
315. WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 59.
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“This new manager told me directly that I would not ‘want’ a promotion
because it requires more responsibility, and I am a mom so I wouldn’t want to
travel.” —a white woman engineer.316
White men also report lower levels of pushback when it comes to asking
for flexible work arrangements and taking family leave. In our studies of lawyers
and engineers, there was a gap of approximately fifteen percentage points
between white men and others.317

Lawyers, engineers, and architects all reported sharp decreases in the
quality of their work environments after they had children.
“Went on reduced work schedule due to having kids—and suddenly could
not get staffed on matters. Basically I have been forced to leave.” —a white
woman law firm lawyer.318
“I made partner in the shortest time of any female. Things were great. I had
my son. I worked part time during leave and came back in 9 weeks. My work
was gone. It has taken 2 years and a change in focus to get back to the level I
was.” —a white woman law firm lawyer.319
“While my last boss was awesome, fully supportive of me within company
politics as well as demands of my personal life (I worked part time ~32
hours/week), I was frequently assigned tasks below my ability level.” —a white
woman engineer.320

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

Id. at 61.
Id. at 125; WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN ’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE, supra note 100, at 35.
WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN ’T SEE, supra note 100, at 36.
Id. at 37.
WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 63.
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“I took leave after having a child and when I returned there was no longer
meaningful work for me at the firm.” —a white woman architect.321
How gender bias differs by race:322 White women were more likely than
women of color to report that parenthood affected their perceived
competence.323 However, interview evidence suggests that Maternal Wall
stereotypes may be heightened for Latinx and Black women, who report facing
assumptions that they will have children—lots of children.324
“We like to be pregnant. We don’t like to take birth control. We’re mañana
oriented. We’re easy.” —a Latinx woman.325
“Usually people take over countries with wars, but you Mexicans are doing
it by having lots of babies.” —a Latinx woman, reporting on a racist comment.326
“I don’t have any data, being a Black woman with children gets complex
because the assumption is once you start, you’re never going to stop. You’ll end
up being a welfare queen. So I also didn’t want to deal with that.” —a Black
woman microbiologist.327
“Worker bee” stereotypes of women of Asian descent sometimes means
they meet hostile prescriptive stereotyping:
“I get that a lot: ‘Don’t you feel bad leaving your kids at home? Don’t you
miss them?’ And I say ‘Sure, I miss them. My husband misses them too, but I
have a wonderful relationship with my kids; my children are fabulous.’ And they
say, ‘Oh, my wife could never do that, never leave the kids.’” —an Asian
American woman lawyer.328
Note the message that she’s a bad mother; as noted above, this may lead to
dislike and being held to higher performance standards.
Maternal Wall has concrete workplace effects:329 In our study of
engineers in India, higher levels of Maternal Wall bias were associated with
feeling excluded in the workplace and feeling like colleagues do not support
diversity.330

321. WILLIAMS & KORN, supra note 100.
322. In order to examine how gender bias differs by race, we standardized the data from women across
studies and used one-way ANOVA testing to test for differences between racial groups. When appropriate, we
used post-hoc Tukey HSD testing to examine the group differences in detail. The graphs in this Part represent
levels of bias relative to other groups of women.
323. Data on file with authors. See supra notes 169–172 and accompanying text.
324. Denise A. Segura, Chicanas in White-Collar Jobs: “You Have to Prove Yourself More”, 35 SOCIO.
PERSPS. 163, 173 (1992); Jody Agius Vallejo, Latina Spaces: Middle-Class Ethnic Capital and Professional
Associations in the Latino Community, 8 CITY & CMTY. 129, 146 (2009).
325. Segura, supra note 324, at 173.
326. Vallejo, supra note 324, at 146.
327. WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE J EOPARDY?, supra note 100, at 30.
328. JANET E. GANS EPNER, COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, VISIBLE INVISIBILITY: WOMEN OF
COLOR IN LAW FIRMS 34 (2006), https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/judicialstudies/panel_1-visible
_invisibility_women_of_color_in_law_firms.pdf.
329. These regression analyses were conducted on data collected from engineers in India, and we have not
had the opportunity to run the same tests on data from the United States. However, we expect that the patterns
of bias will have similar negative effects on workplace processes and outcomes in the United States.
330. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 99, at 17.
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D. TUG OF WAR BIAS
The fourth pattern, Tug of War, occurs when bias against a group fuels
conflict within the group.331 Thus, gender bias can fuel conflict among
women,332 and racial bias can fuel conflict among people of color.333
Threat Mechanisms: Michelle Duguid, Denise Lewin Loyd, and Pamela
Tolbert outline three threat mechanisms that lead to conflict among members of
the same group.334 One is “collective threat,” when an out-group member, such
as a Latinx person, thinks that if another Latinx employee performs poorly, it
reflects poorly on them.335 The next is “competitive threat,” where, for example,
a woman thinks that if another woman performs well, it will make her look
worse by comparison.336 The last is “favoritism threat,” where, for example, a
Black woman is worried that if she supports another Black woman, it will look
like favoritism.337
Systems Justification: As noted above, in-group favoritism means that
members of the dominant group may be held to lower standards and find it easier
to find sponsors and career-enhancing assignments.338 Disadvantaged groups
benefit less from in-group favoritism due to “systems justification”: people are
motivated to see the world as just, even in the face of evidence that their own
group is being harmed by inequality.339 This means that sometimes people in
331. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 179.
332. Belle Derks, Colette Van Laar, Naomi Ellemers & Kim de Groot, Gender-Bias Primes Elicit QueenBee Responses Among Senior Policewomen, 22 PSYCH. SCI. 1243, 1243–44 (2011) [hereinafter Derks et al,
Gender-Bias]; Belle Derks, Naomi Ellemers, Colette Van Laar & Kim de Groot, Do Sexist Organizational
Cultures Create the Queen Bee?, 50 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCH. 519, 520 (2011) [hereinafter Derks et al., Sexist
Organizational Cultures]; Michelle Duguid, Female Tokens in High-Prestige Work Groups: Catalysts or
Inhibitors of Group Diversification?, 116 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 104, 104–05 (2011);
Michelle M. Duguid, Denise Lewin Lloyd & Pamela S. Tolbert, The Impact of Categorical Status, Numeric
Representation, and Work Group Prestige on Preference for Demographically Similar Others: A Value Threat
Approach, 23 ORG. SCI. 386, 387 (2012); Naomi Ellemers, Henriette van den Heuvel, Dick de Gilder, Anne
Maass & Alessandra Bonvini, The Underrepresentation of Women in Science: Differential Commitment or the
Queen Bee Syndrome?, 43 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCH. 315, 325 (2004); Robin J. Ely, The Effects of Organizational
Demographics and Social Identity on Relationships Among Professional Women, 39 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 203, 204
(1994); Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life: Skewed Sex Ratios and Responses
to Token Women, 82 AM. J. SOC. 965, 979–80 (1977); Elizabeth J. Parks-Stamm, Madeline E. Heilman & Krystle
A. Hearns, Motivated to Penalize: Women’s Strategic Rejection of Successful Women, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. BULL. 237, 239 (2008); Graham L. Staines, Carol Tavris & Toby Epstein Jayaratne, The Queen Bee
Syndrome, 7 PSYCH. TODAY 55, 57 (1974); Colette van Laar, Dennis Bleeker, Naomi Ellemers & Eline Meijer,
Ingroup and Outgroup Support for Upward Mobility: Divergent Responses to Ingroup Identification in Low
Status Groups, 44 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCH. 563, 573–74 (2014).
333. Duguid et al., supra note 332, at 387; CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 8, at 2; Tina R. Opie & Katherine
W. Phillips, Hair Penalties: The Negative Influence of Afrocentric Hair on Ratings of Black Women’s
Dominance and Professionalism, 6 FRONT. PSYCH. 1, 1–2 (2015).
334. Duguid et al., supra note 332, at 388.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. See supra notes 110–134 and accompanying text.
339. Jost & Banaji, supra note 74, at 13–14; John T. Jost, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Brian A. Nosek, A Decade
of System Justification Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status
Quo, 25 POL. PSYCH. 881, 910 (2004).
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disadvantaged groups internalize and perpetuate the system of inequality that
disadvantages them.340 Disadvantaged group members may show out-group
favoritism rather than in-group favoritism: better treatment towards members of
outgroups than their own groups.341
Tokenism: In workplaces dominated by white men, women and people of
color may be viewed as “tokens”342 in ways that pit members of underrepresented groups against other members of their group. “Opportunities for
women are very zero-sum. If one woman gets a prized position or assignment,
that means another woman won’t. And so it breeds a sense of competition,” said
one woman.343 Tokenism also makes it difficult for the “token woman” to
advocate for other members of their group.344
Strategic Distancing: In environments where they have a fragile hold,
women or people of color may distance themselves from other members of their
group.345 Belle Derks, Naomi Ellemers, and colleagues document how, in
workplaces where there is gender bias, joining the boy’s club can be a politically
savvy move for a woman.346 This is commonly called the issue of the “Queen
Bee,” as if it reflects just another woman with a personality problem.347
However, the research shows that “Queen Bee” behavior is actually a response
to gender bias in the environment.348
Racism: White women are, of course, white people. Some white people
are openly racist, and white people in general have a lot to learn about racism. It
goes without saying that racism shapes workplaces profoundly. Just one
example, from a Latinx science professor who reported trouble getting white
admins to do for her what they readily did for other professors: “[O]n top of
being young and a woman, I am Mexican. And whether it is clear to them
conscious or unconscious, here, there is this Mexican woman telling [an
administrative staff person] what to do.”349
White women also often assume a sisterhood that Black women do not feel:
in our study of science professors, 76% of women in general, but only 56% of
Black women felt that women in their environments often support each other—
a percentage lower than any other group.350

340. Jost et al., supra note 339, at 891; John T. Jost, Brett W. Pelham & Mauricio R. Carvallo, NonConscious Forms of System Justification: Implicit and Behavioral Preferences for Higher Status Groups, 38 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 586, 587 (2002).
341. Jost et al., supra note 339, at 891; Jost et al., supra note 340, at 587.
342. Kanter, supra note 332, at 966.
343. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 183.
344. Duguid, supra note 332, at 112.
345. Duguid et al., supra note 332, at 387; Duguid, supra note 332, at 104.
346. Derks et al., Sexist Organizational Cultures, supra note 332, at 520.
347. Ellemers et al., supra note 332, at 325; Staines et al., supra note 332, at 55.
348. Derks et al., Sexist Organizational Cultures, supra note 332, at 520.
349. Interview with Erika V. Hall (June 2012) (NSF Tools for Change Project) (on file with authors).
350. WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE J EOPARDY?, supra note 100, at 35.
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In addition, the experience of gender bias differs by race,351 which can set
women of different races against each other.352 For example, Black women
sometimes find they can behave in dominant ways that are sanctioned in white
women.353 Said one science professor: “I kind of aspire to [being a bitch] . . . a
little bit because I see, at this university at least, that actually it’s a very effective
perception” to create.354
White women sometimes respond to Black women’s assertive behavior by
trying to police them into femininity. Here’s an example:
I certainly think that if I was a white man I would not have been given so much
feedback about being an empathetic person and how important it would be to
try to make people more comfortable with me. I also think that part of what
has been interpreted as my hard edges are attributable to me being a black
woman.355

No doubt there’s a lot more; this rich subject deserves further rigorous
study.
Bias Pass-Throughs: Prove-It-Again, Tightrope, and Maternal Wall bias
can all be passed through from women to other women. Although it may be less
common, bias may also be passed from people of color to other people of color.
Studies show that college women rate the typical woman as less competent
than men despite the fact they do not rate themselves that way.356 Prove-It-Again
bias also can be passed through from older women to younger women.357 For
example, older women may apply harsher standards to younger women because
they believe a higher standard of competence is necessary for a woman to
succeed in their workplace.358
Bias pass-through also can create conflict between women professionals
and support staff: “Females are harder on their female assistants, more detail
oriented, and they have to try harder to prove themselves, so they put that on
you,” noted a legal secretary.359 This dynamic can have far-reaching
consequences. In one study, not one legal secretary preferred to work for a
woman boss (although about half of admins had no sex preference).360
351. Rosette et al., supra note 156, at 2; WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE JEOPARDY?, supra note 100, at 9;
WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN ’T SEE, supra note 100, at 9–12; WILLIAMS ET AL.,
CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 118; WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 223.
352. Mamta Motwani Accapadi, When White Women Cry: How White Women’s Tears Oppress Women of
Color, 26 COLL. STUDENT AFF. J. 208, 209–10 (2007).
353. Livingston et al., supra note 192, at 357.
354. WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE J EOPARDY?, supra note 100, at 21.
355. Interview with Erika V. Hall (June 2012) (NSF Tools for Change Project) (on file with authors).
356. RIDGEWAY, supra note 104, at 62.
357. WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 82; WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE
WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE, supra note 100, at 40–43; Williams, supra note 164, at 211.
358. WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 82; WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE
WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE, supra note 100, at 40–43; Williams, supra note 164, at 211.
359. Felice Batlan, “If You Become His Second Wife, You Are a Fool”: Shifting Paradigms of the Roles,
Perceptions, and Working Conditions of Legal Secretaries in Large Law Firms, in 52 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS,
& SOCIETY 169, 200 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010).
360. Id. at 199–200.
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Tightrope bias can also be passed through from women to other women.
For example, women may be critical of other women for dressing in a manner
that they deem too feminine, or using a soft-spoken voice.361 Women also
sometimes criticize other women for acting in a way that they deem too
masculine, simply assimilating to the way men have traditionally acted in the
workplace.362
The Maternal Wall can create “mommy wars.” Research shows that
women hold mothers to higher standards in the workplace and penalize them
when it comes to promotions, compensation, and hiring.363 This may be due to
identity threat, as when older women fault younger women for taking too much
family leave or working part time, on the grounds that, “I worked full time my
whole career and my kids are fine.”364 Older women’s fear that younger women
are judging them for being bad mothers is sometimes fueled by comments by
younger women that they “want to raise [their] own children” (implying that the
older women did not). Bias against mothers by women also can reflect collective
threat: if a new mother is too family-focused, it might reflect poorly on all the
women in the workplace.365
There is less research on bias pass-throughs by race. However, one study
by Tina Opie and Katherine Phillips found that Black evaluators were more
critical than white evaluators of professionals who wore their hair in Afrocentric
styles.366 This highlights the ways that out-groups can be divided against each
other because of different ways of presenting their identities and/or different
strategies for assimilating to the majority group (or refusing to do so).367
Status effects also can divide low-status group members against each other.
Lower status people (for example, women and people of color in a majority
white-male workplace”) may support high-status people because it is less
risky.368 Similarly, low status people often behave in low status ways in order to
gain the approval of their group because they “know their place.”369 These status
mechanisms are utilized by low-status people to assimilate, but could cause
conflict between group members.
WES Data: WES data confirm that the intra-group conflict documented
by lab research on the Tug of War also plays out in everyday workplaces.

361. WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 84–85; see also WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T
CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE, supra note 100, at 21–23; Williams, supra note 164, at 211.
362. WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 80–82; see also WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T
CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE, supra note 100, at 21–23; Williams, supra note 164, at 193.
363. Benard & Correll, supra note 293, at 623.
364. Id. at 624.
365. Duguid et al., supra note 332, at 393.
366. Opie & Phillips, supra note 333, at 7.
367. CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 8.
368. Anderson et al., supra note 183, at 95.
369. Ridgeway & Nakagawa, supra note 185, at 149.

392

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:337

First, the three other patterns of bias may be passed on from woman to
woman, holding other women to higher standards because “that’s what it takes
to succeed here as a woman.”370
“Because she struggled a lot and had to work extra hard and so expects
other women to have done as much as she has.” —a woman scientist of Asian
descent.371
This can be driven by collective threat: ambitious women and people of
color may hold each other to higher standards for fear that poor performance by
other women will reflect poorly on them.372
Tightrope bias also creates conflicts among women. Often (although not
always), these are “gen(d)erational” conflicts, as older women who played by
boys’ club rules come into conflict with younger women who refuse to do so.373
“I’m on kind of a backlash mission almost. I wear dresses, I bake cookies
for my group meetings, I bring my child to class with me. I’ve just stuck it out
there and said I’m a woman, I’m someone’s mother. And you get the whole
package. It is kind of a conscious choice on my part that I’m not going to
compete as a boy because I’m not a boy.”374 —a white woman professor.
Note the message: the older women are doing gender wrong.375 The
judging goes both ways. Here are the voices of women who joined—“just turned
into men” (to quote some of the younger women). These quotes also illustrate
“collective threat” (the fear that other women’s behavior will reflect poorly on
you). 376
“Respect in engineering is earned, not just given. Too many younger
women are under the impression that they should be highly respected just
because they showed up to the office. Younger women have a distorted sense of
what gender harassment is and often do not handle themselves appropriately in
challenging situations. . . . The nonstop whining and groundless harassment
complaints from younger women in my field are making it much harder for other
young women to get hired and much harder for old ladies like me to get jobs.
Employers are tending to paint us all with the same brush.” —a Black woman
who had held an engineering role for thirty years.377
“Women do seem to need to prove themselves more, but don’t make
excuses and you will be respected.” —a white woman engineer.378

370. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 5.
371. WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE J EOPARDY?, supra note 100, at 38.
372. Duguid et al., supra note 332, at 393.
373. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 194.
374. PENELOPE M. HUANG, WORKLIFE LAW, GENDER BIAS IN ACADEMIA: FINDINGS FROM FOCUS GROUPS
8 (2008), https://worklifelaw.org/publications/gender-bias-academia.pdf.
375. See Candace West & Don H. Zimmerman, Doing Gender, 1 GENDER & SOC’Y 125, 125–26 (1987).
376. Duguid et al., supra note 332, at 393–95.
377. WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 100, at 82.
378. Id.
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“There are different types of female engineers, those who want to be seen
as women and those who want to be seen as equal.” —a white woman
engineer.379
Women also spoke about Maternal Wall bias being passed through from
other women:
“I really hoped that [my boss] would mentor me into her role, but even the
men in the firm referred to her as the most sexist Principal in the office. She
always promoted the men in her group over the women and told the (extremely
talented) women in the group that they should stay home with their babies and
take care of their husbands. ( . . . even though she too was married with kids).”
—a White woman architect.380
Other quotes illustrate the way tokenism pits women against each other.
“[O]pportunities for women are very zero-sum. If one woman gets a prized
position . . . another woman won’t. And so, it breeds a sense of competition.” —
an attorney.381
“I have been in an organization where there was room for one woman, but
one woman decided that she was it and would simply sabotage her colleagues,
which unfortunately included me.” —a Black woman scientist.382
“Each department wants to have a female faculty,” so a department with
two women will find them consistently pitted against each other: “one female
will be the one to stay, the other one will not.’” —a woman biophysicist of Asian
descent.383
Still other quotes illustrate strategic distancing, where ambitious women
distance themselves from other members of their group, and align with the boys’
club or the white majority, if that’s what it takes to succeed.384 Thus, famously,
Marissa Mayer (later CEO of Yahoo at a time when there were virtually no
women as Silicon Valley CEOs) commented while she was still working at
Google, “I am not a girl at Google, I’m a geek at Google,” deftly distancing
herself from the out-group—girls—and aligning herself with the in-group—
geeks.385 In some cases, women strategically refuse to align with other women
in order to preserve their political capital.
“I know she didn’t like the things that were going on but she accepted them
and refused to stand up in any way or even admit, publicly, that there was a
problem.” —a woman faculty member who left her institution.386
The quantitative data show this might also impact women’s experience
with administrative support. White men report less difficulty getting support
379. Id.
380. WILLIAMS & KORN, supra note 100.
381. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 183.
382. Id. at 236.
383. WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE J EOPARDY?, supra note 100, at 37.
384. Derks et al., Sexist Organizational Cultures, supra note 332, at 530.
385. John D. Sutter, Marissa Mayer: From Google ‘Geek’ to Yahoo CEO, CNN (July 17, 2012, 8:25 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2012/07/16/tech/web/marissa-mayer-bio/index.html.
386. Susan K. Gardner, Women Faculty Departures from a Striving Institution: Between a Rock and a Hard
Place, 36 REV. HIGHER EDUC. 349, 361 (2013).
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from administrative personnel. This pattern was particularly evident with
lawyers, where there was a seventeen-percentage point disparity between the
experiences of white men and women.387

How gender bias differs by race:388 While 76% of women professors
reported that other women at work generally supported them, only 56% of Black
professors agreed.389 While all groups of women reported more difficulty than
men in getting administrative support, Latinx women and women of Asian
descent reported more difficulty than other groups of women.390 Qualitative data
suggest that, for Latinx women, there may be a racial component. As previously
mentioned, said one Latinx woman science professor, describing how much
resistance she got from admins to do work for her, “conscious or
unconscious . . . [t]here is this Mexican woman telling them what to do.”391

387. WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN ’T SEE, supra note 100, at 42; see also
WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 76 (discussing percentages of administrative tasks
for women engineers versus white male engineers).
388. In order to examine how gender bias differs by race, we standardized the data from women across
studies and used one-way ANOVA testing to test for differences between racial groups. When appropriate, we
used post-hoc Tukey HSD testing to examine the group differences in detail. The graphs in this Part represent
levels of bias relative to other groups of women.
389. WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE J EOPARDY?, supra note 100, at 35.
390. Data on file with authors. See supra notes 169–172 and accompanying text.
391. Williams, supra note 164, at 211–12.
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Tug of War data has concrete workplace effects:392 In our study of
engineers in India, higher levels of Tug of War bias were associated with feeling
excluded in the workplace and feeling like colleagues do not support diversity,
in addition to lower feelings of belonging, lower perceptions of compensation
fairness, and higher reports of considering looking for a new position somewhere
else.393
E. RACIAL STEREOTYPES
People of color face additional forms of bias in the workplace based on
racial and ethnic stereotypes. The implication is that men of color (like white
women) face four patterns of bias, while women of color face five patterns.
Black women in our research reported being demeaned and disrespected in
the workplace, an experience that was not reported by any white women
interviewed.394 Black women also reported a sense of isolation and loneliness in
the workplace, in part because “you really don’t have the support you need,”
said a Black woman microbiologist.395 This lack of inclusion was also clear in
the 2018 Women in the Workplace Survey: Black and African-American women
reported feeling included in their workplaces at the lowest rate of any group.396
392. These regression analyses were conducted on data collected from engineers in India, and we have not
had the opportunity to run the same tests on data from the United States. However, we expect that the patterns
of bias will have similar negative effects on workplace processes and outcomes in the United States.
393. WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 99, at 15–18.
394. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 224; Williams, supra note 164, at 194.
395. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 225; Williams, supra note 164, at 194.
396. Sonya George, The Gender Gap Is Just the Tip of the Iceberg for Black Women, GREAT PLACE TO
WORK (June 3, 2020), https://www.greatplacetowork.com/resources/blog/diagnosing-quit-and-stay-amongblack-women.
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The disrespect, isolation, and lack of inclusion that Black women face in the
workplace lead to a completely different kind of work environment than white
individuals face; Black women reported being mentally checked out at their jobs
at a rate 75% higher than white men and 20% higher than white women.397
Because white people have less contact with Black people in the United
States, they are more likely to rely on stereotypes when judging Black
individuals, both in general and in the workplace.398 Black people face
stereotypes about being lazy and violent,399 as in one case in which a supervisor
referred to an African-American worker as “lazy,” “worthless,” “just here to get
paid.”400 Reporting401 documents that Black professionals may be faulted for
being “intimidating” or “threatening”—a carry-over of the association of Black
Americans with violence.402
Black women may also face trouble advancing in the workplace because
of stereotypes that they are only suited for low-status jobs.403 This stereotype
may help explain why hiring discrimination against African Americans has not
declined since the 1980s.404 In addition, due to stereotypes that Black women
are more dominant, they may be seen as better fit for masculine-typed jobs,405
and less of a fit for feminine-typed jobs, like nurse or administrative assistant,
that provide important opportunities for upwardly mobile workers.406
Black women in the workplace have to contend with other stereotypes that
have roots in slavery.407 The “Mammy” stereotype refers to a Black woman who
does the domestic work, like housekeeping, nannying, and cooking, while being
non-threatening and playing a caretaker role.408 In the workplace, a woman who
triggers the “Mammy” stereotype is seen as being in a support role, and may
397. Id.
398. ELLA L. J. EDMONDSON BELL & STELLA M. NKOMO, OUR SEPARATE WAYS: BLACK AND WHITE
WOMEN AND THE STRUGGLE FOR PROFESSIONAL IDENTITY (1986).
399. Ghavami & Peplau, supra note 240, at 124.
400. Chappell v. Bilco Co., No. 3:09CV00016 JLH, 2011 WL 9037, at *9 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 3, 2011), aff'd,
675 F.3d 1110 (8th Cir. 2012).
401. Emily Flitter, This Is What Racism Sounds Like in the Banking Industry, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/11/business/jpmorgan-banking-racism.html?searchResultPosition=7 (Dec.
14, 2019).
402. Kelly Welch, Black Criminal Stereotypes and Racial Profiling, 23 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 276, 283
(2007).
403. Rosette et al., supra note 156, at 8.
404. Lincoln Quillian, Devah Pager, Ole Hexel & Arnfinn H. Midtbøen, Meta-Analysis of Field Experiments
Shows No Change in Racial Discrimination in Hiring Over Time, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI., 10870, 10870
(2017).
405. Adam D. Galinsky, Erika V. Hall & Amy J. C. Cuddy, Gendered Races: Implications for Interracial
Marriage, Leadership Selection, and Athletic Participation, 24 PSYCH. SCI. 498, 500 (2013); Hall et al., supra
note 121, at 854.
406. Barbara Kilbourne, Paula England & Kurt Beron, Effects of Individual, Occupational, and Industrial
Characteristics on Earnings: Intersections of Race and Gender, 72 SOC. FORCES 1149, 1159–61 (1994);
Cecelia L. Ridgeway & Tamar Kricheli-Katz, Intersecting Cultural Beliefs in Social Relations: Gender, Race,
and Class Binds and Freedoms, 27 GENDER & SOC’Y 294, 308 (2013).
407. Anita Jones Thomas, Karen McCurtis Witherspoon & Suzette L. Speight, Toward the Development of
the Stereotypic Roles for Black Women Scale, 30 J. BLACK PSYCH. 426, 428 (2004).
408. Id. at 428–29.

November 2020]

BEYOND IMPLICIT BIAS

397

struggle to move into higher-profile work.409 The “Sapphire” stereotype, based
on a character in a 1950s TV show, is a Black woman who is threatening,
aggressive, loud, and argumentative.410 A woman who triggers the “Sapphire”
stereotype at work is seen as someone who is manipulative and not someone you
can count on.411 The “Jezebel” stereotype is a Black woman who is seductive
and promiscuous.412 A woman who triggers the “Jezebel” stereotype may be
seen as having used her sexuality to get ahead at work, and will not be judged
based on her competence or merit; this stereotype also opens the door to sexual
harassment.413 These stereotypes have a measurable impact: research
participants who were shown stereotypical images of Black women showed
more implicit racial prejudice when viewing a mock interview of a Black
woman.414
Black women face another set of stereotypes associated with appearance in
the workplace: simply wearing their hair in a natural hairstyle is enough to
trigger negative competence stereotypes.415 Black women with natural,
Afrocentric hairstyles were rated as less professional than Black women with
Eurocentric hairstyles.416 Further research supports this finding: Black women
with natural hairstyles were less likely to receive recommendations for job
interviews than white women or Black women with straightened hair.417
Fewer studies have focused on the experiences of Latinx individuals in the
workplace. Latinx individuals face a pervasive stereotype about laziness.418
“There seems to be this stereotype that, if you are from Mexico, you are lazy,
and you only like to either sleep by a cactus or party,” explained a woman
science professor of Mexican heritage.419 This means that Latinx individuals
may have to put in more work than white individuals in order to be viewed as
equally hardworking. Latinx men are stereotyped as “hot-blooded” and “prone
to emotional outbursts,”420 while women report being seen as “fiery.”421 The

409. Wendy Reynolds-Dobbs, Kecia M. Thomas & Matthew S. Harrison, From Mammy to Superwoman:
Images that Hinder Black Women’s Career Development, 35 J. CAREER DEV. 129, 139–40 (2008).
410. Thomas et al., supra note 407, at 429.
411. BELL & NKOMO, supra note 398.
412. Thomas et al., supra note 407, at 429.
413. Reynolds-Dobbs et al., supra note 409, at 137.
414. Sonja M. Brown Givens & Jennifer L. Monahan, Priming Mammies, Jezebels, and Other Controlling
Images: An Examination of the Influence of Mediated Stereotypes on Perceptions of an African American
Woman, 7 MEDIA PSYCH. 87, 96–100 (2005).
415. Keith B. Maddox, Perspectives on Racial Phenotypicality Bias, 8 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV.
383, 390 (2004).
416. Opie & Phillips, supra note 333, at 1.
417. Christy Zhou Koval & Ashleigh Shelby Rosette, The Natural Hair Bias in Job Recruitment, SOC.
PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI., Aug. 2020.
418. See Andrew W. Bribriesco, Latino/a Plaintiffs and the Intersection of Stereotypes, Unconscious Bias,
Race-Neutral Policies, and Personal Injury, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 373, 381 (2010); Min Zhou & Jennifer
Lee, Becoming Ethnic or Becoming American? Reflecting on the Divergent Pathways to Social Mobility and
Assimilation Among the New Second Generation, 4 DU BOIS REV. 189, 200–01 (2007).
419. Williams, supra note 164, at 194.
420. Rivera, supra note 224, at 240.
421. Williams, supra note 164, at 208.
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“hot blooded” stereotype can open Latinx women up to sexual harassment.422
Latinx workers also face the stereotype of forever being an immigrant and
unable to speak English, which means they may face a harder time being seen
as a good fit in the workplace.423 Finally, Latinx individuals may be stereotyped
as prone to violence—one Latinx woman neuroscientist remarked on a comment
she got after raising her voice: “Oh, be careful, she’s Puerto Rican, and she may
be carrying a knife in her purse.”424
One particularly pervasive stereotype that people of Asian descent face is
the myth of the “Model Minority.”425 This myth perpetuates the idea that people
of Asian descent are uncommonly hardworking, competent, and economically
successful.426 Although this stereotype contains positive content, in practice it
can have negative effects. The idea that people of Asian descent are harder
working and more competent actually makes it more difficult for them to get
ahead in the workplace because they are watched more closely, and potentially
punished, for any signs that they are not living up to the myth.427 At the same
time, individuals who differ from the stereotype of the Model Minority may
instead face heightened invisibility and isolation in the workplace, because they
do not fit the mold for expected behavior.428 Another important negative
consequence of the Model Minority myth is that it has been used against Black
and Latinx people in an attempt to discredit their experiences by pointing to a
successful non-white group.429
People of Asian descent also face the “forever foreigner” stereotype: the
idea that they are not true Americans.430 One science professor noted that she
often got compliments on her English, noting wryly, “I grew up in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania . . . I should speak English surprisingly well.”431 Note the
422. Id.
423. Irene Browne & Joya Misra, The Intersection of Gender and Race in the Labor Market, 29 ANN. REV.
SOCIO. 487, 504–05 (2003); Ediberto Román, Who Exactly Is Living La Vida Loca: The Legal and Political
Consequences of Latino-Latina Ethnic and Racial Stereotypes in Film and Other Media, 4 J. GENDER RACE &
JUST. 37, 50–51 (2000); Segura, supra note 324, at 173.
424. Williams, supra note 164, at 194.
425. Myrtle P. Bell, David A. Harrison & Mary E. McLaughlin, Asian-American Attitudes Toward
Affirmative Action in Employment: Implications for the Model Minority Myth, 33 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 356,
360 (1997); Grace Kao, Asian Americans as Model Minorities? A Look at Their Academic Performance, 103
AM. J. EDUC. 121, 122–23 (1995); STACEY J. LEE, UNRAVELING THE “MODEL MINORITY” STEREOTYPE:
LISTENING TO ASIAN AMERICAN TRUTH (1996).
426. Bell et al., supra note 425; Kao, supra note 425; LEE, supra note 425.
427. Rosette et al., supra note 156, at 10; Williams, supra note 164, at 212–13.
428. Ming Che Tu, Shangyun Zhou, Stephanie N. Wong & Sumie Okazaki, Realities of the American
Dream: Vocational Experiences and Intersecting Invisibility of Low-Income Chinese Immigrant Laborers, 113
J. VOCATIONAL BEHAV. 88, 98–100 (2019).
429. Paul Wong, Chienping Faith Lai, Richard Nagasawa & Tieming Lin, Asian Americans as a Model
Minority: Self-Perceptions and Perceptions by Other Racial Groups, 41 SOCIO. PERSPS. 1, 3 (2017); Kat Chow,
‘Model Minority’ Myth Again Used As A Racial Wedge Between Asians And Blacks, NPR: CODE SWITCH (Apr.
19, 2017, 8:32 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/04/19/524571669/model-minority-mythagain-used-as-a-racial-wedge-between-asians-and-blacks.
430. Mia Tuan, Forever Foreigners or Honorary Whites? The Asian Ethnic Experience Today, 78 SOC.
FORCES 816, 817 (1999).
431. WILLIAMS ET AL., DOUBLE J EOPARDY?, supra note 100, at 47.
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assumption she was not an American.432 Sometimes this is explicit, as when
people of Asian descent get asked, “where are you really from?” with the
assumption being that they are perpetually outsiders.433 These experiences can
lead to a feeling of isolation and invisibility in the workplace.434
As has been noted, people of Asian descent are stereotyped as competent
but not warm or sociable.435 More specifically, these stereotypes include being
quiet, nerdy, good at math, and lacking social skills.436 These stereotypes mean
that people of Asian descent are seen as having good technical skills, but not a
good fit for leadership positions.437 A 2015 analysis of five large companies in
Silicon Valley found that only 1 in 285 women of Asian descent was an
executive, compared to 1 in 87 white men.438 This is well documented as a
“Bamboo Ceiling” that exists for women of Asian descent: they can only
advance so far in the workplace, and face challenges when trying to rise to the
top positions.439 Another issue for advancement involves the stereotype of Asian
women as being very feminine: they may have a harder time getting masculinetype jobs, and may be forever stuck in lower positions.440 In our Double
Jeopardy Report, women of Asian descent who were in faculty positions were
treated like “perennial lab assistants even as postdocs.”441
Women of Asian descent face two other stereotypes that impact the way
they are perceived in the workplace. The “Lotus Blossom Baby” is a woman
who is passive, demure, and sexualized.442 The “Dragon Lady” is a woman who
is assertive and seen as untrustworthy.443 The former stereotype opens women
of Asian descent to sexual harassment;444 the latter to backlash.445

432. Alisia G. T. T. Tran & Richard M. Lee, You Speak English Well! Asian Americans’ Reactions to an
Exceptionalizing Stereotype, 61 J. COUNSELING PSYCH. 484, 484–85 (2014).
433. Brian E. Armenta, Irene J. K. Park, Su Yeong Kim, Richard M. Lee, Stephanie T. Pituc, Kyoung-Rae
Jung, José A. Soto & Seth J. Schwartz, Where Are You From? A Validation of the Foreigner Objectification
Scale and the Psychological Correlates of Foreigner Objectification Among Asian Americans and Latinos, 19
CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCH. 131, 131–32 (2013).
434. SHIRLEY HUNE, ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN WOMEN IN HIGHER EDUCATION: C LAIMING VISIBILITY AND
VOICE (1998); Caroline Sotello Viernes Turner, Women of Color in Academe: Living With Multiple Marginality,
73 J. HIGHER EDUC. 74, 80 (2002).
435. Fiske et al., supra note 149, at 880; Lin et al., supra note 155, at 38.
436. Ghavami & Peplau, supra note 240, at 120.
437. Lai & Babcock, supra note 156, at 312; Rosette et al., supra note 156, at 6.
438. BUCK GEE, DENISE PECK & JANET WONG, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: ASIAN AMERICAN LEADERS IN
SILICON VALLEY 14 (2015), https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.ascendleadership.org/resource/resmgr/research/
hiddeninplainsight_paper_042.pdf.
439. JANE HYUN, BREAKING THE BAMBOO CEILING: CAREER STRATEGIES FOR ASIANS 5–6 (2005).
440. Hall et al., supra note 121, at 865.
441. Williams, supra note 164, at 215.
442. Virginia W. Wei, Asian Women and Employment Discrimination: Using Intersectionality Theory to
Address Title VII Claims Based on Combined Factors of Race, Gender and National Origin, 37 B.C. L. REV.
771, 801–02 (1996).
443. Id.
444. Williams, supra note 164, at 213.
445. Id. at 217.
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F. CONCLUSION
If Sturm’s description of bias as subtle and ambiguous was true in 2001,
this is no longer true today. The same patterns of bias have been documented
repeatedly in the lab—and the studies of Williams and her teams have
documented over and over again that they also occur in the workplace. Defense
experts446 and some courts447 have worried that the decades of lab studies do not
reflect what actually happens in today’s workplace. WES data show that people
report they do.448

III. THE IMPLICIT BIAS CONSENSUS GIVES AN INACCURATE DESCRIPTION
OF TITLE VII LAW
Another major element of the implicit bias consensus is that Title VII is illsuited to address second generation workplace discrimination, a claim that has
proved remarkably resilient despite detailed counterevidence dating back twenty
years.449 “Most scholars writing about this type of discrimination agree that the
law is incapable of responding to all but intentional, conscious, and overt
discrimination,” noted a 2003 article,450 a contention oft-repeated.451 That nearconsensus began when Sturm concluded that implicit bias’s “complexity resists
definition and resolution through across-the-board, relatively specific
commands and an after-the-fact enforcement mechanism.”452 The consensus
crystallized in the articles in the special issue of the California Law Review
organized by Linda Krieger; in the contribution by Samuel R. Bagenstos, he
concluded that “[u]nconscious bias, interacting with today’s ‘boundaryless
workplace,’ generates inequalities that our current antidiscrimination law is not

446. Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 13, at 1069.
447. See, e.g., Jones v. Nat’l Council of Young Men’s Christian Ass’ns of the United States, 34 F. Supp. 3d
896, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (holding that implicit bias expert testimony by Anthony Greenwald was “derived solely
from laboratory testing that does not remotely approximate the conditions that apply in this case”).
448. Appendix C contains further data on how bias plays out in specific workplace processes including
hiring and promotions.
449. Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the
Return to “No Cause” Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1188 (2003); McGinley, supra note 1, at 491; Selmi,
Proving Intentional Discrimination, supra note 1, at 283.
450. Derum & Engle, supra note 449, at 1188.
451. For a recent example, see Rich, supra note 5, at 231 (“The constitutional discriminatory purpose
doctrine requires evidence of malice, or animus, a standard that is ill-suited to address ‘second generation
discrimination’ that frequently results from unconscious stereotyping.” (footnote omitted)).
452. Sturm, supra note 2, at 469.
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well equipped to solve.”453 Katherine Bartlett, a year later, concluded that
implicit bias is not readily reachable through “legal coercion.”454
Two basic arguments typically support the claim that Title VII is ill-suited
to address twenty-first century discrimination. The first is that Title VII law is
designed to address explicit, “first generation” discrimination. The second is that
Title VII addresses only intentional discrimination, whereas most discrimination
today is not intentional. This Part addresses both these arguments, then shows
how five-patterns evidence fits well into long-established patterns of Title VII
gender and race litigation—particularly if courts are honest about the
implications of five-patterns data for the “same-actor” inference and the
“personal animosity” defense.
A. THE FIRST GENERATION DISCRIMINATION/SECOND GENERATION
PERIODIZATION IS INACCURATE, AS IS THE CLAIM THAT TITLE VII
ADDRESSES ONLY FIRST GENERATION DISCRIMINATION
Sturm describes first generation discrimination as explicit discrimination
based on race or sex.455 One problem with this categorization is that an
astonishing amount of discrimination today remains explicit discrimination
proved through direct evidence, for example, comments in which employers or
their representatives state that they are treating someone differently because of
their race or sex.456 Sturm acknowledged that explicit discrimination still exists,
footnoting the insight to her discussions with plaintiffs’ employment lawyers.457
But her influential thesis—that Title VII addresses only explicit
discrimination—is unconvincing. In fact, Title VII from very early in its history
responded to the fact that most employers eliminated policies that discriminated
explicitly based on sex and race shortly after Title VII went into effect.
After the passage of Title VII in 1964,458 some employers substituted
neutral rules that were transparently designed to perpetuate racial
discrimination. In response, the Supreme Court held in Griggs v. Duke Power
453. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1,
3 (2004). Notably, some commentators have always disagreed. “If people are treated differently, and worse,
because of their race or another protected trait, then the principle of antidiscrimination has been violated, even
if the source of the differential treatment is implicit rather than unconscious bias,” noted Christine Jolls and Cass
R. Sunstein in the same special issue of the California Law Review. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 36, at 972; see
also McGinley, supra note 1, at 446 (Title VII is capable of holding liable employers who discriminated
unconsciously; Title VII began to fall in that direction shortly after enactment); Selmi, Proving Intentional
Discrimination, supra note 1, at 283; Derum & Engle, supra note 449, at 1188.
454. Katherine Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893, 1900 (2009). This
continues to be repeated up to the current day. See Bornstein, supra note 5, at 964–65; Goltz et al., supra note
5, at 188; Rich, supra note 5, at 231.
455. Sturm, supra note 2, at 466.
456. See, e.g., Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838, 845 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a man must be paid
more because “[h]e has a family to support”); Taylor v. Amcor Flexibles, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 501, 511 (D.N.J.
2009), aff’d, 507 F. App’x 231 (3d Cir. 2012) (discounting as “stray remarks” an African-American plaintiff’s
supervisor’s comment, shortly after he was hired, “to the effect that Black men know how to post-up in the low
post [in basketball], but do not know the medical packaging business”).
457. Sturm, supra note 2, at 468.
458. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2019).
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that plaintiffs could prove discrimination under Title VII by proving the
existence of a disproportionate impact on an individual based on race or sex that
was not justified by business necessity.459 Already, six years after the passage of
Title VII, courts had begun to adapt the statute to address non-explicit race
discrimination.
Even disparate treatment cases often involve non-explicit discrimination:
in 1973, the Supreme Court explained in McDonnell Douglas v. Green how
plaintiffs could prove employment discrimination through circumstantial
evidence and the bulk of Title VII litigation has always involved circumstantial
evidence.460 To quote Michael Selmi, “legal doctrines of proof have been
adjudicating subtle discrimination without reference to unconscious bias for
more than forty years.”461
If there was ever any doubt that Title VII could reach non-explicit
discrimination, that doubt was put to rest in the 1989 case of Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins. Hopkins involving a woman who was denied partnership in a major
accounting firm because she did not conform to the other partners’ stereotypes
about how women should behave.462 “[I]n forbidding employers to discriminate
against individuals because of their sex,” the Court held, “Congress intended to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting
from sex stereotypes . . . . As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are
beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they matched stereotype associated with their group.”463
Stereotypes produce automatic associations that give rise to bias,464 which is
evidence of discrimination. That fits into Title VII just fine.
The assertion that Title VII is not useful because it requires “intentional
discrimination,” whereas second generation discrimination typically does not
involve malicious intent, reflects a misunderstanding: “intentional discrimination” under Title VII is a term of art.
Krieger and Sturm also argue that Title VII is ill-suited to address
unconscious bias because Title VII disparate treatment cases require proof of
intentional discrimination. “Discrimination—at least in the race and national
origin contexts—is construed as resulting from hostile animus towards and
accompanying negative beliefs about an individual because of his or her
membership in a particular group,” Krieger asserted.465 This mischaracterization
of Title VII is oft-repeated, for example by Tristin Green in 2005, who said
“intent to discriminate [is] frequently construed as conscious bias or animus.”466
Krieger argues that the hostile animus requirement makes Title VII ill-suited to
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–07 (1973).
Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias, supra note 1, at 198.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231–32 (1988).
Id. at 251 (quoting Sporgis v. United Air Lines Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)).
Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 5, 6 (1989).
465. Krieger, supra note 3, at 1177.
466. Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 623, 655 (2005).
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its intended purpose because “a broad class of discriminatory employment
decisions results not from discriminatory motivation, but from a variety of
unconscious and unintentional categorization-related judgment errors.”467
Krieger notes that most individual disparate treatment cases turn on
whether or not a plaintiff can prove that the employer’s asserted “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” for the adverse employment action against the
plaintiff was a pretext for discrimination.468 To prove pretext, Krieger asserts,
requires the court, “in essence, finding that the employer has lied to the plaintiff
and the court. Within the pretext paradigm, it is simply not possible for an
employment decision to be both motivated by the employer’s articulated reasons
and tainted by intergroup bias; the trier of fact must decide between the two.”469
Krieger decries pretext theory’s “rigid dichotomization of [the] ‘real reasons’
and ‘cover-ups’ for discrimination,”470 contending that pretext requires the
plaintiff to prove that the employer’s proffered legitimate business reason is a
“sham.”471
While it is true that disparate treatment requires intentional discrimination,
this does not mean that Title VII typically requires a situation where an employer
has a self-conscious intent to discriminate against a protected employee, and has
engaged in a cover-up to hide that nefarious intent. “Intent” is a term of art in
Title VII law that means that race or gender has been taken into consideration
by the decisionmaker, or that “the employee’s protected trait enter[ed] the causal
chain.”472 In the 1977 landmark case of Teamsters v. United States, the Supreme
Court noted that, “[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in
some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.”473 In
practice today, discrimination typically is proved through differences in
treatment, using comparator evidence, stereotyping evidence, or both:
“intentional discrimination only requires proof of differential treatment, rather
than proof of animus or illicit motive, and thus focuses primarily on questions
of causation while devoting comparatively little attention to subjective mental
states.”474 Indeed, as used in discrimination law, “the concept of intent is only
tangentially related to animus or illicit motive,” Selmi notes.475 He continues:
“In defining intentional discrimination, the question is not what the particular
decisionmaker subjectively intended, but whether the record allows for an
inference that an impermissible factor such as race served as the impetus for the

467. Krieger, supra note 3, at 1239.
468. Id. at 1178.
469. Id. at 1178–79.
470. Id. at 1218.
471. Id. at 1178.
472. Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodations, and the
Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1357, 1377 (2009).
473. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
474. Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination, supra note 1, at 285; see also Bornstein, supra note 19, at
1064.
475. Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination, supra note 1, at 288.
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challenged action.”476 To quote Stephanie Bornstein, McDonnell Douglas’s
“proof structure opens the door for a definition of intent that goes well beyond
the decisionmaker’s conscious choice to act in a biased manner.”477 “If, for
example, a supervisor assumes incorrectly that a male employee is better suited
for promotion than a female employee, the female employee may prove
intentional discrimination even though the supervisor would say he did not
intend to disadvantage the female candidate.”478
Moreover, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,479 a unanimous
Supreme Court “made it clear that only under unusual circumstances will it
tolerate grants of summary judgment [for the employer] where the plaintiff
presents . . . evidence of a prima facie case and that the defendant’s explanation
is pretextual,” noted Ann twenty years ago.480 This means that Title VII plaintiffs
before many (though not all) courts can win by proving that they were treated
differently because of sex or race and that the employer has offered no
persuasive alternative reason to explain the behavior. Blanket statements that
Title VII requires that plaintiffs prove malicious intent,481 or point to explicit
bias,482 or engage in a cover-up,483 are best understood as a cri de coeur from
plaintiff-friendly law professors, but such statements exaggerate the inadequacy
of Title VII (which does not perhaps serve plaintiffs’ interests well).484 Once we
shift from talking about automatic associations to talking about the ways bias
means that members of protected groups are treated differently from members
of nonprotected groups, evidence of bias fits seamlessly into Title VII comment.
The Supreme Court’s most recent Title VII case further widens the scope
of Title VII. Bostock v. Clayton County is best known for its landmark holding
that Title VII covers discrimination based on LGBTQ+ status.485 But it also
forged important inroads for other Title VII plaintiffs in three different ways.
Bostock once again made clear that “intent” for Title VII purposes involves
476. Id. at 294.
477. Bornstein, supra note 19, at 1081.
478. Id.
479. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
480. McGinley, supra note 1, at 462.
481. Bornstein, supra note 19, at 1083; Green, supra note 466, at 655; Selmi, Proving Intentional
Discrimination, supra note 1, at 287; Zatz, supra note 472, at 1432.
482. Sturm, supra note 2, at 554.
483. Krieger, supra note 3, at 1167.
484. Case law provides important resources for plaintiffs’ lawyers who need to respond to defense
arguments that intentional discrimination does not include unconscious bias. See, e.g., Thomas v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 58–59 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The Supreme Court has long recognized that unlawful
discrimination can stem from stereotypes and other types of cognitive biases, as well as from conscious
animus. . . . The ultimate question is whether the employee has been treated disparately ‘because of race.’ This
is so regardless of whether the employer consciously intended to base the evaluations on race, or simply did so
because of unthinking stereotypes or bias.”); EEOC v. Inland Marine Indus., 729 F.2d 1229, 1235–36 (9th Cir.
1984) (holding that disparate treatment occurs where decisionmaker applies subjective policy in racially
discriminatory and subtle manner even absent malice); Pitre v. W. Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1273 (10th Cir.
1988) (“One familiar aspect of sex discrimination is the practice, whether conscious or unconscious, of
subjecting women to higher standards of evaluation than are applied to their male counterparts.” (quoting
Sweeney v. Bd. of Trs. of Keene State Coll., 604 F.2d 106, 114 (1st Cir. 1979))).
485. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
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differential treatment due to sex, not intent in the vernacular sense of self-aware
motivation: “conversational conventions do not control Title VII’s legal
analysis.”486 The Court explained that the employer in a prior case “may have
perceived itself as discriminating based on motherhood, not sex, given that its
hiring policies as a whole favored women. But . . . the Court set all this aside as
irrelevant.”487 If an employer treats someone differently due (in part, as we will
see below) to their sex, it doesn’t matter what the employer’s self-aware
motivation was. “[I]t is irrelevant what an employer might call its discriminatory
practice,”488 noted the Court. Title VII before Bostock did not require a plaintiff
to prove that an employer had conscious bias or animus—but even if it did, Title
VII certainly does not require that now.
Bostock also loosened Title VII’s causation requirement in ways that have
dramatic implications for Title VII plaintiffs. In the past, Title VII cases have
sometimes foundered when courts required plaintiffs to prove that their
treatment reflected that their membership in a protected class was the sole reason
for their mistreatment.489 The Court rejected this argument explicitly, holding
that but-for causation does not require a single cause. “At bottom, the employers’
argument unavoidably comes down to a suggestion that sex must be the sole or
primary cause of an adverse employment action for Title VII liability to
follow . . . . [T]hat suggestion is at odds with everything we know about the
statute.”490 The Court noted that
the adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant
cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that contributed to its
challenged employment decision . . . . An employer violates Title VII when it
intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex. It doesn’t
matter if other factors besides the plaintiff’s sex contributed to the decision.491

The implication is that cases that used to be relegated to Title VII’s mixed
motive theory—unbeloved of plaintiffs’ employment lawyers because that
theory sharply limits damages492—now can be litigated as pretext cases (which
allow for damages).493 Thus, cases plaintiffs’ lawyers could not afford to bring
before Bostock become more attractive, given that the plaintiffs’ bar typically is
paid on a contingency basis (and so needs to bring cases that give rise to damage
awards). In addition, as already mentioned and discussed further below,494 this
aspect of Bostock may well help intersectional plaintiffs.
Finally, Bostock’s rejection of the common defense argument that someone
who harasses both men and women is not harassing “because of sex” also has
486. Id. at 1745.
487. Id. at 1746.
488. Id. at 1744.
489. Alan Kabat, High Court’s Title VII Ruling Reaches Beyond LGBTQ Rights, LAW360 (June 17, 2020),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1283674/high-court-s-title-vii-ruling-reaches-beyond-lgbtq-rights.
490. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1748.
491. Id. at 1739, 1741.
492. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1991).
493. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1964).
494. See infra notes 818–829 and accompanying text.

406

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:337

implications for employment law beyond sexual harassment, notably for cases
involving sex discrimination against fathers.495 The Court’s language suggests a
new understanding that someone who discriminates against both men and
women may nonetheless be discriminating based on sex, because the employer
may be penalizing both men and women for failing to conform to the employer’s
preferred templates for masculinity and femininity. This is discrimination based
on sex, said the Court: “an employer who fires both Hannah and Bob for failing
to fulfill traditional sex stereotypes doubles rather than eliminates Title VII
liability.”496 This passage should help the lower courts understand that when an
employer discriminates against both men and women due to caregiving
responsibilities, the employer is discriminating based on sex—something lower
courts have had a hard time wrapping their heads around.497
B. ONCE THE FOCUS SHIFTS FROM AUTOMATIC ASSOCIATIONS TO THE FIVE
PATTERNS OF WORKPLACE BIAS, TITLE VII DOCTRINE READILY
ACCOMMODATES EVIDENCE OF MODERN FORMS OF GENDER BIAS
Title VII readily accommodates evidence of gender bias once the focus
shifts from automatic associations to documented patterns of workplace bias.
Prove-It-Again bias provides the most obvious example. It requires a
comparison across groups, which makes it a natural for the kind of
“comparator[] evidence” that a similarly situated member of a non-protected
group was treated differently than the plaintiff.498 What the five-patterns model
adds to Title VII litigation is a rigorous, evidence-based protocol for identifying
all the evidence that can add up to protected groups being treated differently
because of their race or sex (as set forth in Appendix A). This is an important
point that contradicts the common assumption that bias evidence is only relevant
as stereotyping evidence under a Price Waterhouse theory. Tightrope bias also
fits as stereotyping evidence, and has since the Supreme Court decided Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins in 1989, but it, too, gives rise to comparisons, as when
women or people of color are faulted for anger when white men displaying
similar anger are seen as admirably authoritative.499 An extremely important and
often overlooked aspect of Price Waterhouse is that, although Ann Hopkins
actually did introduce expert testimony from the prominent social psychologist
Susan Fiske, the Court held that expert testimony was not necessary. Said the
Court:
Indeed, we are tempted to say that Dr. Fiske’s expert testimony was merely
icing on Hopkins’ cake. It takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping
in a description of an aggressive female employees as requiring “a course at
charm school[,]” [n]or . . . does it require expertise in psychology to know
that, if an employee’s flawed “interpersonal skills” can be corrected by a soft495.
496.
497.
498.
499.

Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741, 1752.
Id. at 1742.
Ayanna v. Dechert, 914 F. Supp. 2d 51, 57 (D. Mass. 2012).
LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 8.04 (2019).
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
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hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex and not
her interpersonal skills that has drawn the criticism.500

Given how expensive experts are, this was welcome language for plaintiffs.
Law professors’ assumption that the only use of evidence of implicit bias and
stereotyping is through expert witness testimony may reflect a lack of
understanding of the economics of the bar representing individual employment
discrimination plaintiffs, who typically cannot afford experts.
Not surprisingly, courts have applied Price Waterhouse to rule in favor of
plaintiffs alleging backlash for assertive (“agentic”) behavior. In Margolis v.
Tektronix, the Ninth Circuit reversed a summary judgment for the employer in
a case in which the plaintiff alleged that gender stereotyping affected a decision
to lay her off.501 She alleged that her supervisor “would rarely hear women in
staff meetings,” gave her inferior work assignments, and told her that others
found her “pushy and aggressive,” which she took to mean “pushy and
aggressive for a woman.”502 The court accepted the stereotyping argument.
While her supervisor’s comments might not have been as blatant as the sex
stereotypes in [Hopkins], the subjective nature of the skills matrix—prepared
specifically for the workforce reduction—left ample room for such
stereotypes to affect [the plaintiff’s] scores, especially in areas such as
“leadership” and “teamwork,” whereas aggressiveness by a female might be
impermissibly penalized.503

In Casella v. MBNA, the District Court for the District of Maine denied
summary judgment for the employer in a case in which the plaintiff was not
hired for a customer relationship management program on the grounds that she
needed to be “more motherly, soft, and kind, rather than aggressive, strong, and
arrogant.”504 When she asked why she was not selected, one of the decisionmakers “told her that she was ‘too cocky,’ ‘overly arrogant,’ and that she should
not be ‘so aggressive’ and ‘strong’ and that she reminded him of himself.”505
Another decision-maker told her that she “needed to become more softer, more
motherly; [and] that if [she] was a man, it was acceptable, it’s not acceptable out
of a woman.”506 A third person (not a decisionmaker) helpfully gave her the
advice that “women are actually looked at as mothers, that they need to be a little
softer, a little kinder . . . more motherly” and suggested that she change her
personality.507

500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.

Id. at 256.
Margolis v. Tektronix, Inc., 44 F. App’x 138, 141–42 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 141.
Id.
Casella v. MBNA Mktg. Sys., No. CIV.8-176-B-W, 2009 WL 1621411, at *1 (D. Me. June 9, 2009).
Id. at *14 n.24.
Id.
Id.

408

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:337

Collins v. Cohen Pontani Lieberman & Pavanae combined comparator
evidence with stereotyping evidence and a retaliation claim.508 After two years
at her law firm, the then-managing partner Mr. Cohen told the plaintiff “that she
would never become a partner at the firm because she made the partners
‘uncomfortable,’ and because the partners prided themselves on being
‘collegial’ and like a ‘family.’”509 The defendant’s managing partner, with
whom she worked closely, told the plaintiff “that the other partners thought she
was ‘difficult’ and that she had not expressed enough gratitude for a raise.”510
(We have often heard from women and people of color that they are expected to
be grateful for things that white men aren’t expected to be grateful for.) When
the plaintiff asked the managing partner for help in dealing with a paralegal she
found uncooperative (a classic Tug of War problem), “he told her that she was
not ‘sweet’ enough and needed to use more ‘sugar.’”511 The comparator
evidence reflected a gendered allocation of the office housework and glamour
work; the plaintiff alleged that women litigators were “relegated to nonpartnership track support roles,” and that this had affected her ability to get good
work.512 To quote the court, “[a] reasonable jury could find that Pavane’s
statement indicates that (1) he holds stereotypes that women should be ‘sweet’
and non-aggressive, and (2) that Parvane believed that Plaintiff did not fit this
stereotype. Pavane’s comment could therefore support a jury finding that [the
firm’s] failure to provide Plaintiff with sufficient work was motivated by
Plaintiff’s failure to fulfull sex stereotpes of ‘sweet[ness],’ and therefore
constituted discrimination,” citing Price Waterhouse.513
In Kahn v. Fairfield University, the plaintiff sued when a man was
appointed to a decanal position she had held on an acting basis.514 A professor
who was a member of the search committee advocated reconsideration of her
candidacy, arguing that sex discrimination had been involved.515 While some
committee members “made conclusory statements that [the plaintiff] was
‘arrogant’ or ‘difficult to work with,’ they had difficulty providing a basis for
such conclusions,” observed the court.516 Once again the plaintiff was faulted by
staff that reported to her, who complained about her “overbearing work style,”517
reflecting the Tug of War pattern of conflict between women professionals and
support personnel. In this case, bias was not the whole story: the plaintiff
required staff to work overtime without extra compensation.518 But bias may

508. Collins v. Cohen Pontani Lieberman & Pavane, No. 04 CV 8983 KMW MHD, 2008 WL 2971668, at
*10 n.24 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 2008).
509. Id. at *2.
510. Id.
511. Id. at *9.
512. Id. at *16.
513. Id. at *9.
514. Kahn v. Fairfield Univ., 357 F. Supp. 2d 496, 498–99 (D. Conn. 2005).
515. Id. at 499.
516. Id. at 506.
517. Id. at 505.
518. Id.
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have played a role, given that the Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences rated
her outstanding, including on “[m]aintains open communication and sensitivity
to staff interaction.”519 He also reported complaints from people with whom she
worked on successful grant applications, who said that they “felt condescended
to or lectured to . . . [and] felt in some way belittled.”520 This is ambiguous: did
they just not like being told what to do by a woman? The court felt this was
enough to defeat the employer’s summary judgment.521
While Tightrope evidence is most evident in backlash claims, courts and
lawyers also have long tracked whether women or people of color have less
access to the desirable work assignments at work.522 Plaintiffs’ lawyers need to
continue educating courts that women of all races often face higher loads of
office housework.
Maternal Wall bias is also readily litigable under Title VII. Bostock rewrote
legal history in a way that’s great for plaintiffs, asserting that discrimination
against mothers has been illegal under Title VII from the start, or at least from
1971, when the Court decided Phillips v. Martin Marietta.523 This is not the way
that federal courts were interpreting Title VII in the late 1990s. In Piantanida v.
Wyman Ctr. Inc., the Eighth Circuit in 1997 held that discrimination against
mothers was not actionable because it was discrimination based on
parenthood—a gender neutral category not covered by Title VII.524 In the
charming case of Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., Judge Richard Posner gave
summary judgment for the employer on the grounds that the plaintiff had not
come forward with evidence of a pregnant Mr. Troupe, one of a series of cases
in which mothers’ cases were dismissed for lack of comparator evidence.525
In response, the area of “family responsibilities discrimination” law was
purposely designed by Williams and Cynthia Thomas Calvert around a Price
Waterhouse model, with the goal of presenting stereotyping evidence as
common sense, without the need for expensive expert witnesses. The 2004
landmark case of Back v. Hastings-on-Hudson526 adopted this approach (citing
a law review article co-authored by Williams527), arguing that “it takes no special
training to discern stereotyping in the view that a woman cannot ‘be a good

519. Id.
520. Id.
521. Id. at 506–07.
522. See, e.g., EEOC v. Schott N. Am., Inc., No. 06CV1246, 2009 WL 310897, at *2–3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 5,
2009).
523. Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737, 1743 (2020).
524. Piantanida v. Wyman Ctr., Inc., 116 F.3d 340, 342 (1997).
525. Troupe v. May Dept. Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (1994). For a full discussion, see Joan C. Williams
& Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on
the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 105–06 (2003).
526. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Back does not
allege a violation of Title VII, nor does she allege that the defendants violated her constitutional rights to have
and care for children. We therefore consider only whether she has alleged facts that can support a finding of
gender discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. To make out such a claim, the plaintiff must prove that
she suffered purposeful or intentional discrimination on the basis of gender.” (footnote omitted)).
527. See Williams & Segal, supra note 525, at 152 & n.506.
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mother’ and have a job that requires long hours, or in the statement that a mother
who received tenure ‘would not show the same level of commitment [she] had
shown because [she] had little ones at home’ . . . . These are not the kind of
‘innocuous words’ that we have previously held to be insufficient, as a matter of
law, to provide evidence of discriminatory intent.”528 The Back court rejected
the employer’s argument that Back should lose because she had not shown
evidence of a “similarly situated” man529—as is often the case in sex-segregated
jobs, there was no man in sight. The stereotyping approach was adopted in the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 2007 Enforcement Guidance:
Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities,
which embraced the stereotyping theory and stated explicitly that comparator
evidence could be helpful but was not necessary in a caregiving discrimination
case.530 By 2012, perhaps due in part to Calvert’s work in providing technical
backup to attorneys across the country on caregiver discrimination cases through
the WorkLife Law Attorney Network,531 caregiver discrimination was one of the
fastest growing areas of employment law and plaintiffs were winning threefourths of cases filed in federal courts.532
Class actions that combine evidence of Maternal Wall bias, sexual
harassment, and glass ceiling bias (for example, Prove-It-Again and Tightrope)
may provide a model for class actions going forward. Michael Selmi has argued
that the first large Maternal Wall class action, Velez v. Novartis,533 represents
the path forward from Dukes v. Wal-Mart.534 “What was significant about the
Novartis litigation is that the plaintiffs were able to weave together a coherent
narrative about corporate culture through a collection of individual stories with
similar themes that demonstrated how sexist attitudes had reached the top
echelon of management and thus could be seen as creating a companywide
policy. The narrative was then bolstered by the statistical presentation, rather
than having the statistical presentation do all the work.”535 In effect, Novartis
returned to the pre-implicit bias approach to class actions, where statistics were
combined with anecdotal evidence to present a strong story line. Law professors
tend to remember the language in the landmark case of Teamsters v. United

528. Back, 365 F.3d at 120.
529. Id. at 121.
530. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL
DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING R ESPONSIBILITIES (2007), https://www.eeoc.gov/
policy/docs/caregiving.html.
531. Plaintiffs’ employment lawyers who wish to inquire about joining the WorkLife Law Attorney
Network should consult the WorkLife Law webpage. Attorney-Network Application, WORKLIFE LAW,
https://worklifelaw.org/projects/attorney-network-application/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
532. CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT, WORKLIFE LAW, CAREGIVERS IN THE WORKPLACE: FAMILY
RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION UPDATE 24 (2016), https://worklifelaw.org/publications/
Caregivers-in-the-Workplace-FRD-update-2016.pdf. “Looking only at FRD trials in federal court, the win rate
for plaintiffs is 75%.” Id. Win rate was defined as defeating employer’s summary judgment as well as winning
at trial. Id. at 21 n.47.
533. See generally Valez v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 244 F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
534. Selmi, supra note 28, at 505 n.114.
535. Id. at 505.
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States536—highlighting that cases can be made with statistical evidence alone—
but forget that the plaintiffs in Teamsters provided testimony of forty instances
of discrimination.537 Statistical evidence makes it possible for a judge to find for
the plaintiffs; anecdotal evidence will typically be needed to make the judge
want to find for them.
The law firm of Sanford Heisler has turned this approach into a business
plan, filing lawsuit after gender discrimination lawsuit combining evidence of
discrimination against women because they are mothers with evidence of
discrimination against women because they are women (typically, glass ceiling
bias and sexual harassment evidence). To cite just one example, in Barrett v.
Forest Labs, settled in 2015, the firm represented a class of current or former
female employees.538 The case involved pay discrimination (pointing to the
higher pay of comparator men) as well as promotion discrimination, focusing on
how men were promoted with lower metrics, how women often saw their ratings
fall after they returned from maternity leave, and how women were placed on
probation in contexts where men were not.539 For example, one woman said she
was placed on probation even though other team members had similar
performance numbers, and that a male team member who had committed “a
serious infraction” was not disciplined, but instead told by his manager, “Don’t
worry, I have your back.”540 This is classic leniency bias, presented as
comparator (not stereotyping) evidence.
Plaintiffs also alleged sexual harassment of a singularly coarse variety. One
woman’s manager mouthed, “[y]ou need to fuck her” to a male colleague.541
Another woman alleged that several of her clients made sexually explicit
comments and, on one occasion, one “leaned into [her], pulled her breast out
from her shirt, and attempted to lick it.”542 When she reported these incidents to
her manager he reminded her of how important it was to make a sale, and insisted
that he did not wish to know about clients’ indiscretions that he would be
obligated to report to management, because they would lose sales.543 A third
woman was told she should “‘fuck’ a doctor.”544 After another woman reported
sexual harassment by a colleague, she was ordered to work even more closely
with her harasser going forward.545
The plaintiffs also alleged pregnancy discrimination, pointing to both men
and non-pregnant women as comparators and to sharp plummets in performance
ratings after women became pregnant, returned from maternity leave, or

536. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
537. Id. at 338.
538. Barrett v. Forest Labs., Inc., 39 F. Supp. 3d 407, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
539. Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 95, Barrett v. Forest Labs., Inc., No. 1:12-CV-05224-RA
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2013).
540. Barrett, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 418.
541. Id. at 419.
542. Id. at 423.
543. Id.
544. Id.
545. Id. at 424.
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requested job sharing.546 One manager said “he was not going to hire women
anymore because they all get pregnant and go on maternity leave”; another said,
“everybody who works for me gets pregnant.”547 Another woman’s manager
commented, after she inquired about job sharing, “[m]aybe this job isn’t for you
if you’re not committed,” gave her a low performance rating, twice extended her
probation, and set unrealistic sales goals and assigned her office housework
(“administrative tasks which he did not assign to any other of his direct
reports.”)548 Another woman’s work was hyper-scrutinized after she
unsuccessfully requested a job sharing position, and was told she “had no place
at Forest.”549 After she inquired of HR, her manager made cracks to the effect
that she should just copy HR on everything going forward. In fact, the company
repeatedly ignored a wide variety of complaints, which was duly noted by the
court.
In denying the employer’s motion to dismiss, the court held that the
plaintiffs, despite their failure to introduce any statistical evidence whatsoever,
had plausibly alleged both pattern-or-practice and individual suits with respect
to pay discrimination and a pattern-or-practice claim with respect to pay and
promotion discrimination.550
Stereotyping theory has commonly been understood to be limited to “loose
lips”:551 statements that reflect stereotyping. Prove-It-Again evidence need not
include such statements. Indeed, in the context of Maternal Wall litigation, some
courts have allowed plaintiffs to proceed on a stereotyping theory even without
untoward remarks. In EEOC v. Bob Evans Farms, a server was a part-time
employee with no set guarantee of number of hours.552 The employer used an
automatic scheduling system to create employee schedules and hours. The
employee, who was pregnant with her second child, testified that she was able
to work and, in a conversation with her supervisor, she stated she wanted to work
until her delivery even though he stated that her delivery was “imminent” and
“could happen any day.”553 He removed her immediately from the automatic
scheduling system and set her availability to “zero.”554 The court awarded
summary judgment to the plaintiff, on the grounds that there was no genuine
issue of material fact with respect to pregnancy discrimination.555 Despite the
lack of explicit statements on the part of the employer, the court held that this
was a direct evidence case.556 The court highlighted that the supervisor’s actions
546. Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 95, Barrett v. Forest Labs., Inc., No. 1:12-CV-05224-RA
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2013).
547. Barrett, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 447, 456.
548. Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 64–65, Barrett v. Forest Labs., Inc., No. 1:12-CV-05224RA (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2013).
549. Barrett, 39 F. Supp. 3d at 420.
550. Id. at 417.
551. Williams & Segal, supra note 525, at 107.
552. EEOC v. Bob Evans Farms, 275 F. Supp. 3d 635, 640 (W.D. Pa. 2017).
553. Id. at 641.
554. Id. at 642.
555. Id. at 670.
556. Id.
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in removing the plaintiff from automatic scheduling was because she was
pregnant and his belief that she needed leave because of childbirth.557 The court
also said that expecting the plaintiff to call in to obtain work in order to
demonstrate that she was able to work despite her pregnancy was an adverse
employment action.558
In short, Title VII (while far from perfect) is not ill-suited to accommodate
the types of gender bias evidence that form the basis of modern Title VII claims.
C. ONCE THE FOCUS SHIFTS FROM AUTOMATIC ASSOCIATIONS TO THE FIVE
PATTERNS OF WORKPLACE BIAS, TITLE VII DOCTRINE READILY
ACCOMMODATES EVIDENCE OF MODERN FORMS OF RACIAL BIAS
Prove-It-Again bias is triggered by race as well as gender; again, it fits
readily into the classic Title VII focus on comparators. As in the gender context,
comparative evidence is relevant not only for identifying comparators but as
evidence of Prove-It-Again stereotyping. Although Price Waterhouse’s
stereotyping approach to proving a Title VII claim originated in the context of
gender, some courts have applied it in race discrimination cases, notably in the
much-discussed 1998 First Circuit case, Thomas v. Eastman Kodak.559 The
plaintiff was the only African-American woman in her department whose
problems began when she was assigned to a new supervisor.560 She had worked
for ten years as a customer support representative, with managers who reported
that “they were never dissatisfied with her performance, that they were
‘delighted’ with Thomas, and that her work was excellent and ‘far superior’ to
that of some of [her colleagues].”561 She received awards and bonuses, but all
that ended when Claire Flannery took over as her supervisor.562
Flannery treated Thomas with the kind of disrespect often reported by
Black women professionals.563 An example: her new supervisor accompanied
Thomas to a customer training session in order to observe Thomas’s work, but
instead the supervisor took the session over and conducted the entire training
herself.564 Another time, Flannery told Thomas the incorrect time for a training
session and refused to take responsibility for doing so, leaving the customer
angry with the plaintiff.565 “On a third occasion, Flannery became quite angry
and attempted physically to block Thomas leaving a [departmental] meeting
which had been scheduled at the same time is an important training session for
one of Thomas’s customers.”566 Thomas also encountered an officehousework/glamour work problem: Flannery failed to give her the same type of
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.

Id. at 657.
Id.
Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 59 (1st Cir. 1999).
Id. at 64.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 43, 45.
See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
Thomas, 183 F.3d at 45.
Id.
Id.
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developmental opportunities and failed to give her the same time to develop her
presentations as white colleagues received (thereby subverting Thomas’s
success on glamour-work assignments).567 Thomas also presented evidence of
Prove-It-Again bias: Flannery denied Thomas the opportunity to apply for sales
jobs and discouraged her from applying for a management position on the
grounds that Thomas had not completed her Master’s degree, although none of
the other managers applying for that position had even a bachelor’s.568 The coup
de grace was when Flannery gave Thomas “inaccurately low scores on her
annual performance appraisals” that caused her overall rating to drop from a six
in 1989, to a three in 1990—which Thomas refused to sign.569 Thomas was
ultimately laid off due to her low performance ratings.
The employer made much of the fact that Thomas had no evidence
explicitly tying the treatment of Thomas to race.570 Yet, the First Circuit cited
Price Waterhouse and noted that, “[s]tereotypes or cognitive biases based on
race are as incompatible with Title VII’s mandate as stereotypes based on age or
sex; here too, ‘the entire spectrum of disparate treatment’ is prohibited.”571
Acknowledging that Thomas’s case involved “a more subtle type of disparate
treatment” than cases involving direct evidence, the issue was whether “an
employer evaluates employees of one race less favorably than employees of
another race who have performed equivalently, and if race, rather than some
other factor, is the basis for the difference in evaluations, then the disfavored
employee [has] been subjected to” race discrimination.572 In reversing the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the employer, the court noted
that Flannery treated Thomas differently than her coworkers.573 The court noted,
in useful language, that it was unimportant “whether the employer consciously
intended to base the evaluations on race, or simply did so because of unthinking
stereotypes or bias.”574
In a third case, robust stereotyping evidence unfortunately was ignored by
the court. In Twymon v. Wells Fargo, the plaintiff not only had comparator
evidence that objective rules were applied more rigorously to her than to white
employees; she also reported Tightrope bias—that she was expected to behave
in deferential, rather than dominant, ways because she was Black.575 She said
she was consistently directed “to be accommodating and nice,” while her white
colleagues were allowed to behave badly.576 Phil Hall, the Director of Employee
Relations told her that “intelligence and outspokenness in black employees is
not welcomed” and that “qualities that would make a Caucasian a golden child,
567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.
573.
574.
575.
576.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 45–46.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 58.
Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, 936 (8th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 931.
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being aggressive and intelligent and outspoken and a go-getter, would do exactly
the reverse to a person of color.”577 Twymon said that Hall advised her to
develop a deferential persona as a “good black” who “would be accepted by the
Caucasians at Wells Fargo.”578 She responded by asking if she should act like
an Uncle Tom, to which Hall responded in the affirmative—a classic Tug of War
dynamic.579 Someone in human resources told her she was not “[m]idwest nice,”
and she received comments on her personality on her performance appraisal
from the Senior Vice President of Human Resources, who “admitted she did not
include such comments on white employees’ evaluations.”580 Wells Fargo
alleged a violation of computer policy as the legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason Twymon lost her job.581 The Eighth Circuit unfortunately wrote off the
stereotyping evidence as “stray comments” and affirmed the trial court’s
summary judgment in favor of the employer.582
In a 2010 case, the plaintiff fared better. In Kimble v. Wisconsin
Department of Workforce Development, the Eastern District of Wisconsin did
an outstanding job of identifying patterns of bias.583 The court noted that the
plaintiff’s supervisor viewed him “veiled with images of incompetency.”584 The
supervisor hyper-scrutinized the plaintiff’s spelling and grammar and did not
seem focused on the fact that, as the section chief at the Milwaukee office of the
Civil Rights Bureau, his chief job was to effectively manage his office and
ensure good productivity and morale of his office, both of which he did well (as
a supervisor acknowledged).585 This all is part of Prove-It-Again bias, as was the
supervisor’s largely unsubstantiated criticism of the plaintiff’s writing. The
court also noted two instances of the stolen idea, where the plaintiff’s ideas were
ignored until someone else repeated them, that the plaintiff’s supervisor blamed
the plaintiff for faults she overlooked in others, and attributed a mistake someone
else had made to him.586 This court drew from the literature on implicit bias and
took these Prove-It-Again patterns seriously.
Stereotyping theory has been severely underutilized in race discrimination
cases: a 2016 study found only fifty-eight cases that had ever referenced race or
racial stereotypes.587 Stereotyping theory may hold the potential to help turn
around a troubling fact: a careful empirical study in 2006 by Wendy Parker
found that federal employment race discrimination cases were less likely to
settle and that defendants were more likely to win a pretrial judgment in race

577.
578.
579.
580.
581.
582.
583.
584.
585.
586.
587.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 935.
Id. at 934.
Kimble v. Wis. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 690 F. Supp. 2d 765, 771 (E.D. Wis. 2010).
Id. at 776.
Id. at 777–78.
Id.
Bornstein, supra note 5, at 964 n.249.

416

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:337

than in gender discrimination cases.588 Race discrimination cases also were less
likely to settle than employment discrimination cases in general.589 These
findings are particularly sobering given that a 2017 meta-analysis of field
experiments found that there has been no decrease in racial discrimination for
Black Americans since 1989.590 White people still receive more than a third
more job callbacks than Black people do, even accounting for education and
other relevant factors.591
In short, while some courts have proved less receptive than they should be
to evidence of racial stereotyping and bias, the types of evidence typically
available in race cases fit readily into Title VII.
D. COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FIVE-PATTERNS
MODEL FOR THE SAME-ACTOR AND PERSONAL ANIMOSITY DEFENSES
While Title VII is up to the task of accommodating workplace bias, courts
have definitely taken some wrong turns. Other commentators592 have been aptly
critical in the way some courts misuse the “stray remarks” dicta from Price
Waterhouse593 and discount evidence of discrimination on the grounds that the
employer honestly believed the reason given for the challenged employment
action (even if the reason is ultimately found to be foolish or factually
baseless).594 Here we will focus on the “same-actor inference,” which reflects
the belief that someone who hired the plaintiff would not later fire them, and the
“personal animosity” defense, in which courts have discounted evidence of bias
on the grounds that the plaintiff’s troubles reflected personal dislike, not
discrimination.
Same-actor inference. The “same-actor inference” stems from the Fourth
Circuit case of Proud v. Stone.595 Proud involved the hiring and subsequent
firing of an accountant within a four-and-a-half month period by the same
supervisor.596 The Proud court ignored the obviously relevant evidence of
588. Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889,
895, 932 (2006).
589. Id. at 932.
590. Jamelle Boule, The Racism Right Before Our Eyes, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/opinion/racism-housing-jobs.html (citing Quillian et al., supra note 404).
591. Id.
592. SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S C OURTS UNDERMINE
DISCRIMINATION L AW 70 (2017); Krieger, supra note 3, at 1174; Laina Rose Reinsmith, Proving an Employer’s
Intent: Disparate Treatment Discrimination and the Stray Remarks Doctrine after Reeves v. Sanders Plumbing
Products, 55 VAND. L. REV. 219, 247 (2002); Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray
Comment Doctrine in Employment Discrimination, 77 MO. L. REV. 149, 149 (2012). See, e.g., Taylor v. Amcor
Flexibles, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 501, 511 (D.N.J. 2009), aff’d, 507 F. App’x 231 (3d Cir. 2012) (discounting as
“stray remarks” an African-American plaintiff’s supervisor comment, shortly after he was hired, “to the effect
that Black men know how to post-up in the low post [in basketball], but do not know the medical packaging
business”).
593. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989).
594. SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 592, at 75 n.91, 196 (referencing Clack v. Rock-Tenn Co., 304 F.
App’x 399, 403 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008)); Krieger, supra note 3, at 1184.
595. Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796, 796–98 (4th Cir. 1991).
596. Id. at 797.
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plaintiff’s poor performance, focusing instead on the fact that the same person
had hired and fired the plaintiff, holding that “same hirer and firer” evidence
gave rise to a strong inference that the adverse employment action was not
discriminatory.597 To quote the court, “it hardly makes sense to hire workers
from a group one dislikes (thereby incurring the psychological costs of
associating with them), only to fire them once they are on the job.”598 As Part II
explained, this rationale embeds the inaccurate view that bias reflects dislike of
particular groups, which leaves out many kinds of bias, notably Prove-It-Again,
Maternal Wall, Tug of War and benevolent approval of women or people of
color who “know their place” (Tightrope).
Subsequent courts greatly expanded the scope of the doctrine. As of 2008,
eight out of eleven federal circuits considered same-actor evidence an almost
irrebuttable presumption.599 As of 2015, the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth,
Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits held that the same-actor inference
was a strong, “nearly irrebuttable” presumption against discrimination, often
leading to courts granting employers’ motions for summary judgment.600 The
remaining circuits have adopted a more sensible approach: they consider sameactor evidence to be relevant information that, combined with other evidence,
may create an inference of discrimination (or fail to do so).601
To make matters worse, some courts have dramatically expanded the scope
of the same-actor inference post-Proud. Whereas the time lapse between hiring
and firing in Proud was a few months,602 some courts have extended the
allowable lapse as long as seven years (although others have refused to do so).603
Whereas Proud involved a single decision-maker, other courts have applied the
same-actor inference in the (commonplace) situation involving multiple
decision-makers, where people other than the person who hired the plaintiff also
played a role in deciding to fire her or him.604 Still other courts have applied the
same-actor inference where the same-actor was not involved at all, on the
grounds that the decision in question was made by someone from the plaintiff’s
own social group.605
The same-actor inference makes sense when a decision to fire is made by
the same person who hired the plaintiff, without intervening poor job
597. Id. (“In cases where the hirer and the firer are the same individual and the termination of employment
occurs within a relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference exists that discrimination was
not a determining factor for the adverse action taken by the employer.”).
598. Id. (quoting John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1017 (1991)).
599. See Andrea L. Miller, The Use (and Misuse) of the Same-Actor Inference in Family Responsibilities
Discrimination Litigation: Lessons from Social Psychology on Flexibility Stigma, 41 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1032, 1073 (2015).
600. Id.
601. Id.
602. Natasha T. Martin, Immunity for Hire: How the Same-Actor Doctrine Sustains Discrimination in the
Contemporary Workplace, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1117, 1125 (2008).
603. Miller, supra note 599, at 1035.
604. Id. at 1066–67, 1070–71.
605. Id. at 1072.
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performance, only a short time after the plaintiff was hired—but only as
evidence to be weighed with other relevant evidence. As others have discussed,
any more sweeping doctrine is inconsistent with the evidence from psychology.
Linda Krieger and Susan Fiske first discussed the inconsistency between the
same-actor doctrine and social psychology in 2006, pointing out that the
influence of stereotypes is situational, so that it varies from situation to situation.
“[E]mpirical research suggests that dispositionism, the common-sense model of
behavioral consistency on which the same actor inference is based, is deeply
flawed, and that human behavior is far less consistent across situations than lay
people tend to believe.”606 This is true, but vague.
One article that goes beyond the generalized statement that bias depends
on the situation is Andrea L. Miller’s excellent discussion of why the same-actor
inference makes no sense in the context of Maternal Wall bias.607 Miller goes
far beyond Krieger and Fiske’s critique of dispositionism to pinpoint many
different areas of social science research relevant to the same-actor inference in
the context of Maternal Wall bias.608 Moral credentialing research documents
that members of the dominant group who feel they have taken the
nondiscriminatory action (such as hiring a woman or person of color) may feel
“morally credentialed” as unbiased, which can cause them to fail to provide the
necessary cognitive override to avoid bias in the future.609 Bias can also flourish
in pressured situations where time is short and attention is divided610 and where
one’s membership in a subordinate social group is highlighted.611
The five-patterns model provides a lot more concreteness. The most
obvious irrationality of same-actor defense concerns Maternal Wall bias.
Women may encounter it when they have been hired when they are non-mothers
or not pregnant but later get pregnant or have children. For example, in Moore
v. Alabama, one plaintiff’s male supervisor looked straight at her pregnant belly
and said, “I was going to put you in charge of that office, but look at you now.”612
Other Maternal Wall cases involve mothers who have children but not young
children, as in Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., where a woman’s problems began
when she had triplets, despite the fact that she had not encountered Maternal
Wall discrimination when she only had her one older child.613
A central message of Maternal Wall bias is that women are often perceived
differently before and after they have children. Indeed, WorkLife Law in its
2016 litigation update noted that women often encounter Maternal Wall
discrimination only after the birth of their second child.614 WES data also
606. Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law:
Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1048 (2006).
607. Miller, supra note 599, at 1066–67.
608. Id.
609. Id. at 1067.
610. Id. at 1048.
611. Id. at 1050.
612. Moore v. Ala. State Univ., 980 F. Supp. 426, 431 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
613. Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2009).
614. CALVERT, supra note 532, at 33–34.
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highlight the Tug of War dynamic that can lead to Maternal Wall discrimination
if women discriminate against each other for handling motherhood the “wrong
way.”615 The most dramatic example is from Walsh v. National Computer
Systems, Inc., in which a plaintiff’s supervisor became truly abusive when the
plaintiff got pregnant, took maternity leave, and then took time off work to take
her child to the pediatrician because the child got persistent ear infections.616
Ironically, the abusive supervisor herself had a child who had lost some hearing
due to persistent ear infections.617 One can only imagine the identity threat: the
supervisor presumably had a lot invested in proving (to herself and others) that
she did the right thing in failing to take time off with her child, that this was the
only responsible way to be a good worker, and that her child’s hearing loss was
unavoidable.
The Tug of War also is relevant when the same-actor inference reflects an
assumption that a member of a protected class would never discriminate against
another member of the same protected class. Natasha T. Martin provided the
first comprehensive discussion of this topic in 2008 with an important analysis
of why the doctrine does not make sense in the context of race.618 Notably, she
points out that the Supreme Court has said expressly that the “fact that one
person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class
is . . . irrelevant, so long as he has lost because of [his status in the protected
class].”619 The Supreme Court reiterated this point in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, noting “we have rejected any conclusive presumption that an
employer will not discriminate against members of his own race.” 620 This would
seem to dispose of the presumption, or even the inference, that the plaintiff
cannot bring a case when he is discriminated against by a member of his own
social group. The same holds true for gender: Oncale held that a man had a cause
of action for sexual harassment against another man.621 All this would seem to
preclude lower courts from using a presumption that one member of a protected
group will not discriminate against another as a matter of legal precedent.
The Tug of War helps explain why one member of a protected group might
discriminate against another. Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati’s theory of
“working identity” posits that members of subordinated groups often need to
perform “identity work” to re-sculpt their identities into a version acceptable to
members of the majority group.622 Recall Robert Livingston’s study that found
that whereas white CEOs tend to have mature faces, Black CEOs tend to have

615. See supra text accompanying notes 378–380.
616. Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1154–55 (8th Cir. 2003).
617. WorkLife Law filed an amicus brief in the Walsh case. See Brief for Shireen A. Walsh as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellee, Walsh v. Nat’l Comput. Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2003). The facts in this
paragraph reflect discussions Williams had with Walsh’s lawyer.
618. Martin, supra note 602, at 1167.
619. Id. at 1138 n.76 (quoting O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996)).
620. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998).
621. Id. at 79; see also Martin, supra note 602, at 1162 (referencing Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d
734, 745 (7th Cir. 1999)).
622. CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 8, at 720.
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“teddy-bear” faces—a built-in racial comfort strategy.623 Carbado and Gulati
focused more on people of color’s need to perform an identity acceptable to
white people, but if some people of color embrace racial comfort strategies as a
mechanism for assimilation, whereas other people of color refuse to do so,
conflict among people of color emerges in majority white workplaces—a Tug
of War effect.
Twymon v. Wells Fargo provides an apt example, as mentioned above.624
Recall that in Twymon, an African-American male who was Director of
Employee Relations allegedly told the plaintiff, an African-American female,
that behaving in dominant as opposed to deferential ways was accepted from
white but not Black people in the Minnesota Wells Fargo office where they
worked.625 No doubt he considered his advice to be a “good Black” to be
valuable career advice for navigating a racist workplace, advice that presumably
had worked for him.626 But to Twymon, the advice was completely
unacceptable—a demand that she behave like an “Uncle Tom.”627 When she told
him that, she made it clear exactly what she thought of his strategies for
assimilating into the dominant group.
Tightrope bias also undermines the assumption that the same actor would
not first hire and then discriminate against a member of a protected group. One
scenario is where a white person hires a person of color with the expectation that
they will play a subordinate role that the white person sees as suitable for people
of color, but the person of color fails to deliver. Martin cites the apt example of
Johnson v. Zema Systems Corporation, in which the plaintiff was hired as part
of a merger of two beer distribution companies, one predominantly AfricanAmerican serving mostly African-American customers, and one predominantly
white serving mostly white customers.628 The plaintiff, Leon Johnson, was a
manager who complained that African Americans were originally segregated
into separate rooms, received lower pay because they were allocated only
African-American customers, were the first to be laid off or fired and the last to
be rehired, were referred to as “n**gers,” and that white but not AfricanAmerican managers were allocated company cars.629 In addition, the plaintiff
established a friendship with a white sales manager, which his supervisor found
disconcerting.630 A magistrate judge awarded summary judgment for the
employers, relying in part on the same-actor inference.631 The Seventh Circuit
reversed, aptly criticizing the discrimination-as-dislike model articulated in
Proud.

623.
624.
625.
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.

Livingston & Pearce, supra note 181, at 1229.
Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 931.
Id.
Id.
Martin, supra note 602, at 1167 (citing Johnson v. Zema Systems Corp., 170 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1999)).
See Johnson, 170 F.3d at 738.
Id. at 744.
Id.
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Tug of War dynamics can arise in any number of ways. A manager might
hire a person of a certain race not expecting them to rise to a position in the
company where daily contact with the manager would be necessary. An
employer may hire a woman or person of color and then hold them to higher
standards. An employer may also hire women expecting them to act, dress, or
talk in a way the employer deems suitable for a woman and then fire that
employee if she fails to conform to the employer’s prescriptive gender
stereotypes. If an employee is the first African American hired, an employer
might be unaware of his own stereotypical expectations of African Americans
at the time of hiring. If the employer subsequently discovers he does not wish to
work with African Americans and fires the newly hired employee for this reason,
the employee should still have a claim of racial discrimination. For these and
other reasons, the same-actor inference is often unwarranted.632
Courts also need to be aware of the tensions that can arise between women
professionals and admins. For example, in Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins’
clients praised her “as ‘extremely competent, intelligent,’ ‘strong and forthright,
very productive, energetic and creative.’”633 In sharp contrast, administrative
personnel criticized her as sometimes overly aggressive and unduly harsh with
staff. The Supreme Court did not pick up the Tug of War dynamic in which
women professionals often encounter pushback from support staff, which the
WES Survey documents in industry after industry.634
Note the difference between the generalized statement that bias varies
depending on the situation—Krieger and Fiske’s initial formulation—and the
concrete description afforded by WES data detailing precisely how someone
might easily hire someone and then subsequently fire them, or why a member of
a protected group might discriminate against a member of his or her own group.
That summarizes the transition from the implicit bias consensus to the fivepatterns model proposed in this Article.
Personal animosity defense. Courts also should be wary of the “personal
animosity” defense: the argument that a woman or person of color was fired or
experienced another adverse employment action due to personal animosity, not
discrimination.635 In an at-will employment system like the one in the United
States, employers can fire or discipline employees for any reason or no reason,
including personal dislike.636 Furthermore, we suspect many courts will be
reluctant to interfere with employers’ right to part ways with employees whom
they or others just can’t get along with. To say that some of the “personal
animosity” cases describe people who aren’t easy to get along with is an
understatement: the plaintiffs in the “personal animosity” cases include men

632.
633.
634.
635.
636.

Id. at 745.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 234 (1989).
See supra p. 400.
Derum & Engle, supra note 449, at 1188; McGinley, supra note 1, at 463 n.277.
LARSON, supra note 498, § 8.04.
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accused of sexual harassment,637 a plaintiff who called a co-worker “arrogant,
cocky, unprofessional, and lazy,”638 and another who allegedly described a coworker to other colleagues as a “hillbilly bitch” and commented “God knows
what the f**k she is doing.”639
Nonetheless, courts do need to take care because, as discussed in Part II,
prescriptive bias often is expressed as dislike.640 As has been noted, prescriptive
gender bias often takes the form of hostility to women who do not conform to
the stereotype that women should be modest, supportive, and nice rather than
competitive, ambitious, and direct.641 Courts have long recognized this. As far
back as 1989 in Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court noted, “We sit not to
determine whether Ms. Hopkins is nice, but to decide whether the partners
reacted negatively to her personality because she is a woman.”642 Similarly, if
employers have an expectation that people of color will play a deferential
worker-bee role, those who refuse to do so may find themselves disliked.
Consequently, courts face the challenge of distinguishing when employers’
dislike for an employee stems from prescriptive stereotypes and when it does
not. This should not be insurmountably difficult. An example of a “personal
animosity” case that does not involve prescriptive stereotyping is McCollum v.
Bolger, in which a mother and her two sons alleged sex discrimination and
retaliation when they were all fired from the postal service.643 The trial court
held that the mother’s dismissal was due to her “bad relationship with her
supervisor . . . and she also disagreed with her superiors on how her job should
be performed . . . . in addition to her failure to follow instructions.”644
“Competent witnesses,” it continued, “testified that the plaintiff did not get along
with her supervisor and was ‘a combative, hostile, rude, vindictive and
dictatorial employee.’”645 The court was clearly reluctant to require the
employer to put up with this kind of misbehavior when it noted “[t]he plaintiff
cannot turn a personal fued into a sex discrimination case by accusation.”646
Unfortunately, courts sometimes cite personal animosity as the reason for
adverse employment actions in cases that are less convincing. Chief among them
is the famous Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Center.647 Melvin Hicks was one of
only two African-American shift commanders left after the others were fired
following a 1981 study that warned that “too many blacks were in positions of

637. Hazward v. Runyon, 14 F. Supp. 2d 120, 123 (D.D.C. 1998); Smith v. Equitrac Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d
727, 744 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
638. Mathis v. Perry, 996 F. Supp. 503, 510 n.19 (E.D. Va. 1997).
639. Smith, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 730.
640. See supra Part II.
641. See supra Part II.
642. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
643. McCollum v. Bolger, 794 F.2d 602, 605–08 (11th Cir. 1986).
644. Id. at 610.
645. Id.
646. Id.
647. Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 756 F. Supp. 1244, 1249 (E.D. Mo. 1991), rev’d sub nom St. Mary’s
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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power” at St. Mary’s.648 The employer argued that Hicks was fired for rule
infractions—yet he was the only person disciplined for violations committed by
his subordinates, and much more serious violations by white people were either
disregarded or treated much more leniently.649 It also held that Hicks’s superiors
“had placed plaintiff on the express track to termination” and had “manufactured
the confrontation between the plaintiff” and his supervisor in order to fire him.650
The trial court concluded that the reasons (rule infraction) offered for Hicks’s
dismissal were pretextual.651 Then, despite the fact that Hicks’s supervisors
denied any personal animosity, the court nonetheless awarded summary
judgment to the employer on the grounds that Hicks’s dismissal stemmed from
personal animosity, not discrimination, a holding affirmed by the Eighth
Circuit.652
Going forward, certainly the first principle should be that where an
employer’s agents have expressly denied personal animosity, courts should not
step in at summary judgment (where courts are not supposed to be assessing
credibility)653 and second-guess them. That would seem to be a factual finding
(and one without evidence to back it up).
Moreover, courts should recognize that a claim of personal animosity
against a woman or person of color often requires courts to distinguish between
situations in which animosity was triggered by a plaintiff’s failure to conform to
prescriptive stereotypes and dislike for other reasons. Absent situations
involving a jilted lover, discerning whether personal animosity stems from
prescriptive stereotyping or not typically will involve a trial to resolve factual
issues and credibility assessments—not the kind of thing suitable for summary
judgment or a motion to dismiss.654 Courts should sharply limit the personal
animosity defense and should not use it to give a free pass to excuse employers
after plaintiffs have proven the falsity of the employer’s supposedly “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason.”
E. CONCLUSION
Other authors have been pointing out for more than two decades the
inaccuracy of claims that Title VII is inadequate to address contemporary forms

648. Id. at 1252 (“[P]rior to the 1984 personnel change there was one white and five blacks in supervisory
positions. After Steve Long became superintendent, there were four whites and two blacks in supervisory
positions.”).
649. Id. at 1250–51.
650. Id. at 1251.
651. Id. at 1252.
652. Id.; see also Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 90 F.3d 285, 293 (8th Cir. 1996).
653. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
654. See 1 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, CIVIL PROCEDURE (Daniel R. Coquilettte, Gregory P. Joseph,
Georgene M. Vairo & Chilton Davis Varner eds., 2019); see also Succar v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 60 F. Supp. 2d
1309, 1315–18 (S.D. Fla. 1999), aff’d, 229 F.3d 1343 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[Ms. Lorenz’s harassment of Plaintiff]
was not the result of Plaintiff’s gender ‘but of responses to an individual because of her former intimate place in
[that individual’s] life.’”); see also Huebschen v. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 716 F.2d 1167, 1172 (7th Cir.
1983) (motivation was not based on sex, “but that he was a former lover who had jilted her”).
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of discrimination (or that law itself is).655 Make no mistake: Title VII is far from
perfect. Scholarship makes an important contribution when it critiques Title VII
in order to help courts continue the dynamic statutory interpretation of Title VII
that began in the early 1970s as discrimination transmuted from explicit to more
modern forms.656 But that dynamic process means that modern forms of
discrimination typically can be litigated using one or both of the basic forms of
evidence commonplace in Title VII cases—comparator and stereotyping
evidence. No doubt defense-minded law professors will continue to argue that
Title VII is incapable of reaching anything but the most explicit forms of
discrimination. As the Article shows, we disagree.

IV. USING WES DATA IN LITIGATION
Lawyers we interviewed have used, or expressed interest in using, the fivepatterns model in individual disparate treatment cases657 and class actions.658
Equally important, the five-patterns model is proving useful in mass arbitrations
that are coming to rival class actions in importance, as employers require
employees to sign mandatory arbitration agreements as a condition of
employment. Jocelyn Larkin of the Impact Fund used the five-patterns model in
a series of mass arbitrations that resulted from a class action against a large
retailer.659 “[The company] had a purely subjective system so we had to dig
deeply to show that individual claimants were subject to all manner of implicit
bias. We used the five patterns to create themes for our arbitrations. I remember
that ‘Prove-It-Again’ was very useful because typically it took women 15 years’
work before they could even be considered for the promotions.”660
This Part and Appendix A explore the implications of WES data for
litigation of Title VII cases. This Part begins by pointing out that knowledge of
the basic patterns of bias is now widespread. This has implications for the
summary judgment motions that typically end employment discrimination
cases; in them, courts often make assumptions about whether a reasonable jury
could find that the evidence presented supports an inference of discrimination.661
Widespread dissemination of bias patterns also means that plaintiffs often
should be able to introduce bias evidence as comparator or stereotyping evidence
without the need for expensive expert testimony. 662 This Part first discusses
655. See, e.g., McGinley, supra note 1, at 445; Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination, supra note 1, at
336.
656. See Williams N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1492–96
(1987).
657. Conversation of Joan C. Williams with Kathryn Dickson (2008).
658. Telephone Interview with Kate Mueting, Partner, Sanford Heisler Sharp LLP (Nov. 22, 2019) (on file
with authors); Telephone Interview with Adam Klein, Managing Partner, Outten & Golden (Dec. 6, 2019) (on
file with authors); Telephone Interview with Paul Mollica, Counsel, Outten & Golden (Dec. 3, 2019) (on file
with authors).
659. E-mail from Jocelyn Larkin, Executive Director of the Impact Fund, to Joan C. Williams, Distinguished
Professor of L., Univ. of California, Hastings Coll. of the L. (Oct. 21, 2019, 1:55 PM) (on file with authors).
660. Id.
661. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
662. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1989).
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these issues and presents the evidence of widespread dissemination. The Part
continues with some thoughts on the implications of WES data for class actions.
The Article ends with some brief pointers on how to use bias data in litigation,
from the writing of the complaint, to discovery, to negotiations, to closing
arguments.
B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF WIDESPREAD DISSEMINATION OF THE BIAS
PATTERNS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
The basic patterns of bias have received widespread attention in the last
decade, in public discourse, popular culture, and the business community, as
well as growing representation of the five bias patterns in literature, film,
television, music, advertising, and journalism at large. This widespread
dissemination has implications for summary judgment and for whether bias
evidence can be introduced without expert testimony.
Because employment discrimination cases often end at summary
judgment,663 judges make rulings based on their own understanding of whether
a reasonable jury could find that the evidence can support an inference of
discrimination under Title VII.664 When courts make statements about what a
rational decisionmaker could find, they should take into account the fact that the
bias patterns have been so widely disseminated that today’s jurors are more
likely than those in the past to recognize bias when they see it. Moreover, in
courts or circuits that require that plaintiffs identify a comparator to avoid
summary judgment, five-patterns evidence also can help plaintiffs identify
suitable comparators and establish that the difference in treatment was “because
of” race or sex.665 Plaintiffs also can use five-patterns evidence to create a
“genuine dispute over a fact that is ‘material,’”666 thereby defeating an
employer’s summary judgment motion.667 For example, where a plaintiff claims
that an objective rule has been applied rigorously to women (including her) and
leniently to men, but the employer claims that the rule has been applied
consistently, that’s a genuine issue of material fact.
The broad dissemination of the basic bias patterns also has implications for
whether evidence of bias needs to be introduced through expert testimony. The
663. See Denny Chin, Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases: A Judge’s Perspective, 57
N.Y.L. SCH. L REV. 671, 672–73 (2013) (discussing the statistics suggesting that summary judgment is granted
more often in employment cases); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper
Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 206–07 (1993) (discussing how
three Supreme Court rulings in the early late 1980s were incorrectly interpreted, leading judges to grant summary
judgment when plaintiff’s cases appeared “weak” or “unpersuasive”).
664. See, e.g., Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores, Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738–39 (7th Cir. 1994) (granting summary
judgment for the employer on the grounds that the plaintiff “has no evidence from which a rational trier of fact
could infer” discrimination); see also 11 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 56.23 (Daniel R.
Coquilettte, Gregory P. Joseph, Georgene M. Vairo & Chilton Davis Varner eds., 2019).
665. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2019).
666. 11 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 664, § 56.23.
667. E-mail from Stephanie Bornstein, Professor of Law, Univ. of Fla. Levin Coll. of L. to Joan C. Williams,
Distinguished Professor of L., Univ. of California, Hastings Coll. of the L. (Jan. 26, 2020, 11:57 AM) (on file
with authors).
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implicit bias consensus has long focused on introducing evidence of bias through
the use of experts.668 In class actions that remains important, but in the general
run of discrimination cases experts are not an option because they are too
expensive.
Luckily, as Mort Halperin once said, much of social science is what every
cab driver in New York City already knew.669 That is definitely true of the bias
patterns outlined in Part II. Thus five-patterns evidence often can be introduced
as stereotyping evidence without the expense of an expert. Recall that the
Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse treated the testimony of Professor Susan
Fiske as “merely icing on Hopkins’ cake,” noting that “[i]t takes no special
training to discern sex stereotyping” in the comments of the partners at Price
Waterhouse.670 Williams and Cynthia Thomas Calvert purposely designed
Maternal Wall litigation to present stereotypes about mothers as commonsense
knowledge, and this approach deserves to be adopted more widely.
Dissemination of the five-patterns model. Williams’s model was first
featured in Harvard Business Review’s October 2014 issue, in an article later
republished as one of Harvard Business Review’s 10 Must Reads on Diversity.671
It was featured again in 2015,672 in 2019,673 and yet again in 2020.674 Sheryl
Sandberg’s organization Lean In also made videos of Williams discussing the
bias patterns that were viewed over a million times on Lean In’s website and
social media,675 as well as in free content on Virgin America flights.676
Facebook’s unconscious bias training also uses a version of Williams’s
model.677 Williams’s co-authored book What Works for Women at Work,678
reviewed in The New York Times and now in its tenth edition,679 and Williams’s
668. See, e.g., Hart & Secunda, supra note 18, at 41–44; Jones, supra note 22, at 1227–28, 1232–33;
Kakoyannis, supra note 22, at 1181, 1189 (analyzing five cases and concluding some courts are allowing in such
evidence, while others are not).
669. Conversation between Mort Halperin and James X. Dempsey in 2002, reported to Joan C. Williams
(Jan. 28, 2020) (“Much of social science is either tautological, patently false, or what every cab driver in New
York City already knew.”).
670. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1989).
671. Joan C. Williams, Hacking Tech’s Diversity Problem, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2014), https://hbr.org/
2014/10/hacking-techs-diversity-problem; Joan C. Williams, Hacking Tech’s Diversity Problem, in HBR’S 10
MUST READS ON DIVERSITY (2019).
672. Joan C. Williams, The 5 Biases Pushing Women Out of STEM, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 24, 2015),
https://hbr.org/2015/03/the-5-biases-pushing-women-out-of-stem.ƒ.
673. Joan C. Williams & Sky Mihaylo, How the Best Bosses Interrupt Bias on Their Teams, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Nov. 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/11/how-the-best-bosses-interrupt-bias-on-their-teams.
674. Joan C. Williams & James D. White, Update Your DE&I Playbook, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 15, 2020),
https://hbr.org/2020/07/update-your-dei-playbook.
675. E-mail from Ashley Finch to Joan C. Williams, Distinguished Professor of L., Univ. of California,
Hastings Coll. of the L. (May 22, 2018, 4:24 PM) (on file with authors).
676. Joan C. Williams, 4 Kinds of Gender Bias Women Face at Work, LEAN IN, https://leanin.org/education/
introduction-to-what-works-for-women-at-work (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
677. Managing Unconscious Bias, FACEBOOK, https://managingbias.fb.com (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
678. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82.
679. Debora L. Spar, Leaning In Without Falling Over, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/13/books/review/what-works-for-women-at-work-by-joan-c-williams-andrachel-dempsey.html.
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team further disseminated her model in the studies of science professors,
engineers, lawyers, architects, and tech workers discussed above.680
Much more widespread than the five-patterns model itself is knowledge of
each individual pattern. This Part samples some of the recent public discussions
of the five patterns.
Dissemination of Prove-It-Again. Prove-It-Again bias has so long been
recognized in the context of race that it even has its own aphorism: “you have to
work twice as hard to get half as far.”681 Prominent Black leaders have long
articulated the view that Black people are held to higher standards than their
white peers; former President Barack Obama and Michelle Obama have both
cited the need to be “twice as good . . . to get half as far.”682 This recognition is
non-partisan. In her memoir, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, a
prominent Republican, writes of a similar feeling during her youth when she was
preparing to audition for an all-white music conservatory in Birmingham: “I was
carrying the weight of needing to be twice as good. They [her parents] reassured
me that I was indeed twice as good. Looking back, it is striking that they didn’t
say, ‘You don’t have to be twice as good.’”683
While this phrase has a long history in the Black community, other
communities of color also acknowledge the Prove-It-Again pattern.684 The Not
Your Model Minority activist movement, which challenges the “benevolent”
stereotype that sets higher school and workplace performance expectations for
people of Asian descent, is just one example.685 First generation Latinxers in the
United States have also noted their own “twice as good” challenges through film

680. Williams, supra note 164; WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100; WILLIAMS ET AL.,
YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN ’T SEE, supra note 100; WILLIAMS & KORN, supra note 100. A
forthcoming report (anticipated release in 2021) will address gender and racial bias against women of color in
tech.
681. See DeSante, supra note 123, at 342.
682. Gene Demby, Obama’s Racial Legacy: Some Last Words On The First Black President, NPR: CODE
SWITCH (Jan. 20, 2017, 3:52 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/01/20/510676874/obamasracial-legacy-some-last-words-on-the-first-black-president; see also Gillian B. White, Black Workers Really Do
Need to Be Twice as Good, ATLANTIC (Oct. 7, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/
why-black-workers-really-do-need-to-be-twice-as-good/409276/; Obama: “As An African American You Have
To Work Twice As Hard As Anyone Else If You Want To Get By”, REALCLEARPOLITICS (May 19, 2013),
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2013/05/19/obama_if_you_think_you_can_just_get_over_in_this_eco
nomy_just_because_you_have_a_morehouse_degree_youre_in_for_a_rude_awakening.html; 22 Revelations
from Michelle Obama’s New Memoir ‘Becoming’, BUS. INSIDER S. AFR. (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.business
insider.co.za/michelle-obama-becoming-revelations-2018-11.
683. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, CONDOLEEZZA RICE: A MEMOIR OF MY EXTRAORDINARY, ORDINARY FAMILY
AND ME 107–108 (2012).
684. Quoctrung Bui & Claire Cain Miller, Why Tech Degrees Are Not Putting More Blacks and Hispanics
Into Tech Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/upshot/dont-blamerecruiting-pipeline-for-lack-of-diversity-in-tech.html.
685. Masako Fukui, Being a Good, Quiet and Assimilated ‘Model Minority’ is Making Me Angry,
GUARDIAN (July 27, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/28/being-a-good-quiet-andassimilated-model-minority-is-making-me-angry; Jinseon Park, Not Your Model Minority, HUFFPOST (June 9,
2017, 3:13 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/not-your-model-minority_b_10367878.
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and journalism.686 In the biographical film Selena, which chronicles MexicanAmerican singer Selena Quintanilla-Pérez’s career, her father tells her:
We got to be twice as good as anybody else. We got to prove to the
Mexicans how Mexican we are, and we have to prove to the Americans
how American we are. We got to be more Mexican than the Mexicans and
more American than the Americans, both at the same time. It’s
exhausting!687

Recent presidential elections have also popularized the Prove-It-Again
pattern as it applies to women. Presidential candidate Senator Amy Klobuchar
said: “Women are held to a higher standard. . . . And I think every working
woman out there, any woman that’s at home, knows exactly what I mean.”688
The former political campaign manager for Hillary Rodham Clinton’s
presidential bid put it simply: “It’s no secret that women have to work twice as
hard, be twice as good, to get half the credit.”689
The Prove-It-Again pattern also has been widely discussed in the business
press, in Harvard Business Review and Forbes, as well as mainstream
publications, such as the Los Angeles Times and The Atlantic.690 These
conversations have made waves across industries. In one article in The Cut about
being Black in the fashion industry, Lacy Redway, a celebrity hairstylist,
explained: “You feel like you constantly have to prove that you are qualified to
be in the room. It’s so disrespectful.”691 A Guardian article discussed how
Prove-It-Again plays out in academia, when Heidia Safia Mirza noted, “[T]here
is a double-take as you enter a room, as if you are not supposed to be
there. . . . [I]n many meetings, even though I am a professor, I have been
mistaken for the coffee lady.”692
686. Denise Soler Cox, Do Latinos Have to Be Twice as Good as Everyone Else?, PROJECT EÑYE,
https://projectenye.com/do-latinos-have-to-be-twice-as-good-as-everyone-else/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
687. SELENA (Warner Bros. 1997).
688. Maggie Astor, ‘Women Are Held to a Higher Standard,’ Klobuchar Says at Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/20/us/politics/amy-klobuchar-women-pete-buttigieg.html (Jan. 3, 2020).
689. Patti Solis Doyle Concurs with Amy Klobuchar: “Women Have to Work Twice as Hard, Be Twice as
Good, to Get Half the Credit”, CNN: REPLAY (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.facebook.com/
CNNReplay/videos/patti-solis-doyle-concurs-with-amy-klobuchar-women-have-to-work-twice-as-hardbe/486468798744819/.
690. Williams & Mihaylo, supra note 673; Jack Zenger & Joseph Folkman, Are Women Better Leaders than
Men?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 15, 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/03/a-study-in-leadership-women-do; Tiffany
Pham, Think You’re Not Biased Against Women at Work? Read This, FORBES (Dec. 20, 2016, 8:03 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/break-the-future/2016/12/20/think-youre-not-biased-against-women-at-workread-this/#416344da7e5a; Tracey Lien, Why Are Women Leaving the Tech Industry in Droves?, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 22, 2015, 5:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-women-tech-20150222-story.html;
Katherine Reynolds Lewis, How to Make Your Company Less Sexist and Racist, ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/how-to-make-your-company-less-sexist-and-racist/
388931/.
691. Lindsay Peoples Wagner, Everywhere and Nowhere: What It’s Really Like to Be Black and Work in
Fashion, CUT (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.thecut.com/2018/08/what-its-really-like-to-be-black-and-work-infashion.html.
692. Rachel Hall, ‘I’ve Been Mistaken for the Coffee Lady’: Experiences of Black Female Academics,
GUARDIAN (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/higher-education-network/2017/nov/16/blackfemale-academics-ive-been-mistaken-for-the-coffee-lady.
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The popularization of themes long explored in social psychology took a
major step in two influential reports by the prominent global nonprofit
consultancy Catalyst.693 Women “Take Care,” Men “Take Charge” (2005) and
The Double-Bind Dilemma for Women in Leadership (2007) both played a
central role in disseminating knowledge of Prove-It-Again patterns.694 One
chapter of The Double-Bind Dilemma notes, “Stereotypes create a second
predicament for women leaders. As prototypical leaders, men’s potential to lead
and, in particular, to lead effectively is rarely questioned a priori. As atypical
leaders, however, women often have to prove that they can lead even before they
have the opportunity to do so.”695 Indeed, the business literature often discusses
the technical terms, as in one Harvard Business Review article by a behavioral
economist that discusses performance reviews: “[I]t does your company no good
when employees are overrated because of subjective biases, including leniency
[bias] . . . and the ‘halo effect.’”696
Advice books, too, have broadly disseminated knowledge of Prove-ItAgain and the other basic bias patterns.697 Williams’s co-authored What Works
for Women at Work documents that while women in general often feel they need
to prove themselves over and over, women of color may feel they can never
make a single mistake.698 This also features in advice books written by and for
women of color. An example is Minda Harts’s The Memo: What Women of
Color Need to Know to Secure a Seat at the Table, observes that women of color
“have the added pressure of trying not to make any mistakes while our
counterparts are given a pass to be mediocre and often rewarded for their
imperfections.”699 This additional pressure takes a toll on women of color and
can lead to further feelings of exclusion and isolation.700
This advice literature has also drawn attention to another Prove-It-Again
dynamic: women and people of color are more likely than others to report that

693. CATALYST, WOMEN “TAKE CARE,” MEN “TAKE CHARGE:” STEREOTYPING OF U.S. BUSINESS L EADERS
EXPOSED (2005), https://www.catalyst.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Women_Take_Care_Men_Take_
Charge_Stereotyping_of_U.S._Business_Leaders_Exposed.pdf [hereinafter CATALYST, WOMEN “TAKE
CARE”]; CATALYST, THE DOUBLE-BIND DILEMMA FOR WOMEN IN LEADERSHIP: DAMNED IF YOU DO, DOOMED
IF YOU DON’T (2007), https://www.catalyst.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/The_Double_Bind_Dilemma_
for_Women_in_Leadership_Damned_if_You_Do_Doomed_if_You_Dont.pdf [hereinafter CATALYST, THE
DOUBLE-BIND DILEMMA].
694. See CATALYST, WOMEN “TAKE CARE,” supra note 693; CATALYST, THE DOUBLE-BIND DILEMMA,
supra note 693, at 16.
695. CATALYST, THE DOUBLE-BIND DILEMMA, supra note 693, at 16.
696. Paola Cecchi-Dimeglio, How Gender Bias Corrupters Performance Reviews, and What to Do About
It, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 12, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/04/how-gender-bias-corrupts-performance-reviewsand-what-to-do-about-it.
697. SHERYL SANDBERG & NELL SCOVELL, LEAN IN: WOMEN, WORK, AND THE WILL TO LEAD (2013);
WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82; MINDA HARTS, THE MEMO: WHAT WOMEN OF COLOR NEED TO KNOW
TO SECURE A SEAT AT THE TABLE (2019).
698. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 23–42.
699. HARTS, supra note 697.
700. Williams, supra note 672; Maura Cheeks, How Black Women Describe Navigating Race and Gender
in the Workplace, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 26, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/03/how-black-women-describenavigating-race-and-gender-in-the-workplace.
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other people get credit for ideas they originally offered,701 sometimes called
“bropropriating”702 or a “rewhite.”703 New terms like “mansplaining” have
emerged to reflect the assumption that women’s contribution can be better
explained by a man, another Prove-It-Again pattern.704 Mansplaining has
become so commonplace that Merriam-Webster officially added it to its
dictionary in March 2018.705 A related conversational dynamic was publicized
when women staffers in President Obama’s White House disclosed that they
engaged in “amplification,” where they would repeat and point out the ideas of
other women employees to make sure the idea was not buried or taken without
credit.706
Another prominent example from popular culture concerns coverage of the
2018 United States Open Final, when Serena Williams was penalized by an
umpire, Carlos Ramos, whom, she felt, had applied a rule to her more stringently
than was typically applied to male tennis players.707 Some initial coverage of the
incident, in which Williams smashed a racket in frustration and called the umpire
a thief (for taking a point as a penalty), painted Williams’s behavior as poor
sportsmanship,708 but as the news cycle ran, more stories emerged highlighting
the double standard at play.709 One article in Fast Company highlighted other
incidences where Ramos gave a less-severe penalty, or no penalty, for similar,

701. SANDBERG & SCOVELL, supra note 697, at 149; WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 136; HARTS,
supra note 697.
702. Cliff Leek, 3 Ways You Might Be Silencing Women (And a Checklist for Fixing That), CATALYST (Sept.
27, 2016), https://www.catalyst.org/2016/09/27/3-ways-you-might-be-silencing-women-and-a-checklist-forfixing-that/.
703. Lindsay Dodgson, Men Are Getting the Credit for Women’s Work Through Something Called
‘Hepeating’—Here’s What it Means, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 8, 2018, 2:01 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
what-is-hepeating-2017-9.
704. Mansplain, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mansplaining (last
visited Nov. 23, 2020).
705. Id.; Words We’re Watching: Mansplaining, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
words-at-play/mansplaining-definition-history (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
706. Cassie Werber, Women at the White House Have Started Using a Simple, Clever Trick to Get Heard,
QUARTZ (Sept. 14, 2016), https://qz.com/781404/women-at-the-white-house-have-started-using-the-simpletrick-of-amplification-to-get-heard-not-interrupted/.
707. Don Van Natta Jr., Serena, Naomi Osaka and the Most Controversial US Open Final in History, ESPN
(Aug. 17, 2019), https://www.espn.com/tennis/story/_/id/27408140/backstory-serena-naomi-osaka-mostcontroversial-us-open-final-history. Serena Williams is a Black American tennis player who has won twentythree Grand Slam singles titles. Serena Williams’s Grand Slam Titles, Finals, Records, TENNISX,
https://www.tennis-x.com/grand-slam-finals/serena-williams.php (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
708. Nancy Armour, Instead of Triumphing, Serena Williams Diminished Herself with Behavior at US
Open, USA TODAY (Sept. 8, 2018, 11:12 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/columnist/nancyarmour/2018/09/08/serena-williams-didnt-behave-like-champion-us-open-loss/1243879002/.
709. Georgia Aspinall, 7 Times Male Tennis Players Have Gotten Away With the Same Thing Serena
Williams Was Penalized for, GRAZIA (Sept. 10, 2018), https://graziadaily.co.uk/life/in-the-news/serenawilliams-sexism-tennis-row-umpire/; Liz Clarke, In Her Anger, in Defeat, Serena Williams Starts an Overdue
Conversation, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2018, 4:54 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/tennis/in-heranger-in-defeat-serena-williams-starts-an-overdue-conversation/2018/09/09/9d9125ea-b468-11e8-94eb-3bd5
2dfe917b_story.html; Maya Salam, Serena’s Not Alone. Women Are Penalized for Anger at Work, Especially
Black Women, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/13/sports/serena-williamsdiscrimination-black-women.html.
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or more extreme behavior from tennis-playing men, noting “women who act out
are punished while men are written off as ‘bad boys’ who are just doing what
boys do.”710 The head of the United States Tennis Association, Katrina Adams,
also noted the double standard when interviewed after the event on CBS This
Morning.711
Dissemination of Tightrope bias: Also called the “double bind,” Tightrope
patterns have been discussed in outlets ranging from NPR and Harvard Business
Review, to Cosmopolitan and Essence.712 Again, in both Catalyst’s the Women
“Take Care,” Men “Take Charge” (2005) and The Double-Bind Dilemma for
Women in Leadership (2007) these patterns were discussed extensively:713
Compared to men, women leaders are rated more harshly at stereotypically
male, “take charge” behaviors, such as problem-solving . . . . adding insult to
injury, it may be difficult for women leaders to prove stereotypes about their
leadership wrong. Because people pay more attention to information that
confirms stereotypes . . . . [and] stereotypes have the potential to seriously
undermine women’s ability to lead.714

For most of the last decade, Facebook COO, Sheryl Sandberg, has been
ringing the alarm about the ways in which women are forced to walk a tightrope
in the workplace, including in her book Lean In (which sold over four million
copies worldwide) and her widely circulated New York Times op-ed: “When a
woman speaks . . . . she’s barely heard or she’s judged as too aggressive. When
a man says virtually the same thing, heads nod in appreciation for his fine
idea,”715 she said.
710. Melissa Locker, Was Serena Williams Treated Fairly? Ask These Tennis “Bad Boys” Who Did Much
Worse, FAST CO. (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90234350/was-serena-williams-treatedfairly-ask-these-tennis-bad-boys-who-did-much-worse.
711. Jessica Kegu, Are There Different Standards for Men and Women in Tennis? USTA Head Says “Yes”,
CBS: THIS MORNING (Sept. 11, 2018, 9:26 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/serena-williams-us-openloss-usta-ceo-katrina-adams-men-women-held-to-different-standards/.
712. Jessica Bennett, Why We Need to Stop Calling Powerful Women “Bitches”, COSMOPOLITAN (Mar. 8,
2014), https://www.cosmopolitan.com/career/advice/a5890/powerful-women-names/; Marianne Cooper, For
Women Leaders, Likability and Success Hardly Go Hand-in-Hand, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 30, 2013),
https://hbr.org/2013/04/for-women-leaders-likability-a; Paulana Lamonier, What It Means If You’re CodeSwitching in the Workplace, ESSENCE (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.essence.com/lifestyle/money-career/womenlets-win/what-it-means-if-youre-code-switching-in-the-workplace/; Courtney L. McCluney, Kathrina
Robotham, Serenity Lee, Richard Smith & Myles Durkee, The Costs of Code-Switching, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov.
15, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/11/the-costs-of-codeswitching; Parth Shah, Jennifer Schmidt, Tara Boyle &
Shankar Vedantam, The Double Bind for Women in Leadership, NPR (Mar. 5, 2018, 9:01 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/03/05/590881966/-shes-shrill-but-hes-just-being-a-boss-the-double-bind-forwomen-in-leadership; Shankar Vedantam, Maggie Penman, Renee Klahr, Jennifer Schmidt & Tara Boyle, Too
Sweet, Or Too Shrill? The Double Bind for Women, NPR (Oct. 18, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/
2016/10/18/498309357/too-sweet-or-too-shrill-the-double-bind-for-women.
713. CATALYST, WOMEN “TAKE CARE,” supra note 693; CATALYST, THE DOUBLE-BIND DILEMMA, supra
note 693.
714. CATALYST, WOMEN “TAKE CARE,” supra note 693, at 30.
715. Sheryl Sandberg & Adam Grant, Speaking While Female, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/11/opinion/sunday/speaking-while-female.html; see also Judith Newman,
‘Lean In’: Five Years Later, N.Y. T IMES (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/16/business/leanin-five-years-later.html (indicating 4.2 million copies of “Lean In” sold worldwide).
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Since Rachel Dempsey coined the term “office housework” in 2014,
there’s been a steady rise in buzz about this pattern of bias.716 It has been widely
discussed in many outlets, including Harvard Business Review, Wall Street
Journal, New York Times, and public radio.717 In an episode of Battle Tactics for
Your Sexist Workplace, a public radio show and podcast, a listener described
when a job applicant asked her to throw away his lunch debris while she, a
college dean, was interviewing him: “It felt like he was putting me in my
place.”718 Today the phenomenon is so widely recognized it has entered the
realm of satire, as in a comedic piece in the New Yorker that imagines letters
written by historical figures to women about office housework, including one by
Lewis and Clark to Sacagawea asking her to find a “foraging spot” for a
celebratory thank you lunch.719
It also is widely recognized that it is risky when women express anger or
assertiveness. An example is the public congressional testimony of Dr. Fiona
Hill, former United States National Security Council official, who stated, “I hate
to say it, but often when women show anger, it’s not fully appreciated . . . . It’s
often you know, pushed onto emotional issues perhaps or deflected onto other
people.”720
People of color have also begun to be very public about how they are
perceived as “too loud” or “too emotional” when they are behaving in ways
readily accepted from white peers. In a series by Refinery29 on Latinx
professionals, a Puerto Rican respondent spoke of the criticism she received for
being “too excited” and “too loud.”721 “It was discouraging at first,” she said of
her experience, “I attempted to curve my personality so I could ‘match’ the level
of my white coworkers, but this quickly became exhausting and was never
enough.”722 The prominent writer and actor Mindy Kaling remembers being
“terrified and silent” for most of the first season of The Office as the only woman

716. WILLIAMS & DEMPSEY, supra note 82, at 108–09.
717. Eula Scott Bynoe, Jeannie Yandel & Caroline Chamberlain Gomez, Don’t Bring Cupcakes to Work if
You’re a Woman, KUOW (Oct. 17, 2018, 2:53 PM), https://www.kuow.org/stories/the-dangers-of-bringingcupcakes-to-work; Rachel Feintzeig, Don’t Ask Me to Do Office Housework!, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2019, 5:30
AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/dont-ask-me-to-do-office-housework-11570959002; Maya Salam, Women,
Stop Volunteering for Office Housework!, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
07/19/business/women-careers-volunteering-work.html; Joan C. Williams & Marina Multhaup, For Women and
Minorities to Get Ahead, Managers Must Assign Work Fairly, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 5, 2018), https://hbr.org/
2018/03/for-women-and-minorities-to-get-ahead-managers-must-assign-work-fairly; Deborah M. Kolb &
Jessica L. Porter, “Office Housework” Gets in Women’s Way, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 16, 2015), https://hbr.org/
2015/04/office-housework-gets-in-womens-way.
718. Bynoe et al., supra note 717.
719. Ali Ruth, Office Housework: A History, NEW YORKER (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/
humor/daily-shouts/office-housework-a-history.
720. Alisa Wiersema, Fiona Hill’s Gender Critique During Public Impeachment Testimony Gets Applause
Online, ABC NEWS (Nov. 21, 2019, 2:01 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/News/fiona-hills-gender-critiquepublic-impeachment-testimony-applause/story?id=67205306.
721. Ludmila Leiva, 8 Latinx Professionals Open Up About Discrimination in the Workplace, REFINERY29
(Oct. 8, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2018/10/210398/latina-discrimination-workplacemicroaggressions.
722. Id.
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and only person of color on the popular series’ writing team while her white men
colleagues remember her being loud and opinionated.723
The rise of nationally recognized women presidential candidates has
highlighted the Tightrope pattern that women who display authority risk being
disliked, whereas if they do not display authority they are seen as unqualified. A
flood of articles discussed the likability of Hillary Rodham Clinton.724 In one
television skit highlighting these challenges, talk show host Jimmy Kimmel
“mansplains” to Clinton how to perform her stump speech.725 Kimmel
frequently interrupts her to make contradictory points about how “shrill” she is,
followed by how she sounds “like a mouse.”726 Since then, the discussions
around the likability of women candidates have led to scrutiny, from campaigns
themselves, political pundits, and journalists.727 The New York Times alone has
written about the topic several times in the run up to the 2020 election.728 To
quote one such piece, “Even when voters acknowledge that they have higher
standards for female candidates, they still hold women to those
standards . . . . On the flip side . . . voters will support a male candidate they
don’t like but who they think is qualified.”729
Recent discussions of pay inequity also shine a light on how women need
to tread carefully when handling work issues like negotiating for equal pay.730
After it was revealed that Jennifer Lawrence was making significantly less than
her co-stars who were men, she wrote of her concerns over seeming “difficult”
during pay negotiations, starting her frank essay on pay equity with an
accommodating, “I want to be honest and open and, fingers crossed, not piss

723. Mindy Kaling is an Indian-American writer, actor, and producer. The Off Camera Show with Sam
Jones, Mindy Kaling Shares Her Early Experiences in ‘The Office’ Writers Room, YOUTUBE (Oct. 5, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uY5_e0L7mjw.
724. See, e.g., Michelle Hackman, Is Hillary Clinton “Likable Enough”? Science Has an Answer, VOX (Jan.
1, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/1/1/10695570/hillary-clinton-likable; Chris Cillizza, Hillary
Clinton Has a Likability Problem. Donald Trump Has a Likability Epidemic, WASH. POST (May 16, 2016, 12:43
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/05/16/hillary-clintons-long-lingering-likableenough-problem/; Megan Carpentier, Why Do People Dislike Hillary Clinton? The Story Goes Far Back,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 18, 2016, 8:05 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/18/hillary-clinton-whyhate-unlikeable-us-election.
725. Jimmy Kimmel Live, Jimmy Kimmel Mansplains to Hillary Clinton, YOUTUBE (Mar. 24, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j2wBpYT6Zlo.
726. Id.
727. Joan C. Williams, How Women Can Escape the Likability Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/16/opinion/sunday/gender-bias-work.html; Alisha Haridasani Gupta, The
Likability Trap Is Still a Thing, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/22/us/thelikability-trap-women-politics.html; Jessica Bennett, But Is She Likable Enough?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/27/us/likability-penalty.html; Claire Bond Potter, Men Invented ‘Likability.’
Guess Who Benefits, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/04/opinion/sunday/
likeable-elizabeth-warren-2020.html.
728. Williams, supra note 727; Gupta, supra note 727; Bennett, supra note 727; Potter, supra note 727.
729. Gupta, supra note 727.
730. See, e.g., Katherine Reynolds Lewis, Here’s How Women Can Use ‘Gender Judo’ to Get Ahead at
Work, FORTUNE (Oct. 28, 2015), https://fortune.com/2015/10/28/women-career-advancement/.
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anyone off,” but then ending it with: “I’m over trying to find the ‘adorable’ way
to state my opinion and still be likable! Fuck that.”731
A common way Tightrope bias patterns are featured in the entertainment
industry is through the calls of action to upend prescriptive stereotypes or gender
roles. A joint campaign by Lean In and the Girl Scouts asks for a ban on using
the term “bossy” to pejoratively describe girls taking charge in the classroom
and on playgrounds.732 In one of their promotional videos Beyoncé says, “I’m
not bossy. I’m the boss,” the clip gained nearly three million views on
YouTube.733 Since the launch of this Ban Bossy campaign, Blue Q, a national
socks retailer, has made a pair of socks with this messaging.734
Another example is a widely circulated clip of Nicki Minaj explaining that
men in the hip hop industry are viewed as “a boss” when they behave assertively,
while she is perceived as “a bitch.”735 She goes on to further explain the
constricting Tightrope she’s forced to walk: “When you’re a girl, you have to be
everything. You have to be dope at what you do but you have to be super sweet
and you have to sexy . . . and you have to be nice. . . . ‘I can’t be all those things
at once. I’m a human being.’”736
These bias patterns are so well known they have even made it into
advertising by Toyota, Mercedes-Benz, and other companies.737 In one Nike ad,
Serena Williams lists common prescriptive stereotypes and gendered double
standards that often hold women back; she then flips the script by listing all the
triumphs women athletes have accomplished that were once deemed “crazy” and
challenges women to “show [naysayers] what crazy can do.”738 Williams was in
a Las Vegas hotel when she saw another example: “Assertive women who drink
juice are fucking sexy,” said an ad by Juice Press.739
Dissemination of Maternal Wall Bias: A range of popular media outlets,
from Fast Company, Forbes, The Wall Street Journal, Harvard Business
731. Jennifer Lawrence is a white American actor. Jennifer Lawrence, Jennifer Lawrence: “Why Do I Make
Less Than My Male Co-Stars?”, LENNY LETTER (Oct. 13, 2015), https://www.lennyletter.com/story/jenniferlawrence-why-do-i-make-less-than-my-male-costars.
732. BAN BOSSY, http://banbossy.com/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
733. The Ban Bossy video had 2,883,272 views on YouTube as of Nov. 23, 2020. Lean In, Ban Bossy—I’m
Not Bossy. I’m the Boss, YOUTUBE (Mar. 9, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6dynbzMlCcw.
734. I’m Not Bossy, I’m the Boss W-Crew Socks, BLUE Q, https://www.blueq.com/shop/item/330productId.125847841.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
735. Nicki Minaj is a Black American hip hop and rap artist. Nicki Minaj Vents About Being a Female MC
in ‘My Time Now’ Preview, MTV NEWS (Nov. 26, 2010), http://www.mtv.com/news/1653115/nicki-minajvents-about-being-a-female-mc-in-my-time-now-preview/.
736. Id.
737. CBS This Morning, Toni Harris, Featured in Super Bowl Ad, Aspires to Be 1st Female NFL Player,
YOUTUBE (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G1RvmqYr7D4&t=6s; Nike—Dream Crazier,
YOUTUBE (Feb. 24, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IiCDRNW5A84; Jessica Radloff, 50,000 Toy
Cars Are Being Gifted to Young Girls to Challenge Gender Stereotypes, GLAMOUR (Nov. 8, 2019),
https://www.glamour.com/story/50000-toy-cars-are-being-gifted-to-young-girls-to-challenge-genderstereotypes.
738. Nike—Dream Crazier, supra note 737.
739. Photograph of white text on a red rectangle reading “assertive women who drink juice are fucking
sexy.”, FOURSQUARE (Nov. 2, 2016), https://foursquare.com/v/juice-press/5345b33d498e4336f4bb8b18?
openPhotoId=581a94768edd3a0eac8c1b19.
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Review, to Science and The New York Times—to name a handful—have written
about the persistent and harmful effects of Maternal Wall bias in the
workplace.740 In 2004, Williams wrote in Harvard Business Review: “While
some women stand nose pressed against the glass ceiling, many working
mothers never get near it. What stops them is the ‘maternal wall.’”741 By 2018,
this formulation appeared in Forbes.742
As with the other bias patterns, people understand that there are
professional ramifications to Maternal Wall. In a New York Times piece,
Katherine Goldstein spells it out: “A lack of professional advancement for
mothers as a result of bias, termed the ‘maternal wall,’ often has a big impact on
who makes it to top leadership positions.”743 The business section of The
Atlantic described benevolent prescriptive stereotyping: “[A] common scenario
involves overlooking female employees for challenging assignments because
employers assume mothers won’t want to travel or handle the extra
workload.”744
In recent years, The New York Times released multiple high-profile pieces
in the business section on pregnancy and breastfeeding discrimination at
work.745 One airline pilot, Randi Freyer, developed mastitis with a 104-degree
fever after human resources ignored her multiple requests to modify her flight

740. Alexia Fernández Campbell, The Revolt of Working Parents, ATLANTIC (Jan. 12, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/01/the-new-glass-ceiling/512834/; Melissa Locker,
Discrimination Against Working Mothers Is Alive and Well, FAST CO. (Nov. 15, 2017),
https://www.fastcompany.com/40494089/discrimination-against-working-mothers-is-alive-and-well; Katherine
Goldstein, The Open Secret of Anti-Mom Bias at Work, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/opinion/workplace-discrimination-mothers.html; Lesley Evans Ogden,
Working Mothers Face a ‘Wall’ of Bias—But There Are Ways to Push Back, SCI. MAG. (Apr. 10, 2019, 3:00
PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/careers/2019/04/working-mothers-face-wall-bias-there-are-ways-pushback; Joan C. Williams & Amy J. C. Cuddy, Will Working Mothers Take Your Company to Court?, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Sept. 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/09/will-working-mothers-take-your-company-to-court; Mary Beth
Ferrante, Before Breaking the Glass Ceiling, Women Must Climb the Maternal Wall, FORBES (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/marybethferrante/2018/10/31/before-breaking-the-glass-ceiling-women-mustclimb-the-maternal-wall/#4164a07bc519; Sue Shellenbarger, The “Maternal Wall”: Employer Bias Against
Working Women, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2009, 1:54 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/juggle/2009/12/03/the-maternalwall-employer-bias-against-working-women/.
741. Joan C. Williams, The Maternal Wall, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 2004), https://hbr.org/2004/10/thematernal-wall.
742. Ferrante, supra note 740.
743. Goldstein, supra note 740.
744. Campbell, supra note 740.
745. Natalie Kitroeff & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Pregnancy Discrimination Is Rampant Inside America’s
Biggest Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/06/15/business/
pregnancy-discrimination.html [hereinafter Kitroeff & Silver-Greenberg, Pregnancy Discrimination]; Natalie
Kitroeff, ‘A Pumping Conspiracy’: Why Workers Smuggled Breast Pumps into Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/31/business/breast-feeding-discrimination-pregnancy.html; Jessica
Silver-Greenberg & Natalie Kitroeff, Miscarrying at Work: The Physical Toll of Pregnancy Discrimination,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/21/business/pregnancydiscrimination-miscarriages.html; Natalie Kitroeff & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Planned Parenthood Is Accused
of Mistreating Pregnant Employees, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/
business/planned-parenthood-pregnant-employee-discrimination-women.html [hereinafter Kitroeff & SilverGreenberg, Planned Parenthood].
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schedule so she could express breastmilk.746 In another particularly
heartbreaking case, journalists shared the story of Chasisty Bee, whose
supervisors at a Verizon warehouse rejected her requests for lighter duties during
a pregnancy in 2014.747 “One afternoon, after almost 14 hours on her feet, she
started feeling dizzy and crumpled to the warehouse floor. Her physician told
her that she had miscarried.”748
Williams and Amy Cuddy, a social psychologist and former Harvard
Business School professor, warned employers long ago that perpetuating
Maternal Wall bias puts organizations at legal risk.749 In a 2012 Harvard
Business Review article they noted: “Working mothers have become more likely
to sue their employers for discrimination . . . . A new field of employment law,
family responsibilities discrimination, is taking off.”750 Journalists at The New
York Times have continued to note the rise of Maternal Wall litigation, writing
recently: “The number of pregnancy discrimination claims filed annually with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has been steadily rising for
two decades and is hovering near an all-time high.”751
Again recent presidential campaigns have played a role. Senator Elizabeth
Warren spoke openly about the pregnancy discrimination she experienced early
in her career as a teacher, setting off a buzz in national outlets, like Forbes and
Vox, as well as local ones, like the Detroit Free Press.752 Women athletes
sponsored by Nike outed the ways they were pressured to either keep performing
or be pushed out of their contracts during and after pregnancy in a series of New
York Times videos and articles.753 “If we have children, we risk pay cuts from
our sponsors during pregnancy and afterward. It’s one example of a sports
industry where the rules are still mostly made for and by men . . . . If I, one of
Nike’s most widely marketed athletes, couldn’t secure these [pregnancy]
protections, who could?” wrote Allyson Felix, a nine-time Olympic medalist, in
a New York Times op-ed.754
746.
747.
748.
749.
750.
751.
752.

Kitroeff, supra note 745.
Silver-Greenberg & Kitroeff, supra note 745.
Id.
Williams & Cuddy, supra note 740.
Id.
Kitroeff & Silver-Greenberg, Pregnancy Discrimination, supra note 745.
Emma Hinchliffe, Elizabeth Warren’s Story Shows Why Pregnancy Discrimination Is So Insidious,
FORTUNE (Oct. 8, 2019, 1:37 PM), https://fortune.com/2019/10/08/elizabeth-warren-pregnancy-discrimination/;
Nancy Kaffer, ‘Evidence’ Used to Discredit Elizabeth Warren Pregnancy Story Actually Proves Her Point,
DETROIT FREE PRESS (Oct. 15, 2019, 8:51 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/opinion/columnists/
nancy-kaffer/2019/10/11/elizabeth-warren-pregnancy-fired/3934102002/; Thomas Kaplan, Elizabeth Warren
Details Her Account of Losing Her Teaching Job Because of Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/10/08/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-fired-pregnant.html (Feb. 26, 2020); Emily Stewart, The Elizabeth
Warren Pregnancy Firing Controversy, Explained, VOX (Oct. 8, 2019, 1:35 PM), https://www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2019/10/8/20904777/elizabeth-warren-pregnancy-discrimination-washington-free-beacon.
753. Alysia Montaño, Nike Told Me to Dream Crazy, Until I Wanted a Baby, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/12/opinion/nike-maternity-leave.html; Allyson Felix, Allyson Felix: My
Own Nike Pregnancy Story, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/opinion/allysonfelix-pregnancy-nike.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article.
754. Felix, supra note 753.
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Beyond the now-standard news coverage of the Maternal Wall, there has
also been a growing interest in “know your rights” materials for employees, and
guidance for employers on how to better support mothers in the workplace.
Research and advocacy organizations like the Center for WorkLife Law and A
Better Balance have published resources on these subjects via their own
platforms and have also partnered with The New York Times to create additional
guidance for their readers.755 This awareness has also seen a surge in interest
from elected officials and lobbying groups advocating for stronger protections
for working caregivers, including a recent proposal by Senator Cory Booker to
add caregiver discrimination to Title VII.756 As of March 2020, over thirty states
and localities have passed pregnant workers fairness laws.757
Dissemination of Tug of War Bias: This pattern, too, has received
widespread coverage—although typically as articles about the “queen bee” who
does not support other women.758 This is a blame-the-victim take on women who
find themselves encouraged by gender bias in their environments to side with
the boys’ club against other women. As psychologist Belle Derks explained it to
CBS News in 2011, “(being a) queen bee is simply a way of getting ahead in a
company where femininity is not valued very highly.”759
A 2017 piece in The Atlantic that explores this issue, journalist Olga
Khazan initially received pushback from women when she asked about whether
or not they had been harshly treated by other women at work.760 But then, “they
would say things like ‘[w]ell, there was this one time,” she writes, “and tales of
female sabotage would spill forth. As I went about my dozens of interviews, I
began to feel like a priest to whom women were confessing their sins against
feminism.”761 Khazan’s extensive article goes on to unravel the ways Prove-ItAgain and Tightrope biases act as pressure cookers when women are tokenized
755. Know Your Rights: State and Local Rights, BABYGATE, https://babygate.abetterbalance.org/knowyour-rights/state-local-rights/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2020); Talking to Your Boss About Your Bump?, PREGNANT
AT WORK, https://www.pregnantatwork.org/pregnant-women-pregnancy/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2020);
Workplace Lactation Laws, PREGNANT AT WORK, https://www.pregnantatwork.org/workplace-lactation-laws
(last visited Nov. 23, 2020); Robin Shulman, If You’re Pregnant and Working, Know Your Rights, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 18, 2019), https://parenting.nytimes.com/work-money/pregnancy-discrimination-work; Anna
Nowogrodzki, How to Keep Pumping When You Return to Work, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
article/pumping-at-work.html (May 8, 2020).
756. Protecting Family Caregivers from Discrimination Act, S. 3878, 116th Cong. § 2 (2020); ACLU
Petition: Protect the Rights of Pregnant Workers, ACLU, https://action.aclu.org/petition/protect-pregnantworker-rights?ms_aff=NAT&initms_aff=NAT&ms=190108_womensrights_pwfa&initms=190108_womens
rights_pwfa&ms_chan=web&initms_chan=web (last visited Nov. 23, 2020); Melissa Locker, Congress Moves
to Protect Pregnant Women at Work, FAST CO. (May 15, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90350356/newbill-in-the-u-s-house-protects-jobs-of-pregnant-workers.
757. State Pregnant Workers Fairness Laws, A BETTER BALANCE, https://www.abetterbalance.org/
resources/pregnant-worker-fairness-legislative-successes/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
758. Reality Check Team, Queen Bees: Do Women Hinder the Progress of Other Women?, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-41165076.
759. Kimberly Weisul, Why Your Queen Bee Boss Won’t Help You, CBS NEWS (July 8, 2011, 4:46 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-your-queen-bee-boss-wont-help-you/.
760. Olga Khazan, Why Do Women Bully Each Other at Work?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/the-queen-bee-in-the-corner-office/534213/.
761. Id.
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at work, leading to strategic distancing or intensified survival-mode competition,
such as when women managers hold their women subordinates to higher
expectations, or nitpick their performance, often because they recognize their
team member’s work will likely reflect back on them as another woman, not just
as their manager (aka “collective threat”).762 Another Atlantic article concluded
simply that “Queen Bee behaviors are triggered in male dominated environments
in which women are devalued.”763
Prominent women have begun to warn other women to avoid the Tug of
War. One of the earliest examples is a now oft quoted line from a speech by
former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, “I think there is a special place in
hell for women who don’t help other women.”764 Tina Fey’s Bossypants, which
has sold nearly four million copies since it was published in 2011, advises
readers: “People are going to trick you. To make you feel that you’re in
competition with one another. . . . Don’t be fooled. You’re not in competition
with other women. You’re in competition with everyone.”765 Senator Claire
McCaskill also spoke up: “Now that there are other female colleagues, I think
you get over the Queen Bee Syndrome. If you’re not gonna be the only woman,
you’re less worried about other women competing with you.”766 In an article for
Harvard Business Review, finance leader Anne Welsh McNulty said that she
had learned from her own early career “queen bee” experiences and urged
readers, “[d]on’t underestimate the power of women connecting and supporting
each other at work.”767
Popular culture, too, has taken up this theme in both the gender and the race
contexts. The Pixar animated short Purl is about a pink ball of yarn trying to
assimilate in a white men dominated workplace; the video has been viewed over
seventeen million times on YouTube alone.768 When a new ball of yarn shows
up to work after Purl has finally been accepted by her peers, the title character’s
initial instinct is to distance herself from the new co-worker given how difficult
it was for her colleagues to accept her when she exhibited feminine traits.769 The
film makes it clear that this instinct is unworthy, and Purl quickly reverses her

762. Id.; see also Duguid et al., supra note 332, at 393–94.
763. Marianne Cooper, Why Women (Sometimes) Don’t Help Other Women, ATLANTIC (June 23, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/06/queen-bee/488144/. This article goes on to explain that
elements of ‘queen bee’ are not unique to women, social distancing for example may happen among gay men
who “try to distance themselves from stereotypes about gays being effeminate by emphasizing hyper-masculine
traits.” Id.
764. Mechelle Voepel, Albright Empowers All-Decade Team at Luncheon, ESPN (July 12, 2006),
https://www.espn.com/wnba/columns/story?columnist=voepel_mechelle&id=2517642.
765. TINA FEY, BOSSYPANTS 88 (2011).
766. Alex Wagner, Ladies First, ATLANTIC (Nov. 5, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2016/11/ladies-first/506546/.
767. Anne Welsh McNulty, Don’t Underestimate the Power of Women Supporting Each Other at Work,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 3, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/dont-underestimate-the-power-of-women-supportingeach-other-at-work.
768. Purl has been viewed 17,208,366 times on YouTube as of November 20, 2020. Pixar, Purl—Pixar
SparkShorts, YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B6uuIHpFkuo.
769. Id.
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initial strategy and embraces her new colleague—at which point the men do,
too.770
Less discussion exists of Tug of War dynamics among people of color. A
notable exception is the persistent questions faced by Black politicians about
whether they are “Black enough.”771 Then-presidential candidate Senator
Kamala Harris responded to this common critique in an interview with The
Breakfast Club: “[T]his is the same thing they did to Barack
[Obama] . . . . They’re trying to . . . sow hate and division among us, and so we
need to recognize when we’re being played.”772 Harris is also an example of how
this Tug of War gets even more complicated for multiracial people, as she also
faced calls from some in the Asian American community to showcase her Indian
heritage more on the national stage.773 A similar theme emerged in The Good
Fight, a television series that features a Black-majority law firm in Chicago,
where tensions run high when Black employees begin to fear that their white coworkers are unfairly favored by management after salary inequities become
public.774 In the midst of this reckoning, Lucca, a biracial character, faces
conflict with a white colleague for insinuating her colleague may be racially
biased and criticism from a Black colleague for not being more aware of racial
inequities at their workplace.775
New Recognition of the Harm of Racial Stereotyping: Racial stereotypes
have had a long history in the United States; what is new is the recognition in
mainstream media of how inappropriate and hurtful they are, as the movement
spurred by Black Lives Matter highlights the structural nature of racism. In May

770. Id.
771. Satta Sarmah, Is Obama Black Enough?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Feb. 15, 2007), https://archives.
cjr.org/politics/is_obama_black_enough.php; David Graham, A Short History of Whether Obama Is Black
Enough, Featuring Rupert Murdoch, ATLANTIC (Oct. 8, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2015/10/a-short-history-of-whether-obama-is-black-enough-featuring-rupert-murdoch/409642/;
Jaweed Kaleem & Melanie Mason, Kamala Harris & Cory Booker Embrace New Era for Black Candidates
Post-Obama, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-harris-booker-blackafrican-american-20190331-story.html.
772. CNN, Kamala Harris’ Answer to Critics Who Say She’s Not ‘Black Enough’, YOUTUBE (Feb. 11,
2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IIpkBYSN9m4&feature=youtu.be&t=104.
773. Chris Fuchs, In Kamala Harris’ Presidential Campaign, Indian Americans Want More Opportunities
to Connect, NBC NEWS (Feb. 12, 2019, 10:25 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/kamalaharris-presidential-campaign-indian-americans-want-more-opportunities-connect-n965436; Emil Guillermo,
Kamala Harris Has No Problem Being Black, But Why Doesn’t She Say Publicly She’s Part Asian?, DIVERSE
EDUCATION (June 30, 2019), https://diverseeducation.com/article/148713/. Presidential candidates of color were
not the only ones to receive pushback that they were not “[insert identity] enough.” Pete Buttigieg also received
criticism from some members of the LGBTQ+ community for not being sufficiently “gay” because of his
personality and policy positions. Shannon Keating, You Wanted Same-Sex Marriage? Now You Have Pete
Buttigieg, BUZZFEED NEWS (Dec. 11, 2019, 1:11 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/shannonkeating/
pete-buttigieg-marriage-equality-lgbtq-gay-rights; Skylar Baker-Jordan, If One More Polyamorous Coastal
‘Queer’ Tells Me Pete Buttigieg Isn’t Gay Enough I’ll Scream. He Is—and So Am I, INDEPENDENT (Dec. 13,
2019),
https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/buttigieg-chasten-gay-enough-queer-radical-a9246501.html;
Masha Gessen, The Queer Opposition to Pete Buttigieg, Explained, NEW YORKER (Feb. 12, 2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-queer-opposition-to-pete-buttigieg-explained.
774. The Good Fight: The One with Lucca Becoming a Meme (CBS television broadcast Apr. 4, 2019).
775. Id.
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2020, following the continued killings of Black Americans, including Ahmaud
Arbery, Breonna Taylor and George Floyd, nationwide protests and calls for
justice emerged.776 Calls for reform were not isolated to policing and criminal
justice circles; it became in vogue for companies to send out emails and social
media campaigns aligning themselves with the Black Lives Matter movement
and their commitment to a just workplace.777 This conversational renaissance
around race prompted some to refer to these statements by major corporations
as “woke-washing,” a half-hearted attempt at solidarity with limited, if any,
structural changes on their part.778 Color for Change, a civil rights advocacy
group, started a petition campaign demanding companies like Nike move
#BeyondTheStatement: “Any company [who has] released a statement
championing equity and decrying racism needs to take a good look at how
injustice plays out in their own structures.”779
Current controversies are causing more Americans to recognize racist
stereotypes when they see them. In 2018, clothing retailer H&M faced backlash
after an image from their website showing an elementary school-aged Black boy
wearing a sweatshirt that read “COOLEST MONKEY IN THE JUNGLE” went
viral on Twitter.780 H&M apologized, and took the image offline and the product
out of stores.781 Black people have long been likened to apes; even being
President and First Lady did not prevent Barrack and Michelle Obama from
being depicted as apes in internet memes or being called “monkey face” by
detractors.782
When San Francisco 49ers football player Colin Kaepernick began
protesting during the national anthem in August 2016, he faced significant
backlash.783 He was voted the most disliked player in the National Football
776. Anna North, The Protest Over Breonna Taylor’s Shooting Death, Explained, VOX (June 3, 2020, 9:30
PM) https://www.vox.com/2020/6/3/21279590/breonna-taylor-david-mcatee-death-police-protests; Derrick
Bryson Taylor, George Floyd Protests: A Timeline, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
article/george-floyd-protests-timeline.html; Bob Self, Demonstrators Gather to Protest Shooting Death of
Ahmaud Arbery in Brunswick, Ga., USA TODAY (May 9, 2020, 11:04 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/picturegallery/news/nation/2020/05/08/protests-erupt-following-shooting-death-ahmaud-arbery/3097112001/.
777. Tiffany Hsu, Corporate Voices Get Behind ‘Black Lives Matter’ Cause, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/business/media/companies-marketing-black-lives-matter-georgefloyd.html (June 10, 2020).
778. Erin Dowell & Marlette Jackson, “Woke-Washing” Your Company Won’t Cut It, HARV. BUS. REV.
(July 27, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/07/woke-washing-your-company-wont-cut-it.
779. Nike: It’s Time to Move #BeyondTheStatement, COLOR OF CHANGE, https://act.colorofchange.org/
sign/black-workers-matter/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
780. Liam Stack, H&M Apologizes for ‘Monkey’ Image Featuring Black Child, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/08/business/hm-monkey.html.
781. Id.
782. Samantha Cooney, Doctor Who Called Michelle Obama ‘Monkey Face’ Has Been Suspended, TIME
(Dec. 2, 2016), https://time.com/4588752/michelle-obama-monkey-face-doctor/; Adam Beam, GOP Hopeful
Not Sorry for Posts Depicting Obamas as Monkeys, AP NEWS (Sept. 30, 2016), https://apnews.com/90ec82dfca4
f45e48628e4ae45b8247f; Leslie Marshall, Obama Monkey Picture Shows Racism Is Alive and Well in America,
US NEWS: THOMAS JEFFERSON ST. (Apr. 20, 2011), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/lesliemarshall/2011/04/20/obama-monkey-picture-shows-racism-is-alive-and-well-in-america.
783. Amy Tennery, Kaepernick Anthem Protest Prompts Backlash from NFL Greats, REUTERS (Aug. 30,
2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-nfl-kaepernick-idUSKCN1152AJ; Hamed Aleaziz, Colin
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League (NFL), and was not hired by any team after declining to renew his
contract with the 49ers.784 About a year later, President Donald Trump suggested
the NFL should fire players who do not stand for the national anthem. In
response, many team owners took a knee or locked arms with players during the
national anthem as a show of unity.785 More recently, people have begun to view
Kaepernick’s earlier protests as “prescient,” and NFL Commissioner Roger
Goodell issued an apology to players in June 2020: “[W]e were wrong for not
listening to NFL players earlier and encourage all to speak out and peacefully
protest. We, the National Football League, believe black lives matter.”786
The new recognition that racial stereotypes are deeply inappropriate and
harmful was highlighted when Quaker Oats announced in 2020 that it will be
pulling its Aunt Jemima brand syrup and pancake mix off the shelves because
the name’s origin in a “racial stereotype.”787 Also newly controversial are
depictions of African Americans as “the help.” In June 2020, HBO Max, an
online streaming service, temporarily pulled the 1940 film Gone with the Wind
from its platform stating, “These racist depictions were wrong then and are
wrong today, and we felt that to keep this title up without an explanation and a
denouncement of those depictions would be irresponsible.”788 Two weeks later,
the platform reintroduced the film with accompanying videos that contextualize
the depictions of Black people in the film, with scholar Jacqueline Stewart
explaining: “The film represents enslaved Black people in accordance with longstanding stereotypes: as servants, notable for their devotion to their white
masters, or for their ineptitude.”789 Viola Davis, a Black woman who was
nominated for an Academy Award for her performance as Aibileen Clark, a
maid for a southern white family in The Help, has said she regrets playing the
role, telling Vanity Fair, “[T]here’s a part of me that feels like I betrayed myself,
and my people, because I was in a movie that wasn’t ready to [tell the whole

Kaepernick and Other Pro Athletes Pay A Price for Activism, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 1, 2016, 8:40 AM),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/Colin-Kaepernick-and-other-pro-athletes-pay-a-9196376.php.
784. Scooby Axson, Poll: 49ers QB Colin Kaepernick Most Disliked Player in NFL, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.si.com/nfl/2016/09/22/san-francisco-49ers-colin-kaepernick-most-dislikedplayer; Matt Maiocco, Kaepernick Officially Opts Out of 49ers’ Contract to Become Free Agent, NBC SPORTS
(Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nbcsports.com/bayarea/49ers/kaepernick-officially-opts-out-49ers-contractbecome-free-agent.
785. Tim Webber, How Every NFL Team Responded to Trump’s National Anthem Protest Comments, NPR
(Sept. 25, 2017, 5:64 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/25/553539767/how-every-nfl-team-responded-totrump-s-national-anthem-protest-comments.
786. The Saga of Colin Kaepernick: Vindication But Still No Contract, CBS SF BAY AREA (June 6, 2020,
2:42 PM), https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2020/06/06/colin-kaepernick-vindication-no-nfl-contract/.
787. Ben Kesslen, Aunt Jemima Brand to Change Name, Remove Image that Quaker Says Is ‘Based on a
Racial Stereotype’, NBC NEWS (June 17, 2020, 12:07 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/auntjemima-brand-will-change-name-remove-image-quaker-says-n1231260.
788. Daniel Victor, HBO Max Pulls ‘Gone With the Wind,’ Citing Racist Depictions, N.Y. TIMES (June 14,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/business/media/gone-with-the-wind-hbo-max.html.
789. Cydney Henderson, ‘Gone With the Wind’ Returns to HBO Max with Disclaimer, Discussion on
‘Complicated Legacy’, USA TODAY (June 24, 2020, 7:54 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
entertainment/movies/2020/06/24/gone-wind-returns-hbo-max-disclaimer-videos/3254546001/.
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truth].”790 In the more recent television adaptation of Little Fires Everywhere,
an affluent white woman is depicted as uncomfortable with inviting a Black
woman to help her around the house.791 “You mean, like to be your maid?,” asks
the Black woman.792 “More, more like a housekeeper,” responds the white
woman.793 In a workplace context, Editor-in-Chief of Bon Appétit, Adam
Rapoport, resigned after allegations of racism and unequal treatment at the
magazine began to emerge.794 Business Insider quoted his assistant, Ryan
Walker-Hartshorn, a Black woman, explaining that, “He treats me like the
help.”795
The COVID-19 pandemic may also have made Americans more aware of
the links between the twenty-first century “forever foreign” stereotype and the
intensely harmful and xenophobic nineteenth century stereotyping of Asian
Americans as the “yellow peril.”796 In early 2020, when the COVID-19 health
pandemic began to spread in the United States, it didn’t take long for some to
frame the virus as a foreign threat.797 President Donald Trump went on to refer
to the pathogen as the “Chinese virus,” despite strong criticism that the label was
rooted in xenophobia and might trigger discrimination against the Asian
community.798 While the first known case of this strain of coronavirus was found
in Wuhan, China, it quickly became a global phenomenon. One headline from
NBC summarized it simply: “Coronavirus fears show how ‘model minority’
Asian Americans become the ‘yellow peril.’”799 Newspapers highlighted the
ways attacks became literal: the Mercury News noted that 300 news articles
reported attacks on Asian Americans in a roughly a two week period.800 In the
current freighted atmosphere, mainstream media are also becoming more aware
of the downsides to the “model minority” stereotype. As reported by Business
790. Sonia Saraiya, Viola Davis: “My Entire Life Has Been a Protest”, VANITY FAIR (July 14, 2020),
https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2020/07/cover-story-viola-davis.
791. Little Fires Everywhere: The Spark (Hulu streaming Mar. 18, 2020).
792. Id.
793. Id.
794. Rachel Premack, Bon Appétit’s Editor in Chief Just Resigned—but Staffers of Color Say There’s a
‘Toxic’ Culture of Microaggressions and Exclusion that Runs Far Deeper than One Man, BUS. INSIDER (June
9, 2020, 8:22 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/bon-appetit-adam-rapoport-toxic-racism-culture-2020-6.
795. Id.; Justin Curto, Everything to Know About the Media’s Reckoning With Abuse of Power, VULTURE
(July 24, 2020), https://www.vulture.com/2020/07/a-list-of-media-companies-reckoning-with-racism.html.
796. Adrian De Leon, The Long History of U.S. Racism Against Asian Americans, from ‘Yellow Peril’ to
‘Model
Minority’
to
the
‘Chinese
Virus’,
USC
DORNSIFE
(Apr.
8,
2020),
https://dornsife.usc.edu/news/stories/3192/coronavirus-covid-19-racism-asian-americans-model-minority/.
797. Robin Savillo, Fox News Pushes Racist and Xenophobic Language for Coronavirus, MEDIA MATTERS
FOR AMERICA (Mar. 25, 2020, 1:17 PM), https://www.mediamatters.org/coronavirus-covid-19/fox-newspushes-racist-and-xenophobic-language-coronavirus.
798. Eren Orbey, Trump’s “Chinese Virus” and What’s at Stake in the Coronavirus’s Name, NEW YORKER
(Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/whats-at-stake-in-a-viruss-name.
799. Matthew Lee, Coronavirus Fears Show How ‘Model Minority’ Asian Americans Become the ‘Yellow
Peril’, NBC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2020, 8:22 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/coronavirus-fears-showhow-model-minority-asian-americans-become-yellow-ncna1151671.
800. Leonardo Castañeda, Coronavirus: Attacks Against Asian Americans Reported in Bay Area and
Beyond, MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 23, 2020, 6:42 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/03/21/coronavirusattacks-against-asian-americans-reported-in-bay-area-and-beyond/.
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Insider, chef and magazine contributor Sohla El-waylly shared that she and her
fellow co-workers of color at Bon Appétit had not been compensated for their
video appearances on the magazine’s successful YouTube channel, “Test
Kitchen.”801 El-waylly, who is Bengali-American, pointed out that she was
offered a considerably lower status position and salary at Bon Appétit despite
having more extensive training and expertise than many of her white, bettercompensated peers.802
The heightened attention to the Black Lives Matter movement and
structural racism has also impacted popular understandings of Latinx stereotypes
and the American Latinx experience. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, a
congresswoman of Puerto Rican descent who has become a press phenomenon,
has played a critical role in increasing visibility and understanding for the Latinx
community. In July 2019, President Donald Trump tweeted a rant concerning
“‘Progressive’ Democrat Congresswomen,” suggesting that “they go back and
help fix the totally broken and crime infested places from which they came.”803
Though Trump didn’t list the congresswomen by name, it was widely reported
in the media that he was referring to Ocasio-Cortez and some of her close
colleagues, all women of color.804 In response Ocasio-Cortez called him out:
“once you start telling American citizens to quote ‘go back to their countries,’
. . . it’s about ethnicity and race.”805
Ocasio-Cortez’s straightforward callouts of racist and sexist attacks on her
may provide a useful reference point for attorneys trying to explain their Latinx
clients’ experience. In June 2020, The Hill reported that Ocasio-Cortez was
verbally accosted on the United States Capitol steps by Representative Ted
Yoho, who later called her a “fucking bitch.”806 The New York Times printed the
“fucking bitch” comment on the front page.807 After the story went viral, Yoho
publicly spoke about the matter in the House of Representatives, but he did not
mention Ocasio-Cortez by name in his “apology” and denied the “offensive
801. Premack, supra note 794; Palmer Haasch, The Internet Is Rallying Behind Bon Appétit’s Sohla ElWaylly After She Accused the Publication of Pay Inequity, BUS. INSIDER (June 9, 2020),
https://www.businessinsider.in/thelife/news/the-internet-is-rallying-behind-bon-apptits-sohla-el-waylly-aftershe-accused-the-publication-of-pay-inequity/articleshow/76290920.cms.
802. Premack, supra note 794; Haasch, supra note 801.
803. Nina Golgowski, Trump Urges Democratic Congresswomen to ‘Go Back’ to Other Countries in Racist
Rant, HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/trump-tells-congresswomen-to-leave-us_n_5d2b300fe4b
0060b11ee0664 (July 20, 2019).
804. Id.; Donald Trump Tells US Congresswomen to Go Back to Where They Came From, ABC NEWS (July
14, 2019), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-15/trump-tells-us-born-congresswomen-to-go-back-to-homecountries/11308368.
805. Daniel Marans, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Embraces Her Maverick Role in First Town Hall Since
High-Profile Spat, HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.com/entry/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-immigration-townhall-maverick-defiant-progressive-corona-queens_n_5d33b7c8e4b020cd99446eaa (July 22, 2019).
806. Mike Lillis, Ocasio-Cortez Accosted by GOP Lawmaker Over Remarks: ‘That Kind of Confrontation
Hasn’t Ever Happened to Me’, HILL (July 21, 2020, 8:45 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/508259ocaasio-cortez-accosted-by-gop-lawmaker-over-remarks-that-kind-of.
807. Luke Broadwater & Catie Edmondson, A.O.C. Unleashes a Viral Condemnation of Sexism in Congress,
N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/23/us/alexandria-ocasio-cortez-sexismcongress.html.
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name calling” that was reported in the press.808 He closed his remarks by saying,
“I cannot apologize for my passion or for loving my God, my family, and my
country.”809 The following day, Ocasio-Cortez took to the microphone in
response with a speech that quickly gained traction:
Representative Yoho put his finger in my face, he called me disgusting, he
called me crazy, he called me out of my mind, and he called me dangerous
. . . . Representative Yoho called me, and I quote, a fucking bitch. These are
the words that Representative Yoho levied against a congresswoman . . . this
issue is not about one incident, it is cultural.810

As of November 2020, the clip of her speech on the C-SPAN Twitter
account had over 16.1 million views.811 This level of visibility and direct
recognition of the harm caused by racist and sexist stereotypes is a prime
example of the sea change happening in America’s conversation on racial and
ethnic inequality.
Conclusion. Attorneys arguing employment discrimination cases and
judges assessing what a reasonable jury would find in the context of summary
judgment motions would be well-advised to recognize the widespread
dissemination of the basic bias patterns. Widespread dissemination also means
that five-patterns evidence often can be introduced as commonsense
stereotyping evidence, without expert testimony. An important note: this does
not mean that use of expert testimony will never be appropriate. For example,
although most Americans know by now that some groups need to prove
themselves more than others, an expert could provide important context
concerning the relationship between leniency bias and in-group favoritism, or
on the psychological processes that create Tug of War patterns (favoritism
threat, competitive threat, etc.). How five-patterns evidence is used often will
depend on circumstances. Plaintiffs in individual disparate treatment cases likely
will use five-patterns evidence as stereotyping evidence or comparator evidence,
while class action plaintiffs are more likely to link the patterns to specific studies
(such as those cited in this Article) and seek to introduce expert testimony.
B. TO AVOID DILUTION, WES DATA SUGGEST THAT LAWYERS SHOULD
CONSIDER USING WHITE MEN AS COMPARATORS, PARTICULARLY IN
CASES INVOLVING “INTERSECTIONAL PLAINTIFFS”
Lawyers in class actions involving race or gender discrimination plaintiffs
should consider comparing the experience of the protected group to the
experience of white men, rather than comparing men to women or white people
808. Representative Yoho Apologizes for “Abrupt” Conversation with Representative Ocasio-Cortez,
Denies Name-Calling (C-SPAN television broadcast July 22, 2020).
809. Id.
810. Jack Hutton, Rep Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Addressing Rep Ted Yoho’s Abusive Comments, C-SPAN
(July 23, 2020), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4894472/user-clip-rep-alexandria-ocasio-cortez-addressingrep-ted-yohos-abusive-comments.
811. CSPAN (@CSPAN), TWITTER (July 23, 2020, 8:02 AM), https://twitter.com/cspan/
status/1286315637275598849 (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
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to people of color. The strongest case for trying this concerns Prove-It-Again
bias, which is triggered robustly both by gender and by race.812 Requiring
women to compare themselves to men of all races will understate the level of
gender-based Prove-It-Again bias against women by diluting the sharply lower
rate of Prove-It-Again bias reported by white men with the considerably higher
rate reported by men of color. Similarly, requiring racial discrimination
plaintiffs to compare themselves to white people of all genders will understate
the level of race-based Prove-It-Again bias by diluting the sharply lower rate of
Prove-It-Again bias against white men with the higher rate reported by white
women.
Of course, sometimes slicing and dicing in this way, in small workplaces
or with small samples within a workplace, risks resulting in numbers too low to
produce statistically significant differences. So, the recommendation is not to
always do this, but to try it out. In cases where numbers are high enough,
comparing everyone to white men will produce a more accurate measure of bias.
Perhaps the solution is to proceed in several steps. For example, in a case
involving a Black woman, the plaintiff could first compare the effect by gender,
then compare the effect by race, and then compare the effect by both race and
gender, explaining that is the most significant comparison because it eliminates
both discriminatory factors encountered by women of color (race and gender).
The early nationwide samples of professionals surveyed by the WES
typically contained too few representatives of Black and Latinx people to do
statistical analysis broken down by racial group—though this problem was
solved in more recent studies of architects and tech workers (still unpublished).
(Anyone litigating a case involving people of Asian descent may find it helpful
to consult a WorkLife Law White Paper813 that summarizes WES findings about
that group.) Plaintiffs’ employment lawyers may find themselves in a similar
situation in the context of disparate impact claims, which are proven by
comparing protected and non-protected groups and showing statistically
significant differences.814 It is defense lawyers who usually push for
disaggregation, while plaintiffs’ lawyers are resistant out of fear that
disaggregation will erase statistically significant differences (sometimes called
the “sparse cell problem”).815
Thus, plaintiffs’ lawyers will be pulled in two directions: they will be
pulled towards disaggregation to avoid the dilution effect described above, yet
they will be pulled away from disaggregation by the sparse cell problem.

812. See supra Part II, p. 370–71.
813. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RACHEL M. KORN & SU LI, WORKLIFE LAW, WHITE PAPER: DOES THE
STEREOTYPE THAT “ASIAN PEOPLE ARE GOOD AT SCIENCE” HELP WOMEN OF ASIAN DESCENT IN STEM
CAREERS? NO (2017), https://worklifelaw.org/publications/White-Paper-Bias-Against-Asian-People-inSTEM.pdf.
814. CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 93 (9th ed. 2017).
815. Telephone Interview with Adam Klein, Managing Partner, Outten & Golden (Dec. 6, 2019) (on file
with authors).
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The use of white men as comparators may be particularly important for
women of color, given the challenges faced by “intersectional plaintiffs.”816 A
robust law review literature posits that women of color face particularly high
hurdles in employment discrimination cases.817 The most elegant study on the
lower success rates of women of color who bring employment discrimination
suits is a 2011 study by a group of lawyers and sociologists.818 They drew upon
a 2% random sample of district and circuit court opinions in federal
discrimination cases between 1965 and 1999, yielding 328 circuit court opinions
and 686 district court opinions.819 They found “plaintiffs making intersectional
claims are less than half as likely to win” as compared to non-intersectional
plaintiffs (15% compared to 31%), only half as likely to obtain at least a partial
victory, and one-third as likely to win completely.820 Holding other factors equal,
intersectional plaintiffs will win only 13% of the time and non-intersectional
plaintiffs win 28% of the time.821 While white women are most likely to have a
full victory (38%), nonwhite women are the least likely (11%), with nonwhite
men much closer to nonwhite women than to white women (15%).822 The study
suggested that the claims of intersectional plaintiffs are not intrinsically weaker
than those of discrimination plaintiffs in general.823 The study also found that
intersectional claims represent an increasing proportion of discrimination
claims: in the 1970s and 1980s, they represented only about 10% of all
discrimination claims, a number that climbed to more than a quarter once they
began rising around 1990.824
Happily, Bostock v. Clayton County’s revamp of Title VII’s causation
requirement, which clarifies that Title VII requires that discrimination be a butfor cause of the adverse employment action complained of—not the only
cause—may help reverse the shockingly low success rate of intersectional
plaintiffs. Bostock’s holdings preclude the common defense argument that
intersectional plaintiffs should lose because they need to prove either that gender
completely explains the adverse employment action or that race does.825 Bostock
can be used in conjunction with WES data documenting that Prove-It-Again bias
and some forms of Tightrope bias are more widely reported by women of color
than by any other group.826 Hopefully, Bostock spells the end of the era when
women of color’s attempts to point out that both gender and racial bias shape

816.
817.
818.
819.
820.
821.
822.
823.
824.
825.
826.

Williams, supra note 164, at 238; see also Crenshaw, supra note 9, at 140–41, 149.
See Williams, supra note 164, at 238 (reviewing relevant studies).
See Best et al., supra note 9.
Id. at 999.
Id. at 1009.
Id. at 1011.
Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1011–12.
Id. at 1008.
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741–43 (2020).
See supra Part II.
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their experience are dismissed by courts as an illegitimate attempt to create a
“new super-remedy.”827
C. STEP BY STEP USE OF FIVE-PATTERNS EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION
Attorneys who seek to use five-patterns evidence should start educating
others about how bias operates long before trial, as early as in the client interview
to ensure that plaintiffs’ lawyers have uncovered all available evidence of racial
and gender bias (using the protocol set forth in Appendix A). This Subpart sets
forth considerations about how to use five-patterns evidence in litigation from
complaint to the closing argument.
In the complaint. Charles A. Sullivan has pointed out that Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly828 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal829 raise the requirements for what
constitutes a complaint that can survive a motion to dismiss. Prior to those two
cases, the standard was “notice pleading” (a short and plain statement that gives
notice of the claim to the other party),830 but these two cases raised the standard
to “plausible pleading.” That requires that “the plaintiff would have to plead not
merely that defendant had intent to discriminate, but also additional facts that
make such an allegation plausible.”831 Judges are urged to use their “common
sense” in assessing complaints under the plausible pleading test.832
Sullivan argues that plaintiffs should plead studies documenting the
widespread nature of bias as a “legislative fact” that a court would have to take
as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, given that in a motion to dismiss
courts have to take the facts pled as true. Sullivan proposes such language as:
“social science research indicates that discriminatory attitudes are common,
even typical, in 21st century America and further indicates that such attitudes
often result in decisions adverse to” members of protected groups.833 This is a
creative suggestion, and may be helpful in introducing five-patterns evidence in
the complaint. Five-patterns evidence will be much more concrete than the
formulation offered by Sullivan: complaints may well be able to state that
plaintiffs recognized what happened to them as bias because of the widespread
discussion of bias patterns in the press and popular culture.
However, some caution is in order. Courts do not have to accept legal
conclusions or conclusory statements when ruling on a motion to dismiss.
Moreover, a common defense technique in depositions is to take the plaintiff
827. See Crenshaw, supra note 99, at 141–42 (discussing Degraffenreid v. General Motors Corp., 413 F.
Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976)).
828. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
829. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009).
830. Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibility Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613,
1616 (2011).
831. Sullivan notes that ambiguity exists about whether the governing case prior to Twombly and Iqbal,
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002), is still valid law. Id. at 1617. He assumes for purposes of argument
that it is not; purely for purposes of argument, so do I, to explore what is the best strategy for plaintiffs under
this worse-case scenario.
832. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
833. Sullivan, supra note 830, at 1671.
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line by line through the complaint and have her say everything she knows about
every allegation.834 If the complaint contains an allegation about patterns of bias,
the plaintiff has to be prepped and able to persuasively defend the notion that
she has personal knowledge of the pervasiveness of the bias patterns. Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, an attorney’s signature on a
complaint is a certification that to the best of their knowledge and after
reasonable inquiry, the complaint is well-grounded in fact.835 So lawyers need
to avoid alleging things in the complaint that they or their clients do not
personally know.836
During negotiations. One way of using evidence of bias that has received
little or no attention in law reviews is during negotiations. To quote Jennifer
Schwartz of Outten & Golden:
Evidence of bias is important, and indeed critical, in many cases and at
different stages of the litigation. However almost every single working woman
on this planet has experienced gender bias so often that when negotiating
settlements with a woman lawyer on the other side, I try to analogize what
happened to my client to what I think was likely my opponent’s experience.
Or what she knows could easily be her experience. Bringing it home can often
benefit settlement negotiations.837

Begin early and be persistent. Cynthia Thomas Calvert, who provides
support to plaintiffs’ employment lawyers in cases involving family
responsibilities discrimination through the WorkLife Law Attorney Network,
has a lot of experience in helping plaintiffs’ lawyers educate judges and
opposing counsel on common patterns of bias against mothers.838 “You can’t
assume that the judge will understand. You need to begin the process of
educating judges by mentioning the bias patterns in the complaint, and in a
motion to dismiss if one is filed.”839 Bias evidence also is obviously relevant in
the defense’s nigh-inevitable motion for summary judgment, as discussed
above.840 “It is also great in closing arguments,” she continued, “where it is
important to relate the case to the everyday experience of the jury.”841 The
materials above discussing mainstream media and popular culture references to
each of the five patterns should prove helpful in talking with juries.

834. Interview with Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Senior Advisor to WorkLife Law (Jan. 28, 2020).
835. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
836. E-mail from Cynthia Calvert, Senior Advisor to WorkLife Law, to Joan C. Williams, Distinguished
Professor of L., Univ. of California, Hastings Coll. of L. (Jan. 28, 2020, 12:01 PM) (on file with authors).
837. E-mail from Jennifer Schwartz, Partner at Outten & Golden LLC, to Joan C. Williams, Distinguished
Professor of L., Univ. of California, Hastings Coll. of L. (Feb. 2, 2020, 9:41 PM) (on file with authors).
838. Plaintiffs’ employment lawyers who wish to inquire about joining the WorkLife Law Attorney
Network should consult the WorkLife Law webpage. Attorney-Network Application, WORKLIFE LAW,
https://worklifelaw.org/projects/attorney-network-application/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
839. Interview with Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Senior Advisor to WorkLife Law (Jan. 28, 2020).
840. See supra Part II.
841. Interview with Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Senior Advisor to WorkLife Law (Jan. 28, 2020).
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CONCLUSION: MERITOCRACY GONE AWRY
In an important and insightful article, Katie R. Eyer points out that
plaintiffs’ low success rate in employment discrimination cases predates socalled second generation discrimination. 842 She attributes that low success rate
to Americans’ deep belief in meritocracy, which makes many Americans
resistant to acknowledging discrimination.843 Eyer herself despairs of
antidiscrimination statutes as an approach to workers’ empowerment, and argues
instead for general workers’ rights statutes such as Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA).844 We draw a different conclusion from her impressive analysis:
perhaps the key to winning a Title VII suit is to describe precisely how, in the
plaintiff’s case, the meritocracy ideal was subverted. The five-patterns model
can do that by describing in very concrete ways how plaintiffs’ treatment thwarts
meritocracy.
Eyer’s article joins a long string of articles that point to low win rates,
sometimes overlooking the fact that (according to Wendy Parker’s careful study)
two-thirds of cases settle.845 Commentators sometimes appear to forget that
plaintiffs’ employment discrimination lawyers typically support themselves
through settlements, interspersed with only occasional trials.846
Settlements occur in the shadow of the law,847 so it matters whether
plaintiffs’ lawyers are telling stories that would convince a reasonable jury. The
central insight we take from Eyer is that plaintiffs need to tell stories of
meritocracy gone awry. Five-patterns data allow them to do so by pinpointing
the very concrete ways that women and people of color are disadvantaged
through normal workplace interactions: by being held to higher standards than
white men to gain promotions or be seen as having promise; by being criticized
for personality traits that are tolerated or praised in white men; by losing access
to good work after they have children; by being pitted against members of their
own group due to differences in assimilation strategies.
To highlight how different this is from the implicit bias consensus
approach, consider the testimony by IAT-inventor Anthony Greenwald in Jones
v. National Council of Young Men’s Christian Associations.848 In that case,
Greenwald testified “that bias or stereotypes—and particularly unconscious bias
against African Americans, which is widely present in the population—poses
greater risk of manifesting itself in conjunction with subjective criteria.”849 The

842. Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law,
96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1287 (2012).
843. Id. at 1279.
844. Id. at 1341.
845. Parker, supra note 588, at 912.
846. Telephone Interview with Jennifer Schwartz, Partner, Outten & Golden LLP (Jan. 28, 2020);
Telephone Interview with Rachel Dempsey, Associate, Outten & Golden LLP (Mar. 16, 2020).
847. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979).
848. Jones v. Nat’l Council of Young Men’s Christian Ass’ns, 34 F. Supp. 3d 896, 899 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
849. Id.
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judge, an Obama appointee,850 rejected this classic social framework testimony
on the grounds that “Dr. Greenwald’s opinions do not fit: they are (so far as his
report suggests, anyway) derived solely from laboratory testing that does not
remotely approximate the conditions that apply in this case.”851 The court was
troubled that the IAT involved “people who spontaneously react to virtual
strangers in laboratory settings,” not what people do when making “deliberate
business decisions in the workplace.”852
WES data confirm that, alas, the same stereotypes and bias that have been
documented by forty years of lab studies do, in fact, appear in “deliberate
business decisions.” Using evidence of the five patterns of bias can help
empower plaintiffs to show how widespread ideals of meritocracy have been
subverted in a specific case—or an entire institution.

850. Kathryn A. Kelly, Judicial Profile: John J. Tharp, Jr., ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N (June 2013),
https://www.isba.org/sections/federalcivilpractice/newsletter/2013/06/judicialprofilejohnjtharpjr.
851. Jones, 34 F. Supp. 3d at 900.
852. See id.

November 2020]

BEYOND IMPLICIT BIAS

451

APPENDIX A
Here are some useful questions to help lawyers ensure that they have
uncovered all available evidence of bias from plaintiffs in Title VII race and
gender cases.
B. PROVE-IT-AGAIN
Numbers that are potentially useful include whether women take longer to
get promoted than men and whether base pay, pay raises, or bonuses are lower
for women than men. It is also useful to look for a pattern of polarized
evaluations, where a few women superstars get very high evaluations, while
most women get very low evaluations. Another pattern is where positive
feedback about men translates into high ratings, but positive feedback about
women does not.853
In a class case with performance evaluation data, assess whether they are
judging men and women on the same criteria. Also look for the “halo/horns
effect,” where one success or strength is generalized into an overall positive
assessment for men but not for women, or where one mistake or weakness is
generalized into an overall negative assessment for women but not for men.854
Along the same lines, are men more likely to be seen as having promise than
women?855
Investigating Prove-It-Again bias first entails investigating whether ingroup favoritism has affected the hiring and/or advancement of women or people
of color. If a company hires based on internal referrals, see if they have records
about who has been hired based on internal referrals, and see if there’s a
demographic pattern.
Does your company hire people based on internal referrals?
In some workplaces, it’s really important in order to be promoted to have
a sponsor—a sponsor is a mentor who is willing to spend their political capital
to help your career. Is that true in your workplace? If so, are men more likely to
have sponsors than women?
In some workplaces, it’s really important to be part of a tight little in-group
in order to get promoted or get access to good work. Is that true in your
workplace? If so, why is it important?
Other questions to tease out Prove-It-Again bias:
Have you had to prove yourself more—to get a job, get promoted, get a
raise or a bonus, in order to get high-quality work—than your male colleagues
with similar education and experience?856

853. Monica Biernat, M. J. Tocci & Joan C. Williams, The Language of Performance Evaluations: GenderBased Shifts in Content and Consistency of Judgment, 3 SOC. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI. 186, 190–91 (2012).
854. See generally Rosenburg et al., supra note 133; Thorndike, supra 132.
855. Daniel Storage, Tessa E. S. Charlesworth, Mahzarin R. Banaji & Andrei Cimpian, Adults and Children
Implicitly Associate Brilliance with Men More Than Women, 90 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. (2020).
856. Depending on a variety of factors, the comparison can be drawn with men in general, or white men in
particular for all of the Prove-It-Again questions.
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Have you been told you have to do one thing for promotion—but then when
you do that one thing, another is added (on and on and on) in a way that doesn’t
happen to men?
Do white men get promoted or get other work benefits based on their
promise or potential, or based on the assumption that they will pick up what they
need to know after they have the job or promotion—while you have to show you
have met every requirement before you get the job, promotion, etc.?
Are objective rules and requirements applied leniently to white men but
rigidly to everyone else?857 (This is such a broad and important category; followup questions may well be needed.)
Has your work been hyper-scrutinized, more so than is the case for men
(or white men)?
Is a credential more valued when white men have it?
Are your mistakes or oversights more likely to be noticed and remembered,
or more likely to come back to haunt them, than men’s are? Has this happened
to you?
Do other people regularly get credit for ideas you originally offered?
Have your successes and accomplishments been written off (for example,
as “just luck”) or overlooked in a way that doesn’t happen to white men (or
white people)?
Have you had to prove yourself more—to get a job, get promoted, get a
raise or a bonus, or high-quality work—than your white (or white male)
colleagues with similar education and experience?858
Have you been told you have to do one thing for promotion—but then when
you do that one thing, another is added (on and on and on) in a way that doesn’t
happen to white colleagues (or white men)?
Do white men (or white people) get promoted or get other work benefits
based on their promise or potential, or based on the assumption that they will
pick up what they need to know after they have the job or promotion—while you
have to show you have met every requirement before you get the job, promotion,
etc.?
Are objective rules and requirements applied leniently to white peoples (or
white men) but rigidly to everyone else?859 (This is such a broad and important
category; follow-up questions may well be needed.)
Has your work been hyper-scrutinized, more so than is the case for white
men (or white people)?
Is a credential more valued when white people (or white men) have it?

857. “He didn’t do the planner, and wasn’t dinged for it. She was.” Interview with Jocelyn Larkin, Executive
Director, Impact Fund (Nov. 13, 2019) (on file with authors).
858. See supra note 856 and accompanying text.
859. “He didn’t do the planner, and wasn’t dinged for it. She was. . . . If a guy didn’t achieve his goal, it was
overlooked. If a woman didn’t, it was not.” Interview with Jocelyn Larkin, Executive Director, Impact Fund
(Nov. 13, 2019) (on file with authors).
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Are people of color’s mistakes or oversights more likely to be noticed and
remembered, or more likely to come back to haunt them, than white peoples’ (or
white men’s) are? Has this happened to you?
Do other people regularly get credit for ideas you originally offered?
Have your successes and accomplishments been written off (for example,
as “just luck”) or overlooked in a way that doesn’t happen to white people (or
white men)?
Do you sometimes feel that you can’t afford to make a single mistake?
Does your workplace hire only people of color with elite degrees, but white
people from a broader range of schools?
Have your accomplishments and/or credentials been written off on the
grounds that you’re “just an affirmative action hire”?
B. TIGHTROPE
1. Gender & Race
Have you ever been faulted for being too self-confident or too assertive in
ways that are readily accepted from (men, white people, white men)?
Have you received comments about your personality on your performance
evaluations?
Have you gotten pushback for giving critical feedback of a type readily
accepted from (men, white people, white men)?
Have people ever sent the message, overtly or covertly, that they wanted
you to be supportive and nice, rather than rigorous and demanding, whereas
(men, white people, white men) can just “go for it”?
Have you ever been penalized for showing anger in ways that are readily
accepted from (men, white people, white men)?
Have you ever been penalized for sharing your accomplishments and
successes in ways that are readily accepted from (men, white people, white
men)?
Have you felt wary about sharing your accomplishments and successes,
although the (men, white people, white men) do that all the time?
Do you feel like you are expected to be uncomplaining “worker bees” who
do not demand the limelight, but support those who do? Do you feel that other
(women, people of color) are?
If there is a way to track assignments, look for patterns in who gets careerenhancing work. Some useful questions:
Are there any key times when (men, white people, white, men) have been
given a chance to shine before the higher-ups that women are not—perhaps men
are more likely to be promoted as a result?
Are (men, white people, white, men) been given more of a chance to
develop skills required for promotion than you and other members of your group
have?
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Are (men, white people, white, men) given better access to careerenhancing work, or given access to it earlier in their careers, than you and
members of your group have gotten?
2. Race
Have you ever been called words like “difficult,” “aggressive,” “a poor
communicator,” or sent messages that assertive behavior accepted in (white
people or white men) is inappropriate in you?
Have people interpreted your behavior as “angry,” “emotional,” or “out
of control,” when they would readily accept similar behavior from (white people
or men)?
Have people interpreted your behavior as angry when you weren’t angry
at all—you were just having a business disagreement?
Do you feel like you (and members of your group) are expected to be
uncomplaining “worker bees” who do not demand the limelight, but support
those who do?
Have you gotten pushback for giving critical feedback of a type readily
accepted from (white people or white men)?
3. Gender
Have you ever been called words like “bossy,” “difficult,” “strident,”
“aggressive,” “too tough,” “sharp elbows,” “a poor communicator,” or told
to be nicer when you are behaving in ways that are readily accepted from men
(or white men)? If the client is a woman of color, also ask if she has been called
“feisty,” “fiery,” “sassy,” or a “dragon lady.”
Have people you supervise expected you to be the ever-supportive office
mom rather than the boss who insists on quality work?
Have you ever felt pressures to behave in feminine ways—to be the
peacemaker, or the office mom who takes care of everyone around her, or the
dutiful daughter who aligns with a powerful man but never threatens him? Are
the same things expected of men?
At your workplace, do women do more of the office housework? Have you
done more than your colleagues? This includes literal housework like ordering
the lunch, cleaning up the room after a meeting, or being expected to plan
parties and get signatures on birthday cards.
Are women in your workplace (and are you) more likely to be given
administrative tasks than men, such as being expected to take notes of the
meeting, find a time everyone can meet, or send follow-up email?
Are women in your workplace (and are you) more likely to be expected to
take care of other people’s emotions or personal and professional development
in ways men aren’t, such as being the peacemaker, or doing the mentoring, or
running the summer program, or the like?
Are women in your workplace (and are you) more likely to be under
pressures to do the back-office or undervalued tasks, while men are seen as a
better fit for the glamour work—career-enhancing tasks?
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C. MATERNAL WALL
1. Gender
First, some numbers to be crunched:
Do women’s pay or promotions fall when they get pregnant, return from
maternity leave, or ask for workplace flexibility (job sharing, part time, flex time,
telecommuting, etc.)?
Are women pressured to go part time even when they are working the same
number of hours as men who are full time? (This can mean that women are
working longer hours for the same pay.)
Here are additional questions for mothers.
Did your work get hyper-scrutinized after you got pregnant, returned from
leave, or asked for workplace flexibility? Were you criticized for things men are
rarely criticized for?
Did men get a pass for things you did not get a pass for?
Were you assumed to be less competent, less productive, or less committed
because you are a mother?
Were you deprived of opportunities or shifts that might have led to a
promotion, higher pay, or other benefits because people at work assumed that,
as a mother or a wife, you would not want them?
Were you deprived of opportunities that required you to move your family
that might have led to a promotion, higher pay, or other benefits because people
at work assumed that, as a mother or a wife, you would not want them?860
Were you pressured to go part time after you had children?
Did or do people keep assuming that you won’t return to work after you
had children (even if you have never given any signal or made a statement to
that effect)?
Are women told that they are not getting hired, getting raises, or getting
paid as much, because their husbands, fiancés, or boyfriends are, or should be,
supporting them or that men are being paid more because “he has a family to
support”?861
If you asked for an accommodation for pregnancy or breastfeeding, has
anyone else been given a similar accommodation for other reasons?
2. Race
The Center for WorkLife Law has run a hotline for twenty years for
workers who encounter discrimination based on family responsibilities. We
regularly hear from women of color who have been denied workplace
accommodations that are routinely offered to white women.

860. See Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004). “Sometimes managers made assumptions
that women with a number of children or husband were not interested in a more important job because they
couldn’t move.” Interview with Jocelyn Larkin, Executive Director, Impact Fund (Nov. 13, 2019) (on file with
authors).
861. Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838, 845 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
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Have you been denied or penalized for asking for accommodations like
leaves or workplace flexibility that are readily offered to white women?
D. TUG OF WAR
1. Gender
Do some women hold each other to higher standards because “that’s what
it takes to succeed here as a person of color”?
Do women undercut each other by criticizing each other for being too
masculine or too feminine (in clothing, voice, manner, etc.)?
Do women undercut each other for taking too much time off to be with
children—or too little?
Do some women join the boys’ club, aligning with men against other
women?
In your workplace, is there room for only one woman on certain teams or
high-profile committees? If so, do women feel the need to compete with each
other to get that one position? Has this affected you?
Do you get the same level of support from support staff as the men in your
environment do?
2. Race
Do some people of color hold each other to higher standards because
“that’s what it takes to succeed here as a person of color?
Do people of color fault each other for acting “too white” or “not white
enough”?
In your workplace, is there room for only one person of color on certain
teams or high-profile committees? If so, do people of color feel the need to
compete with each other to get that one position? Has this affected you?
Do you get the same level of support from support staff as your colleagues?
E. RACIAL STEREOTYPES (NOT OTHERWISE MENTIONED)
1. For Black Individuals
Have you been criticized for talking loudly when you were just speaking in
a normal tone of voice, or for dominating the conversation, when you were
contributing no more than other people were?
Has your behavior been treated as threatening when you were just
behaving in ways other people behave all the time?
Have you ever been treated with the kind of disrespect not typically shown
to others in your workplace?
2. For People of Asian Descent
Have you been criticized for being “passive”?
Do colleagues assume you will, or should, work more, or do more with less,
than is expected of your colleagues?

November 2020]

BEYOND IMPLICIT BIAS

457

Do colleagues hold you to higher standards when it comes to technical
work on the assumption that people of Asian descent are naturally good at
technical work?
Do colleagues assume you are good at technical work but that you lack
social skills or leadership potential?
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APPENDIX B
The Workplace Experiences Survey is a ten-minute survey designed to
examine the way bias plays out in the workplace. The current Article discusses
five studies conducted with the workplace experiences survey. Each study
involved participants filling out the workplace experiences survey for their
current or most recent workplace. The populations and sample sizes of each
study were as follows:
• Women STEM Science Professors – 550
• U.S. Engineers – 3093
• Indian Engineers – 693
• Lawyers – 2827
• Architects – 1346
• Cross-Industry Sample 1 – 823
• Cross-Industry Sample 2 – 1616

Throughout this Article we highlight graphs, quotes, and findings from
these studies. This data can also be found in the original reports for the first
three studies. Reports on the two cross-industry studies are forthcoming.
Survey participants for industry surveys were recruited through partner
organizations using email list serves as follows:
• Women STEM Science Professors were recruited through the Association for
Women in Science.
• Engineers were recruited through the Society of Women Engineers.
• Lawyers were recruited through the American Bar Association’s Commission
on Women in the Profession and the Minority Corporate Counsel Association.
• Architects were recruited through the American Institute of Architects

The cross-industry samples were recruited differently:
• Cross-Industry Sample 1 was recruited using a combination of social media,
targeted emails, a link on our website, and word of mouth.
• Cross-Industry Sample 2 was recruited using Cint, a paid participant pool.
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APPENDIX C
The Workplace Experiences Survey also contains data on workplace
processes. Our research shows that white men tend to report more fair workplace
processes across a variety of systems.
B. HIRING
In a biased workplace, differential treatment of gender and racial groups
begins with the hiring process. Our data on lawyers support this: white men
reported that their organizations’ hiring systems were unbiased at a rate more
than twenty percentage points higher than women of color, with men of color
and white women falling in between.862

White women have an easier time than other women when it comes to some
workplace processes: Black women report having more difficulty in the hiring
process than white women.863

862. WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE, supra note 100, at 45.
863. Data on file with authors. See supra notes 169–172 and accompanying text.
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B. MENTORSHIP
Mentorship can be a crucial factor in career advancement, but there can
also be gender and racial disparities that make it easier for some groups to get
ahead than others. In our data from lawyers, white men reported having good
mentors at a level higher than women and people of color.864

864. WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN ’T SEE, supra note 100, at 45.
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Similarly, white men reported access to networking opportunities at a
higher rate than women and people of color in our study of engineers.865

C. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS
Although performance evaluations are supposed to be objective measures
of performance, they are subject to the types of bias we have documented over
and over again. In our studies of lawyers, women and people of color reported
receiving constructive feedback on their performance evaluations at a level
lower than white men.866

865. WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 128.
866. WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN ’T SEE, supra note 100, at 53.
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D. PROMOTIONS
In order to get more women and people of color at the top of organizations,
it is essential to promote them. Data from our survey on engineers shows that
white men report fair opportunities for advancement at a level higher than
women and people of color.867

867. WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 128.

November 2020]

BEYOND IMPLICIT BIAS

463

Black women and women of Asian descent also report less fairness in the
promotions process than white women.868

E. COMPENSATION
Compensation is an area in which women and people of color have long
struggled to reach equality with white men. Data from both our studies on
engineers and lawyers indicate that individuals in these fields are noticing a pay
gap in their own jobs.869

868. Data on file with authors. See supra notes 169–172 and accompanying text.
869. WILLIAMS ET AL., CLIMATE CONTROL, supra note 100, at 128; WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE
WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE, supra note 100, at 57–61.
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The disparity between the reports of white men and women of color in our
study of lawyers is particularly large: over thirty percentage points between
white men and women of color.870

870. WILLIAMS ET AL., YOU CAN’T CHANGE WHAT YOU CAN’T SEE, supra note 100, at 58.

